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Cold War 2.0 Euro-Atlantic Ex-Soviet

Flashpoint Snake Island: Why Russia Wanted the “Rock” in the Black Sea

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Snake Island, or Serpents Island (Ostriv Zmiinyi in Ukrainian; Insula Serpilor in Romanian) is an islet off Ukraine’s southwestern coast and near the Danube Delta in the Black Sea. With…

Snake Island, or Serpents Island (Ostriv Zmiinyi in Ukrainian; Insula Serpilor in Romanian) is an islet off Ukraine’s southwestern coast and near the Danube Delta in the Black Sea. With a surface of 17 ha, the islet became a major flashpoint between the Ukrainian Operational Command-South and the Russian Navy, following the Russian seizure of Snake Island on 24 February 2022. Persistent Ukrainian counterstrikes forced Russia to retreat on 30 June 2022, ending a 127-day occupation. Following Ukraine’s victory, many have questioned the military and political value of the bitterly contested island. Our analysis seeks to shed light on Snake Island’s multilayered significance in the Black Sea and Odesa theaters of operations. 

KEY JUDGEMENTS 

I. Occupied in the opening hours of the invasion on 24 February 2022, Snake Island held, and still holds, kaleidoscopic importance for Moscow’s objectives in southwestern Ukraine and the Black Sea, including against NATO. Snake Island’s significance spans across all three levels of war – tactical, operational, and strategic – and serves three goal lengths, as follows: 

A.Short-term: Support the Odesa Offensive and Anti-Shipping Mission. 

  • Secure the seaway to the Ukrainian shoreline in preparation for Russia’s planned amphibious assault on Odesa- part of the failed Operational Direction-Southwest (OD-SW). 
  • Seize key maritime terrain to support the interdiction of the Odesa-Bosphorus shipping lanes and subsequent blockade of Ukraine’s port. 

B. Medium-term: Become a thorn in NATO’s Southeastern Flank. 

  • Establish a SIGINT listening station (COMINT and ELINT included) to monitor NATO activities in SE Romania. 
  • Expand offensive potential: kinetic effectors and electronic warfare (EW) systems. 

C. Long-term: Seize lucrative offshore gas platforms located in NATO member Romania’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 

  • Contest and claim parts of Romania’s EEZ, which has an estimated potential of 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The XIII Pelican, EX-27 Muridava, and EX-28 EST Cobalcescu concessions are likely targets. The development of the Black Sea gas fields would make Romania the European Union’s biggest natural gas producer and, inherently, a competitor to Russian gas. 
  • Russia has similarly captured all energy-rich parts of Ukraine’s EEZ since “little green men” annexed Crimea in 2014. Extending into new reserves aligns with Russia’s plans to assert military and economic dominance over the Black Sea.

II. Ukraine’s constant barrage of missile and artillery strikes successfully extirpated the Russian presence on Snake lsland. Bayraktar TB-2 combat drones conducted at least ten kinetic operations and were involved in a number of ISR and fire control taskings. The R-360 Neptune and Harpoon anti-ship missiles (AshMs) also played a key role, countering the Russian Navy’s sea-lines-of-communications (SLOC) and sinking at least six vessels, including the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) flagship Moskva. At least one manned aircraft strike was recorded and featured a low-altitude bombing by a pair of Su-27s (AFIC/NATO Reporting name: Flanker). Artillery systems such as the homegrown 2S22 Bohdana were responsible for putting the last nail in Russia’s coffin, decimating the man-made infrastructure on the island until the occupiers were left with no physical cover. 

III. It is imperative that Russia does not re-capture Snake Island, even at the cost of the island becoming “no man’s land .” At the time of writing, Snake Island is in limbo – vacated by the Russians, re-claimed by Ukraine, but not yet re-garrisoned. Even if Ukraine does not create an outpost on the island, keeping the key maritime terrain from Russia’s hands is enough to deny Moscow’s original objectives. 

Change detection analysis of Snake Island pre-invasion (Google Earth imagery from 2016) and post-withdrawal of Russian forces (30 June 2022). Imagery credits: Maxar Technologies; annotated by T-Intelligence.

SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES: ODESA OFFENSIVE AND ANTI-SHIPPING MISSION

SECURE SEAWAY FOR ODESA OFFENSIVE a.k.a OD SW

1. Russia seized Snake Island from Ukrainian forces to secure the SLOC in preparation for an amphibious assault on Odesa- part of the Odesa offensive, designated Operational Direction Southwest (OD-SW). A Russian Navy (RuN) surface action group led by the now-sunk Slava-class Moskva was in charge of the operation, which took place in the early hours of February 24. Immediately after the takeover, Russian marines garrisoned the island to deny key maritime terrain to Ukraine and exploit its tactical-operational value.

2. Russia started to turn Snake Island into an expeditionary outpost in support of the maritime component of OD-SW. Russian forces had anchored patrol boats near the island and, also pressed by Ukrainian air strikes, deployed short-range air defenses (SHORAD). In addition, Snake Island could have been used to base forward arming and refueling points (FARP) to boost sortie rate and repetition during air-naval attacks on Odesa and naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 

3. The collapse of OD-SW in the steppes of Kherson operationally “orphaned” Snake Island. Ukraine’s Operational Command-South (OC-S) defeated the Russian Southern Military District (MD) grouping at Mykolaiv and Voznezensk and drove the invaders down to Kherson city in mid-March 2022.

Assessed Russian OD-SW map, reprinted from “Target Transnistria: Russia’s Maskirovka and Pathways to Escalation (Threatcast)” (T-intelligence)

4. Russia’s follow-on plans for Snake Island largely depended on capturing the Odesian littoral. Russian control of the shoreline would have secured Snake Island from land-based threats. But with OD-SW in shambles and the Odesian coast still under Ukrainian control, the Russian garrison on Snake Island became a fixed, vulnerable target. The new situation likely prompted Sevastopol commanders to effect a cost-benefit analysis of abandoning versus defending the island, with the top brass opting for the latter. As Ukraine’s OC-S started lashing back with air, artillery, and anti-ship missile strikes at Snake Island, the Russian forces were forced on the defensive. 

Sevastopol’s attempt at holding Snake Island despite the terrain entering a state of tactical limbo indicates operational stubbornness, continued interest in the Odesa offensive as a later option, and commitment to longer-term political objectives. The latter point rendered Snake Island a politically-charged issue, which most likely influenced Sevastopol’s decision to stay. 

TOLLBOOTH TO INTERDICT MARITIME SHIPPING

6. The secondary objective of Russia’s designs on Snake Island was to augment the BSF in interdicting the shipping lanes to and from Ukraine. Part of this plan was to deploy land-based anti-ship missiles, coastal surveillance radars, and naval ISR assets on Snake Island. There were also indications of plans to base fast patrol craft out of the island. While BSF warships and naval aviation are primarily conducting the anti-shipping mission, a sensor-effector pair on Snake Island could have provided an additional layer to Russia’s maritime construct.

Annotated screenshot of MarineTraffic.com density map (T-Intelligence). As the map shows, Snake Island overlooks the main trade artery in the western half of the Black Sea.

7. Snake Island never got to contribute to the anti-shipping mission as the Russian occupants were busy surviving Ukraine’s constant barrage of missile and artillery strikes. Based on open-source reporting, Ukraine conducted at least 16 separate attacks on Russian positions between March and late June. Bayraktar TB-2s initially spearheaded ten kinetic operations and were involved in a number of ISR and fire control taskings. The R-360 Neptune and Harpoon anti-ship missiles (AshMs) also played a key role, countering the RuN’s SLOCs, and sinking at least six vessels, including the BSF flagship Moskva. At least one manned aircraft strike was recorded and featured a low-altitude bombing by a pair of Su-27s (AFIC/NATO Reporting name: Flanker)

Artillery systems such as the homegrown 2S22 Bohdana were responsible for putting the last nail in Russia’s coffin, decimating the man-made infrastructure on the island until the occupiers were left with no physical cover. 

8. In response to Ukraine’s hammering, Sevastopol rushed 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher), Pantsir S-1 (SA-22 Greyhound), and Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet) SHORADs along with ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft (AA) guns to the island, but with little effect. Ukraine destroyed most of the AA guns and SHORADs, especially the first batches of Strelas. With just 17 ha to rove around to escape Ukrainian targeting, the SHORADs were likely more offline than active and therefore suppressed. 

