Category: Euro-Atlantic

Race for Germany’s Next Fighter Jet Ends in Compromise

It seems that the race between Airbus’ Eurofighter Typhoon and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F SuperHornet for replacing Germany’s aging Tornado fleet will end in a draw. According to German media reports, Berlin…

It seems that the race between Airbus’ Eurofighter Typhoon and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F SuperHornet for replacing Germany’s aging Tornado fleet will end in a draw. According to German media reports, Berlin plans to acquire both airframes. The acquisition of both jets would be a compromise to protect the interests of the European defense industry and preserve the nuclear certification of the German Air Force. The German Defense Ministry has not dismissed the report but stated that the defense minister is yet to make an official decision. 

If the compromise comes to pass, the German Air Force (or “Luftwaffe” in German) will receive at least 78 and up to 90 Eurofighter Typhoons. The American part of the deal will include a mix of approximately 30 F/A-18E/F SuperHornet and 15 E/A-18G Growler aircraft. The Luftwaffe needs the E/A-18G Growler to maintain its capability to conduct electronic attack (EA) and suppression of enemy air defense missions and the F/A-18E/F SuperHornet for nuclear certification after the retirement of the Cold War veteran Tornado. However,  the two-fighter procurement plan could surge logistics and maintenance costs for the Luftwaffe in the long run. 



In early 2019, Germany ruled out the F-35A fifth-generation multi-role stealth fighter for replacing the obsolete Tornado fleet. Most NATO countries (United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland) are preferring the F-35A as their fighter jet for the next decades. The German armed forces were also reportedly pushing for getting the F-35. However, the German government has openly favored an upgraded Eurofighter Typhoon for commercial reasons. Airbus, the Eurofighter Typhoon producer is a joint French-German-Spanish venture, and the governments want to deepen their cooperation in the defense industry. 

The decision for the Eurofighter Typhoon seemed to be a “done deal,” until German officials received information from the Pentagon about the timeframe for certifying the Eurofighter to carry nuclear weapons, according to DefenseNews. Getting the Eurofighter approved would take between three and five years longer than the F/A-18, which qualifies for nuclear strike missions. 

Maintaining the Luftwaffe’s nuclear-delivery capability is key to Germany’s commitment to the NATO nuclear-burden sharing framework. This means that in case of war, German pilots will also equip their aircraft with American B-61 thermonuclear weapons and conduct airstrikes on enemy positions. 

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Royal Air Force Intercepts Russian Aircraft Three Times in Six Days

The British Royal Air Force (RAF) Quick Reaction Alert-North (QRA) from Lossiemouth scrambled three times in the past week to intercept Russian military aircraft transiting the United Kingdom’s flight information…

The British Royal Air Force (RAF) Quick Reaction Alert-North (QRA) from Lossiemouth scrambled three times in the past week to intercept Russian military aircraft transiting the United Kingdom’s flight information region (FIR). The British QRAs, often done in partnership with regional allies, are coordinated by the Combined Air Operations Centre (COAC) based in Uedem, Germany. COAC-Uedem acts as NATO‘s Command and Control hub for the northern air policing area. 

During their transits through the UK’s FIR, the Russian aircraft buzzed the flight corridors used by civilian airliners to enter and depart British airspace. The RAF jets, typically two or three Eurofighter Typhoons, activated their transponders to make themselves visible to air traffic controllers (ACT) while shadowing the Russian “visitors.” This allowed the ACT authorities to see where the uncooperating planes are and de-conflict the airspace accordingly. At times ACT had to divert commercial flights to mitigate the risk of collision with the “incognito” Russian aerial formation. 

Russian military activity in the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap has increased exponentially in the past years in terms of training exercises, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sorties and maritime surveillance missions. The GIUK gap is very important for Russia to move its nuclear-capable submarines and ASW aircraft in and out of the North Atlantic in case of war. To better understand the enemy order of battle and tactics in the region, the Russian are deliberately testing the RAF and NATO’s overall QRA reaction (time and tactics) while also monitoring maritime movements. 