9. The loss of Snake Island had little effect on Russia’s anti-shipping mission, which continues to be spearheaded by BSF surface action groups and naval aviation. Ukraine’s increasingly diverse and lethal coastal artillery and multi-rocket launcher systems (MLRS), often paired with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have re-shaped the BSF’s risk assessment. Early signs indicate that Russian vessels are now forced to operate at arm’s length from the Ukrainian littoral. 

MEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVES: LISTENING STATION AND OFFENSIVE POSTURE

LISTENING STATION

10. Left unchecked, the Russian occupation could have filled Snake Island with antennas, direction-finders, and other technical equipment to collect Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) on key military facilities in NATO member Romania’s southeast (SE). Just 40 km from Romania, the unrealized Snake Island listening station would have likely pointed its antennas at Mihail Kogalniceanu and Fetești air bases and command & control (C2) nodes to collect Communications Intelligence (COMINT). Electronic intelligence (ELINT) would have been an equally valuable objective, with specialized equipment attempting to collect, analyze and classify Romanian and NATO radar emissions to paint what is known as EOD, or electronic order of battle. An EOD typically contains the location of radars, frequencies, and operating bands used by said radars, emission signatures, etc. 

11. Russia had already deployed some SIGINT equipment to Snake Island, according to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council (RNBO) Oleksii Danilov. The same source says that Russia already leveraged Snake Island’s position to monitor communications in Odesa province and Transnistria – read more about the breakaway region in our recent threatcast. 

ENHANCED OFFENSIVE POSTURE

12. It is likely that Russia would have also sought to expand the island’s offensive potential with the deployment of a few but suitable systems in time. MLRS could have been a likely candidate to build up the island’s offensive posture, providing an attritable but effective firing solution. The BM-30 Smerch, with its assortment of 300mm rockets and warheads, can strike areas 90 km away. More high-end systems such as the K-300P Bastion (SS-C-5 Stooge) could have also been considered. Packing a double-punch against land targets and ships 300 km away, Bastion is uniquely suited for coastal-based engagements. However, the island’s small and complex surface would have posed a continuous limitation regarding build-up potential (i.e., number of systems) and system survivability (limited shoot-and-scoot).

13. Besides kinetic effectors, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems would have been some other logical candidates for beefing up Russia’s offensive posture. Examples are the Krashuka, 1L22M Avtobaza-M, and Repellent-1. With a powerful electronic attack (EA) capability, Russia’s EW systems can jam communications, navigation systems such as GPS, and drone down/up-links, to ranges in excess of 250 km. Some systems like the Krashuka-4 can even jam spy satellites in the Low-Earth orbit (LEO). Russian EW systems have been present in Ukraine since the early days of the invasion, with some being captured and destroyed by Ukrainian forces. 

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE: BLACK SEA ENERGY THEFT

14. The Kremlin’s long-term goal was, and likely still is, to leverage Snake Island’s position to contest Romania’s energy-rich exclusive economic zone (EZZ), which holds an estimated 200 billion cubic meters of gas. We assess with a high degree of confidence that Russia would have rejected the 2009 Hague ruling on the Ukrainian-Romanian Snake Island dispute. 

ICoJ litigation maps. Left shows the Romanian vs Ukrainian claims / Right shows the ICoJ agreed maritime boundary between the Romanian and Ukrainian EEZs (All rights reserved ICoJ 2009)

Key Background: In 2004, the Romanian government asked the Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on the maritime boundary between Ukraine and Romania. The decision depended on whether the ICJ defined Snake Island as an island, part of Ukraine’s continental shelf, or an islet (i.e., “a rock” in Romania’s terms). In 2009, the ICJ ruled that Snake Island was too far from the seashore (Odesa) and small to constitute a benchmark in setting boundaries. The ICJ ruling satisfied 80 percent of Romania’s claims over the continental shelf and placed 9,700 square kilometers of waters under Bucharest’s control.  

15. Russian claims over Romania’s EEZ are difficult to threatcast but would most likely include at least the gas fields closest to Snake Island: 

  • XIII Pelican: gas potential confirmed (discovery wells are yet to be appraised). Black Sea Oil & Gas (BSOG), which is owned by Carlyle International Energy Partners and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, holds the majority package to XIII Pelican.
  • EX-27 Muridava: gas potential confirmed and estimated at 169 billion cubic feet. British company Petroceltic holds the majority package. 
  • EX-28 Nicolae Colbacescu: gas potential confirmed and estimated at 404 billion cubic feet. Muriadava and Colbacescu are underexplored and believed to hold more oil and gas deposits. Estimates for the two concessions are extracted from the 2013 Petroceltic annual results presentation and could be dated. 

Gas concessions in Romania’s and Bulgaria’s EEZ (all rights reserved IHS Markit). Snake Island is seen as a small dot north of the XIII-Pelican concessions.

Key Background: The development of the Black Sea gas fields would make Romania the European Union’s biggest natural gas producer, according to the Oil and Gas Employers Federation (FPPG). Romania would not only become self-sufficient* but also compete in the natural gas market with Russia. Romania currently imports less than most European Union members (nearly 21 percent). 

16. The most likely course of action would have been for RuN warships to ascertain de facto control over the targeted gas fields and escort Russian drillships to start exploitation. Sevastopol can profit from the Romanian Navy’s inability to police its waters following decades of underinvestment. From a political standpoint, the Kremlin would most likely leverage the grey zone nature of EZZs in the context of NATO’s Article 5. EEZs do not constitute territorial waters, and disputes over offshore energy deposits exist even within the Alliance (e.g., Turkey-Greece). However, Russia will probably tread lightly and probe NATO unity and Western European/North American commitment to the Black Sea states. 

17. Due to the Montreaux Convention, NATO cannot establish a permanent, large-scale naval presence in the Black Sea. However, NATO assists Romania (and Bulgaria) through periodic port visits by individual warships or joint fleet units called NATO Standing Maritime Groups. NATO Enhanced Air Policing is another means to protect Romanian interests in the Black Sea, especially if the fighter units are also outfitted for anti-shipping. Despite continuous Allied support, local allies must do the heavy lifting through defense procurement to be able to police their territorial waters and EZZs. 

18. Russia took over all energy-rich parts of Ukraine’s EEZ in a similar manner since “little green men” annexed Crimea in 2014. The Tavrida gas platforms, nearly 10 km east of the Snake Island, are one of the most forward-positioned offshore energy platforms that Russia has stolen from Ukraine. Ukraine recently hit the Tavrida gas platforms with two AshMs. Extending into new reserves aligns with Russia’s plans to assert military and economic dominance over the Black Sea.

19. Russia can still deter Bucharest from extracting gas from the Black Sea and attack (overt or cover) Romanian offshore energy infrastructure and drillships. RuN Spetsnaz units, subordinated to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GU), are uniquely qualified to conduct deniable attacks against drillships, offshore platforms used for housing and logistics, and oil rigs. Russian warships can stage shows of force and engage in a slate of other intimidation tactics, for example, exercises with subsequent notice to mariners/airmen (NORAM/NOTAM) that cover parts of Romania’s EEZ. If such provocations continue, Russia may discourage foreign investments in Romania’s offshore gas fields and prevent drilling activities completely. 

20. Russian warships have already shadowed Romanian gas platforms in June 2022, telegraphing a not-so-veiled reminder of Moscow’s ambitions in the Black Sea. It is imperative that Russia does not re-capture the island at any given time. Even if Ukraine does not establish an outpost on the island, keeping the key maritime terrain from Russia’s hands is enough to prevent Moscow from achieving its medium to long-term objectives in the western Black Sea. Snake Island is a fitting example of how even a tiny Russian land grab has far-reaching implications for Euro-Atlantic security. 

by HARM

This assessment was made using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques and resources. Visit Knowmad OSINT to learn more about our online OSINT training. 

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Euro-Atlantic News

The Drone-Type that Killed Gen. Soleimani, Now in Romania

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The United States Air Force (USAF) will deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to the 71st Air Base in Campia Turzii (Cluj county), Romania. The mission, starting in January 2020, has been…

The United States Air Force (USAF) will deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to the 71st Air Base in Campia Turzii (Cluj county), Romania. The mission, starting in January 2020, has been fully coordinated with the Romanian government. Directed by the U.S. European Command’s air component, the deployment serves to promote stability and security within the region, and to strengthen relationships with NATO allies and other European partners. The MQ-9 Reapers have been previously deployed to the 71st AB in July 2019, when they were temporarily re-positioned from their traditional staging area in Poland.