FIRST INTERCEPTION

The first interception this week took place on 8 March 2020, when a composite formation of Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) and Russian Navy (RuN) buzzed both the Norwegian and the British FIRs. The Russian composite formation consisted of one Tu-142 MK ASW and maritime patrol aircraft (AISC/NATO Reporting name: Bear-F), one Tu-142MR/M submarine communications relay variant (Bear-J), and one MiG-31 (Foxhound) operated by the RuAF.

The Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) scrambled first and deployed two F-16AM fighter jets, which conducted an initial visual identification of the Russian aircraft formation, and (for the first time) two F-35A stealth multirole fighters. When the two Bear’s continued their flight further down over the North Sea, two RAF Eurofighter Typhoons intercepted them. 

The Tu-142s are the maritime variant of the notorious Tu-95 strategic bombers and were built to hunt NATO submarines. The Russians were likely collecting intelligence on the NATO naval buildup in Norway for the multinational exercise “Cold Response” as well as communicating with submerged platforms.



SECOND INTERCEPTION

RAF Lossiemouth dispatched two QRA Typhoons to intercept and shadow two Russian Tu-142 (Bear-F) aircraft as they approached the UK’s area of interest on 11 March 2020. The British Typhoons intercepted the Russian “Bears” west of the Shetland islands, inside the UK’s FIR, and shadowed them south towards Ireland. French aircraft took over QRA duty for the airspace until the Bay of Biscay, where the Bears returned north and were again intercepted by the RAF jets. 

THIRD INTERCEPTION

RAF Lossiemouth scrambled three QRA Typhoons to intercept and shadow two Russian Tu-160 long-range strategic bombers (“Blackjack”) on 12 March 2020. The flight path and pattern was identical to the one from the day before.

SECURING THE SKIES TRANSPARENTLY

The RAF Lossiemouth QRA team proved that it can secure British and NATO skies at a moment’s notice 24/7 and 365 days per year. However, thanks to its social media and communications team, RAF Lossiemouth demonstrated how a military operation can be done efficiently and transparently.  

The RAF Lossiemouth has actively engaged with the public through its Facebook and Twitter accounts, explaining why and how the interceptions were conducted, sharing photos from the QRA scrambles and even publishing ADS-B/ Mode-S tracking codes so that enthusiasts can track their aircraft using flight trackers.

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NATO to Hold Emergency Article 4 Meeting After Deadly Attack on Turkish Forces in Idlib

NATO’s decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), will meet on Friday (28 February 2020), following a request by Turkey to hold consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty…

NATO’s decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), will meet on Friday (28 February 2020), following a request by Turkey to hold consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty on the situation in Syria. Under article 4 of the Treaty, any Ally can request consultations whenever, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.

WHAT HAPPENED? 

A pro-government attack killed 33 Turkish soldiers in northwestern Syria last night. The attack took place in the village of Balyun (Idlib province), where the Turkish military had diverted to hold the frontline against the advancing pro-government forces (e.g. Syrian Arab Army, Iranian-backed Shiite militias and the Russian Aerospace Forces and advisors). Initially, only 9 casualties were reported, but the death toll spiked overnight to over 30 KIA. Turkey was only able to evacuate the wounded by land, as Russia reportedly refused to deconflict the airspace for Turkish helicopters. 

WHO CONDUCTED THE ATTACK?

Ankara identified “regime forces” as being behind the mass-casualty attack, although there is reason to believe that the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) bombed the Turkish military position. Ever since Turkey demonstrated a willingness to use MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense systems) in Idlib earlier this month, when it shot down two Mi-17 Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) helicopters, Damascus grounded its helicopter fleet. This left Russia as the only force engaged in air operations over Idlib. While some of the few SyAAF fighter jets are still air-worthy (one MIG-23 “Flogger” was recently spotted airborne) they have limited capability to conduct precision airstrikes at night (e.g. small to no inventory of thermal/ infrared-targeting pods). 

The Kremlin, however, claims the Turkish forces were hit by Syrian artillery shelling and that Turkey had not informed Russia in advance about their recent movements. Moscow’s’ claims are difficult to believe as both the Russian and Turkish command centers are keeping tabs 24/7 on each other through drones, satellite imagery, and other ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) assets. Russia has also been aware of the recent Turkish troop surge in southern Idlib and even targeted a Turkish military convoy in the area several days ago. Russia is also using small unmanned aerial systems to direct Syrian artillery on Turkish and opposition forces.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said that the Turkish re-positioning has been pre-coordinated with Russia and that even ambulances came under fire during the medical evacuation. 