The U.S. Air Force built this hangar, which could house manned or unmanned aircraft, at Campia Turzii from October 2017 to May 2018. Documents obtained by Defense News show plans to build a hangar to accommodate medium-altitude, long-endurance drones like the MQ-9. (Valerie Insinna/ Defense News)

The U.S. Department of Defense has invested over $3 million in the modernisation of Romania’s 71st AB in the past two years. Part of the infrastructure upgrade package was the construction of a $950,000 hangar that is able to house medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones such as the MQ-9 and support drone operations. 

The MQ-9 Reaper is one of the most advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) ever built. As a multi-role platform, the MQ-9 can perform a variety of missions, including intelligence, reconnaissance, target-aquisition and surveillance (ISTAR), ground attack, close air support (CAS), and combat search and rescue. 

While the Reaper is most known for its kinetic strikes against terrorist leaders (including IRGC-QF Gen. Soleimani on January 3) and other high-value targets, the drone is a very effective ISR/ ISTAR asset. The MQ-9’s endurance is 30 hours when conducting ISR sorties, with decreases to 14 to 23 hours (depending on the loadout) when carrying weapons. The Reaper has a 1,850 km range (1,000 nmi; 1,150 mi) and an operational ceiling of 15,000 meters (50,000 ft). It’s sensor suite includes a syntethic aperture radar and infrared forward-looking infrared, which can stream live footage at views ranging from 19mm to 560mm. 

During its stay in Romania, the MQ-9 will likely be tasked with gathering intelligence on enemy intentions and capabilities in the region. The Black Sea will be a main focus of its ISR mission, where the UAV will monitor the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) for nefarious activity, force buildup and forward deployments. The collection of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) on Russia’s BSF activities is not only important for NATO’s Eastern flank, but also for monitoring Moscow’s force deployment to Syria. The ports of Sevastopol and Novorossysk are Russia’s main logistics bases supporting expeditionary operations in Syria, and are periodically sealifting capabilities to Tartus (Syria). 

In addition to the Black Sea, the MQ-9 will likely also fly over Eastern Ukraine. American UAVs were frequently spotted on ADS-B receivers loitering over the frontline in Donbas and Luhansk, monitoring for enemy activity (e.g. ceasefire violations, Russian supplies, tactical movements). 



When used as a striking platform, the Reaper can field a “cocktail” of weapons systems such as the GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb, AIM-9 “Sidewinder” air-to-air missile, GBU-38 with JDAM, and the more famous AGM-114 “Hellfire” air-to-surface missile. Due to its armament, the UAV can target and destroy light infantry, surface vessels and armored tanks. 

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Euro-Atlantic News

CIA Declassifies Records About the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

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The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March…

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March 1990. The collection represents much of the Agency’s short-term analysis of events unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as popular opposition to Soviet misrule erupted and quickly surpassed anything the Communist regimes were prepared to understand or to which they could respond. The material also represents a major source of information and insight for US policymakers into what was happening in these countries, where they were heading, and which implications the collapse of Communist rule in Europe and the beginnings of the breakup of the Soviet Union had for Europe and the United States.

The CCEE refers to a series of demonstrations and revolutions that ended the Soviet-imposed Communist rule in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, and paved the way for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The CCEE also marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War between the Western liberal democracies and the Soviet Union and its satellites (Warsaw Pact). 

The newly declassified intelligence demonstrates the accuracy of the Agency’s collection and analysis of the events unfolding in the padlocked CEE states. Despite the large volume of materials released, this is only a fraction of the CIA’s reporting on the CCEE. 

After going through the more than 100 documents, we can draw the following conclusions: 

  • Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) collected by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was the backbone of the NDIs. 
  • The developments in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania drew extra attention from Washington due to their specific geopolitical importance.
  • East Germany was the main “frontline” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a particular issue of concern for West Germany, a key US ally in the region. If the Communist regime in Berlin was to fall, the Agency was confident that re-unification with Bonn was a strong possibility.

Germans stand on top of the Wall in front of Brandenburg Gate in the days before it was torn down.