TURKISH RETALIATION

The Turkish military released a video showing that it executed a series of UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) strikes against pro-government positions and vehicles in retaliation for the attack. 

CAN TURKEY INVOKE ARTICLE 5? 

Almost certainly not. As Article 6 stipulates: “the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

  • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey or the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
  • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

Article 5 is the cornerstone of NATO and states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members. Article 5 cannot be used to draw collective military support for extraterritorial operations or wars-by-proxy. 

WHAT WILL ARTICLE 4 BRING? 

Article 4 meetings usually result in political support from the other 28 members and possibly a largely defensive military support package. Ankara has previously used Article 4 at least three times to request NATO augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities. This time, however, the Turkish government will likely pressure its allies to provide more support. President Erdogan has recently threatened to allow the millions of refugees that were forced to the border by the pro-government offensive, to flee for Europe. 


FOR CONTEXT

The pro-government camp and the Turkish-backed opposition groups (National Front for Liberation/NFL) are both on the offensive in Idlib. With Turkish artillery and limited air support, the NFL has recaptured Nayrab and Saraqib on the M5 highway- positions that it lost less than a month ago (see Facebook post). 

After capturing the M5 highway, the pro-government camp reshuffled its forces to south-central Idlib province, where it aims to dislodge the Opposition forces from the M4 highway section linking Latakia province to Saraqib city.

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Russian, American Satellites Play Cat-and-Mouse in Space

The United States Space Force confirmed that two Russian “inspector” satellites have stalked a U.S. spy satellite in the low-Earth orbit (LEO), in the past weeks. The American satellite, known…

The United States Space Force confirmed that two Russian “inspector” satellites have stalked a U.S. spy satellite in the low-Earth orbit (LEO), in the past weeks. The American satellite, known as “USA 245”, is one of the highly-secretive and advanced KH-11 Block IV geospatial intelligence spacecraft. Built by Lockheed Martin as part of the U.S. “Keyhole” program, the KH-11 uses a 2.4 diameter prime mirror, which enables ultrahigh-resolution of 15 cm (objects that are minimum this size can be seen on satellite photos). The KH-11 satellites are operated by National Reconnaissance Office.

A KH-11 satellite was likely the GEOINT platform that photographed Iran’s failed space launch in August 2019 (photo in the post). President Donald J. Trump later tweeted the photo. In addition to its high-end electro-optical digital imaging, KH-11 satellites can be tasked with certain ELINT missions. 

COSMOS 2542 AND 2543 

The Russians claim that their sensors, named “Cosmos 2542” and “Cosmos 2543” are in space to conduct maintenance inspections of other Russian satellites. However, Russia has been lying about its space operation ever since it placed the satellites into orbit on November 26, 2019. Initially, Moscow only announced Cosmos 2542 as being launched into space. But after two weeks of orbiting, Cosmos 2542 literally “birthed” a second, smaller satellite (Cosmos 2543). The two satellites then approached USA 245 instead of drifting away as Cosmos 2542 usually did. 

A visual timeline of the Cosmos-2452 launch on November 25, 2019, via RussianSpaceWeb.com

UNUSUAL ORBITAL ACTIVITY

Between January 20 and 23, the Russian spacecraft essentially matched orbits with the American spy satellite. The distance between the Russian and American parties was fluctuating from 150 to 300 km. The Russian satellites traversed a clever orbit that allowed them to inspect the KH-11 from multiple angles while keeping the American satellite in sunlight for most of the time. This put the KH-11 in perfect light and distance for the Russian spacecraft to photograph the American satellite and in particular, its high-tech lenses. 

Credits for the discovery and orbital activity analysis goes to geospatial expert @M_R_Thompson who’s close observation of the three spacecraft made it to OSINT circles since January. 

DIRECT/ SOFT KILL PRACTICE?

The unusual behavior of the two Russian satellites suggests that they were either attacking, simulating an attack, or collecting intelligence on the American spacecraft. Many agree that the Kremlin would have gained little from photographing the KH-11’s optics. This opens up the possibility that the Russian satellite duo was practicing an attack on USA 245. The simulated attack could have been either direct – donating near the target – or through soft-kill techniques. For example, the Russian satellites could have deployed low-energy lasers or chemical sprayers to blind USA 245’s camera lens and therefore render it useless. High-frequency microwaves or radiofrequency jammers could have also been used to disrupt the KH-11’s function. 

Types of anti-satellite attacks via the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

NEED FOR U.S. SPACE FORCE, BIGGER THAN EVER

Situations like this underline the importance of the newly established and independent U.S. Space Force. As opposed to Russia and China, the U.S. military is heavily dependent on the orbital “high-ground” to command, control and execute operations in case of war. With the threat of Chinese and Russian anti-satellite capabilities growing at a rapid pace, Washington took the U.S. Space Command from the Air Force and transformed it into a separate service. Given the plethora of American intelligence collection, communications, early warning, and missile defense satellites, the U.S will only benefit from having a platform dedicated to safeguarding these assets.



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Poland Signs Contract for Dozens of F-35A Stealth Fighters

The Polish government has signed a contract with Lockheed Martin to buy 32 F-35A stealth multirole fighter jets for the Polish Air Force, on January 31, 2020. The contract is…

The Polish government has signed a contract with Lockheed Martin to buy 32 F-35A stealth multirole fighter jets for the Polish Air Force, on January 31, 2020. The contract is estimated to be worth  $4.6 billion, making it the biggest military purchase in the country’s history. The first F-35As are expected to arrive in Poland in 2026. 

The groundbreaking purchase makes Poland the first Central and Eastern European country country to acquire the fifth generation aircraft. Warsaw joins the exclusive club of current or future F-35 operators, that includes six NATO members (United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark), Japan, Australia, Singapore and the Republic of Korea. 


REPLACING OLD SOVIET AIRCRAFT

The American defense contractor will deliver the latest configuration (Block 4) of the F-35’s Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) version. The Block 4 features an expanded missile capacity, from four to six internally carried missiles, improved sensors and data-link, and advanced computing power. The Polish Air Force (PoAF) will use the F-35s to replace the Soviet-era legacy Su-22 fighter-bombers  (NATO Reporting name: “Fitter”) and MiG-29 air superiority jets (“Fulcrum), and will serve alongside its existing fleet of 48 F-16s. 

ENHANCING POLISH AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES

With the F-35 in service, the PoAF will posses a top-of-the-line air defense capability and striking platform. Poland will enjoy unmatched interoperability in joint force and Coalition operations. In addition to national air policing, the F-35A will enable Poland to conduct Destruction/ Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (D/SEAD), Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and to prosecute targets defended by enemy anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) “bubbles.” 

STEALTH

The F-35 is known for its low-observability (or stealth), sensor fusion, increased situational awareness and integrated electronic warfare system, but also for its production delays and constant software patches. Born from the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the F-35 was designed as a jack-of-all-trade platform to satisfy the operational requirements of the three major U.S. military branches. As the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have different needs and operational doctrines, the JSF’s initial requirements mutated in the compromise and more economical formula we have today. However, the one element that remained universally embraced was stealth. 

Contrary to widespread misperception, stealth is not invisibility. Rather, stealth gives the F-35 the ability to elude or greatly complicate an enemy’s ability to find and destroy an aircraft using a combination of tactics and technology. In general, stealth is the ability to evade detection by radar, infrared sensors or emission interception. Stealth provides greater survivability and access, allowing aircraft to operate in contested A2/AD environments, that legacy fighters simply cannot penetrate or evade. 



An integrated airframe design, advanced radar-absorbing materials, low-probability of intercept sensors and other features maximize the F-35’s stealth features. This allows the F-35 to defeat upper band radars (X- and Ku-bands) that are used by air defense systems for SAM engagement control. The aircraft performs less effective against early-warning and acquisition radars operating in the lower bands (UHV/ VHF), however these sensors are unable to provide engagement guidance , and can only “paint” a vague picture of threat. 

REAL TEST AFTER 2026

With the F-35 purchase, Poland sets an example for the other NATO militaries that are still struggling to transition from the defunct Warsaw Pact model. However, the real test begins after 2026 when the PoAF will have to undertake the exhausting task of absorbing the F-35 fleet into operational use and keep its combat readiness rate high. Another Herculean challenge will be to provide constant maintenance to the “needy” platform, in the form of software patches, logistical support infrastructure, weapons integration, LO coating maintenance and other aspects.

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Serbia to receive Russian-made Pantsir-S1 Air Defense Systems in late February

Russia’s delivery of Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (NATO Reporting name: SA-22 “Greyhound”) to Serbia will commence in late February this year. The first shipment is rumored to consist of…

Russia’s delivery of Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (NATO Reporting name: SA-22 “Greyhound”) to Serbia will commence in late February this year. The first shipment is rumored to consist of six Pantsir-S1 batteries.

The Pantsir-S1 is a road-mobile self-propelled SAM system designed to provide point air defense air defense against precision-guided attacks from short-to-medium range and low altitudes. The Pantsir’s main armament is the 57E6/E short-range SAM, which can engage targets at a range of 12 to 20 km and altitudes varying from 5 to 15 km. The Pantsir can carry a maximum of 12 SAMs. As a secondary capability, the battery is equipped with two 30mm twin-barrel cannons. The Pantsir’s sensor package consists of a target detection and designation radar, target and missile tracking radar, and electro-optical sensor systems.

CONTROVERSIAL COMBAT PERFORMANCE

Russia advertises the Pantsir as being a highly resilient air defense system against enemy anti-radiation missiles and drones, however, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has repeatedly overwhelmed and destroyed Pantsir batteries operated by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) in the past years. A Russian report also revealed that the Pantsir performed poorly in its role to defend the Russian 555th Khmeimim Air Base (Syra) against small consumer drones launched by the Syrian armed opposition groups. This forced Russia to deploy additional assets such as the Tor-M2 to reinforce its defenses after a drone attack damaged multiple aircraft in January, 2018. 

SLAVIC SHIELD 2019

Serbian President Alexandar Vucic first announced that Belgrad had ordered the Pantsir SAM systems during a visit at “Slavic Shield 2019,” on October 24, 2019. As the first exercise between the Serbian Air Defense Units and the Russian Aerospace Forces, Slavic Shield 2019 deepened joint force interoperability and served as a technology demonstrator for Belgrade. During the event, Russia airlifted a multi-layered and diverse package of SAM systems to Milenko Pavlović Air Base in Batajnica (Serbia), including a S-400 SAM system (SA-21 “Growler) and several Pantsir-S1 batteries. This allowed Serbian military officials to inspect the equipment and simulate integration into Belgrad’s air defense network. In addition to the Pantsir, President Vucinic expressed interest in the S-400, but clarified that Serbia cannot afford the system.

Serbia President Vucic at “Slavic Shield 2019” Photo: Damirir Banda, MC Odbrana

Although Belgrad has repeatedly named Russia as it main defense partner and source of military donations, an official booklet of the Serbian Ministry of Defense shows that Serbia’s main military donor is the United States. Serbia received $10 million in military assistance from the U.S. in equipment and money between 2014 and 2018. Second on the donor list is China, which has donated around € 5.2 million, followed by Norway with € 586,000, Denmark with € 494,860 and the UK with £ 169,000, respectively.

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The Drone-Type that Killed Gen. Soleimani, Now in Romania

The United States Air Force (USAF) will deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to the 71st Air Base in Campia Turzii (Cluj county), Romania. The mission, starting in January 2020, has been…

The United States Air Force (USAF) will deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to the 71st Air Base in Campia Turzii (Cluj county), Romania. The mission, starting in January 2020, has been fully coordinated with the Romanian government. Directed by the U.S. European Command’s air component, the deployment serves to promote stability and security within the region, and to strengthen relationships with NATO allies and other European partners. The MQ-9 Reapers have been previously deployed to the 71st AB in July 2019, when they were temporarily re-positioned from their traditional staging area in Poland.

The U.S. Air Force built this hangar, which could house manned or unmanned aircraft, at Campia Turzii from October 2017 to May 2018. Documents obtained by Defense News show plans to build a hangar to accommodate medium-altitude, long-endurance drones like the MQ-9. (Valerie Insinna/ Defense News)

The U.S. Department of Defense has invested over $3 million in the modernisation of Romania’s 71st AB in the past two years. Part of the infrastructure upgrade package was the construction of a $950,000 hangar that is able to house medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones such as the MQ-9 and support drone operations. 

The MQ-9 Reaper is one of the most advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) ever built. As a multi-role platform, the MQ-9 can perform a variety of missions, including intelligence, reconnaissance, target-aquisition and surveillance (ISTAR), ground attack, close air support (CAS), and combat search and rescue. 

While the Reaper is most known for its kinetic strikes against terrorist leaders (including IRGC-QF Gen. Soleimani on January 3) and other high-value targets, the drone is a very effective ISR/ ISTAR asset. The MQ-9’s endurance is 30 hours when conducting ISR sorties, with decreases to 14 to 23 hours (depending on the loadout) when carrying weapons. The Reaper has a 1,850 km range (1,000 nmi; 1,150 mi) and an operational ceiling of 15,000 meters (50,000 ft). It’s sensor suite includes a syntethic aperture radar and infrared forward-looking infrared, which can stream live footage at views ranging from 19mm to 560mm. 

During its stay in Romania, the MQ-9 will likely be tasked with gathering intelligence on enemy intentions and capabilities in the region. The Black Sea will be a main focus of its ISR mission, where the UAV will monitor the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) for nefarious activity, force buildup and forward deployments. The collection of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) on Russia’s BSF activities is not only important for NATO’s Eastern flank, but also for monitoring Moscow’s force deployment to Syria. The ports of Sevastopol and Novorossysk are Russia’s main logistics bases supporting expeditionary operations in Syria, and are periodically sealifting capabilities to Tartus (Syria). 

In addition to the Black Sea, the MQ-9 will likely also fly over Eastern Ukraine. American UAVs were frequently spotted on ADS-B receivers loitering over the frontline in Donbas and Luhansk, monitoring for enemy activity (e.g. ceasefire violations, Russian supplies, tactical movements). 



When used as a striking platform, the Reaper can field a “cocktail” of weapons systems such as the GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb, AIM-9 “Sidewinder” air-to-air missile, GBU-38 with JDAM, and the more famous AGM-114 “Hellfire” air-to-surface missile. Due to its armament, the UAV can target and destroy light infantry, surface vessels and armored tanks. 

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CIA Declassifies Records About the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March…

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March 1990. The collection represents much of the Agency’s short-term analysis of events unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as popular opposition to Soviet misrule erupted and quickly surpassed anything the Communist regimes were prepared to understand or to which they could respond. The material also represents a major source of information and insight for US policymakers into what was happening in these countries, where they were heading, and which implications the collapse of Communist rule in Europe and the beginnings of the breakup of the Soviet Union had for Europe and the United States.

The CCEE refers to a series of demonstrations and revolutions that ended the Soviet-imposed Communist rule in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, and paved the way for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The CCEE also marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War between the Western liberal democracies and the Soviet Union and its satellites (Warsaw Pact). 

The newly declassified intelligence demonstrates the accuracy of the Agency’s collection and analysis of the events unfolding in the padlocked CEE states. Despite the large volume of materials released, this is only a fraction of the CIA’s reporting on the CCEE. 

After going through the more than 100 documents, we can draw the following conclusions: 

  • Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) collected by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was the backbone of the NDIs. 
  • The developments in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania drew extra attention from Washington due to their specific geopolitical importance.
  • East Germany was the main “frontline” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a particular issue of concern for West Germany, a key US ally in the region. If the Communist regime in Berlin was to fall, the Agency was confident that re-unification with Bonn was a strong possibility.

Germans stand on top of the Wall in front of Brandenburg Gate in the days before it was torn down.

  • In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which experienced the mildest revolutions, over 135,000 Soviet Army troops were stationed. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from CEE would have significantly altered the balance of power in Europe in NATO’s favor. The three countries were also the fastest to enact unprecedented constitutional amendments and legislation in support of economic reform. 
  • Despite being affected by the domino effect of anti-Communist uprisings, Romania was seen as the Bloc’s last holdout due to the Ceausescu regime’s violent crackdown on protests. Not only was the Ceausescu regime strongly entrenched, but it also sought external support from other rogue regimes – particularly North Korea, Iran and Libya – to escape international isolation. Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country whose citizens overthrew the Communist regime violently. 
  • The CIA did not only extensively cover the Romanian revolution, but it also issued periodic situation reports and net estimates. One of the many valid assessments of the Agency analysts was that sustained violence against demonstrators would result in an alliance between the Romanian Armed Forces and disgruntled Communist officials (such as Ceausescu’s successor, Ion Iliescu, who was identified as a potential supporter in the CIA analyses) against Ceausescu and his family. 

December 1989: Thousands of Romanians rallied in front the the Communist Party’s politburo in Bucharest.

  • The Western Balkans were sparsely featured in the NDI dump. However, the risk of prolonged conflict as an effect of the CCEE was judged to be the highest in this region. The CIA feared that Albania would become a “second Romania” due to the regime’s opposition to change, while Yugoslavia was believed to be on the brink of collapse, leaving behind a mosaic of inter-ethnic armored conflicts. 
  • The CIA was confident that the Kremlin, paralized and weak, would not risk everything by launching punitive actions to suppress the revolutions that were overthrowing its “satellite” regimes in the Warsaw Pact. One analysis even observed how Lithuanian and Baltic nationalists were capitalizing on the Kremlin’s weakness by “pushing towards de facto independence, as a prelude for outright separation”.
  • The CIA was concerned that expectations among CEE populations were dangerously high. In the Special Analysis “Long Road Ahead to Economic Well-Being”, the Agency argued that the benefits of economic transition from a command economy to a free market system was a long-term game with few immediate positive effects. The Agency certainly remained open to the possibility that disenfranchised workers could stage counter-revolutions. 
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Turkey to Send UAVs to Northern Cyprus Base, Expanding ‘Mediterranean Ops’

Amid Ankara’s continued hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will allow the Turkish Air Force (TAF) to fly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from…

Amid Ankara’s continued hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will allow the Turkish Air Force (TAF) to fly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Gecitkale airport, Turkish Cypriot officials announced on Friday. 

Geckitale Airport was opened in 1986 and is located 25 km inland from the TRNC capital and coast city of Famagusta/ Gazimagusa. Turkey developed Geckitale Airport as both an alternative to the TRNC’s main airport (Ercan) and as major, NATO-standardized air base. While Geckitale served only briefly as a commercial airport, it saw intense military activity. During the renewed tensions with Greece in the 1990s, Turkey forward-deployed F-16s to Geckitale. Following privatisation in 2012, Geckitale is only opened to VIP, charter and military flights. 

AN ENERGY SECURITY DISPUTE

The move to open Geckitale to Turkish UAVs comes at a time of rising tensions between Turkey, on the side, and Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, on the other, over the demarcation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Eastern Medtierranean. Over recent years, Greece, Cyprus and Israel have discovered offshore gas fields in their EEZs. The trio, supported by the United States, signed an intergovernmental agreement to pursue a common pipeline project, in March 2019. Known as the “EastMed,” the project envisions an undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriote natural gas to the European Union via Greece. The European Commission has designated the EastMed pipeline as a “Project of Interest.”



Turkey, who hasn’t found any hydrocarbons in indisputably Turkish waters, sees the EastMed project as a threat to its status as an energy transit country and to the TRNC’s maritime rights. Turkey is the only member of the United Nations that does not recognize Cyprus, and is not a signatory of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. As a result, the Turkish view on maritime disputes is that no island, including Cyprus, can have a full EEZ. Ankara therefore either claims parts of the Cypriote offshore hydrocarbons or demands that the internationally-recognized Government in Nicosia shares its exclusive resources with the TRNC. 

Turkish efforts to contest and redraw the map of the Eastern Mediterranean are far more advanced. On November 28, Ankara signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), outlining their maritime boundaries. In accordance to the Turkish view on maritime boundaries, the agreement deprives the Greek islands of Kastellorizo, Karpathos, Kasos and Crete of an EEZ. This surged tensions with Greece but also with Israel and Egypt, which are spearheading a diplomatic offensive against Ankara. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the agreement would also allow Turkey to carry out drilling on Libya’s continental shelf with Tripoli’s approval.



UNILATERAL TURKISH DRILLINGS TO SPARK MILITARY TENSIONS

The Turkish Government ignored international criticism and authorized Turkish Petroleum to conduct drillings off Cyprus’ east and west coasts. Two Turkish drilling vessels – “Fatih” and “Yavus” – alongside “Oruc Reis” and “Barbaros Hayrettin Pasa” seismic vessels have been searching for oil and gas in the past five months. UAVs deployed from Dalaman Airport in southwestern Turkey have previously provided overwatch for the surface group. Turkish Navy and Coast Guard vessels – including Barbados- and G-class frigates – have also escorted Fatih and Yavus throughout their explorations. 


The Turkish Navy intercepted “Bat Galim”, an Israeli research ship belonging to the Oceanographic and Limnological Research Institute, in Cypriote waters two weeks ago. The Bat Galim was conducting research in coordination with the Cypriote government when the Turkish warships forced it to leave. In response, the Israeli Air Force and Navy staged a major military exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean involving F-15I “Ra’am”, F-16I “Sufa” and F-35I “Adir” fighter jets, two days ago. 

GECIKTALE AIRPORT: FASTER ISR DEPLOYMENTS, LONGER LOITER TIME

Tensions are expected to rise as Turkey will enforce its maritime claims and safeguard its commercial drilling operations, while Israel, Greece and Egypt will attempt to contest the Turkish and Libyan (GNA) objectives. With the permission to use Geciktale in effect, the Turkish UAVs – likely Bayraktar 2-TB – will have a shorter flight-path to its objective and enjoy a longer loiter time. This translates into increased situational awareness over the drilling operations and better response time to Greek or Israeli actions.

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Turkey’s S-400 “Growler” Goes Operational Near Ankara

Turkey’s newly acquired S-400 air defense system (NATO Reporting name SA-21 Growler) is now operational at Mürted Akinci airfield, an Israeli geospatial company claims.  Satellite imagery, which was shared by…

Turkey’s newly acquired S-400 air defense system (NATO Reporting name SA-21 Growler) is now operational at Mürted Akinci airfield, an Israeli geospatial company claims. 

Satellite imagery, which was shared by ImageSatIntel (iSi) on Twitter, shows the S-400 battery components in an operational configuration on the airfield tarmac. According to iSi’s analysis, three tractor erector launchers (TELs) are deployed erected, but unarmed, near the S-400’s 92N63 “Gravestone” engagement radar. The 96L6E “Cheese board” early warning and acquisition radar is located less than 100 meters south near an auxiliary vehicle parking area. The S-400’s second 91N6E “Big Bird” acquisition radar was spotted further south. 

The first S-400 battalion set was delivered to Turkey on Friday, July 12, 2019. Russian heavy lifters transported the air defense components directly to Mürted Akinci, an airfield 35 km northwest of Ankara. The rest of Ankara’s 2.5 billion order will be shipped in three installments until the end of the year. The S-400 will likely be permanently stationed near Ankara to provide long-range area air defense for Turkey’s capital. 

Engagement range of Turkey’s first S-400 deployment (T-Intelligence)

What’s the deal with the S-400?

Despite harsh criticism on the part of NATO, Turkey went through with the controversial S-400 purchase from Russia. In response, the United States removed Turkish defense companies from the Joint Strike Fighter program and halted the sale of the F-35 to Ankara. The NATO allies fear that the S-400’s radars may register the F-35’s very low observable (VLO) radar cross section, if Turkey is allowed to field both systems. Russia could then collect this critical intelligence through clandestine means such as malware.

At the moment, Turkey is seriously considering Russian fighter jets as an alternative to the F-35. Last weekend, Turkish President Erdogan met his Russian counterpart at MAKS, an aerospace technology exhibition near Moscow. The two presidents inspected Sukhoi’s recent export-version of the Su-57 stealth multirole fighter (Su-57E). 

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