  • In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which experienced the mildest revolutions, over 135,000 Soviet Army troops were stationed. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from CEE would have significantly altered the balance of power in Europe in NATO’s favor. The three countries were also the fastest to enact unprecedented constitutional amendments and legislation in support of economic reform. 
  • Despite being affected by the domino effect of anti-Communist uprisings, Romania was seen as the Bloc’s last holdout due to the Ceausescu regime’s violent crackdown on protests. Not only was the Ceausescu regime strongly entrenched, but it also sought external support from other rogue regimes – particularly North Korea, Iran and Libya – to escape international isolation. Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country whose citizens overthrew the Communist regime violently. 
  • The CIA did not only extensively cover the Romanian revolution, but it also issued periodic situation reports and net estimates. One of the many valid assessments of the Agency analysts was that sustained violence against demonstrators would result in an alliance between the Romanian Armed Forces and disgruntled Communist officials (such as Ceausescu’s successor, Ion Iliescu, who was identified as a potential supporter in the CIA analyses) against Ceausescu and his family. 

December 1989: Thousands of Romanians rallied in front the the Communist Party’s politburo in Bucharest.

  • The Western Balkans were sparsely featured in the NDI dump. However, the risk of prolonged conflict as an effect of the CCEE was judged to be the highest in this region. The CIA feared that Albania would become a “second Romania” due to the regime’s opposition to change, while Yugoslavia was believed to be on the brink of collapse, leaving behind a mosaic of inter-ethnic armored conflicts. 
  • The CIA was confident that the Kremlin, paralized and weak, would not risk everything by launching punitive actions to suppress the revolutions that were overthrowing its “satellite” regimes in the Warsaw Pact. One analysis even observed how Lithuanian and Baltic nationalists were capitalizing on the Kremlin’s weakness by “pushing towards de facto independence, as a prelude for outright separation”.
  • The CIA was concerned that expectations among CEE populations were dangerously high. In the Special Analysis “Long Road Ahead to Economic Well-Being”, the Agency argued that the benefits of economic transition from a command economy to a free market system was a long-term game with few immediate positive effects. The Agency certainly remained open to the possibility that disenfranchised workers could stage counter-revolutions. 
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Cold War 2.0 Euro-Atlantic

Airborne ISR over Transnistria Monitors Russian Drills

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A Beech 200T (BE20) Super King Air aircraft outbound from Constanta (Romania) is currently flying Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sorties near the Russia-backed separatist republic of Transnistria (Moldova). The 200T…

A Beech 200T (BE20) Super King Air aircraft outbound from Constanta (Romania) is currently flying Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sorties near the Russia-backed separatist republic of Transnistria (Moldova). The 200T variant of the twin-turboprop aircraft is configured with a surveillance radar pod and vertical photography systems for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. Based on initial observations, the BE20 calibrated its flight profile at a low-altitude of 3,000 meters and commenced with “donut rounds,” after reaching Transnistria’s northern edge. A typical BE20 low-altitude ISR mission takes approximately 5 hours. 

BE20 Flight (and 3D view) screen-grab from a public flight tracker via T-Intelligence

The ISR sortie, likely conducted by the U.S. Navy/Army, suggests significant nefarious activity on part of Russia in the breakaway Transnistria region. Russia has maintained a 1,200 troop presence in Transnistria since the 1992 conflict with the Republic of Moldova.

ASSESSMENT

The ISR is most likely collecting imagery intelligence on the recent activities of the Operational Group of the Russian Forces in Transnistria (OGRF-T). Military drills have been vaguely announced for mid-February and on February 4, the Russian Defense Ministry informed the public that the OGRF-T has finalised preparations. U.S. ISR sorties have been spotted periodically in January and almost daily between February 4 and 7.  The Russian Ministry of Defense has confirmed that the OGRF-T has conducted high-calibre firing drills from late January to February 1. The drills are part of a series of exercises organized in the Western Military District. Overall, the OGRF-T have increased their activities in Transnistria in 2017 and 2018, causing the Moldovan government push for the removal of foreign forces at the United Nations.  

By HARM and Gecko

DISCLAIMER: As the BE20 appears on flight trackers, the sortie is an intentionally public maneuver. This article has been updated.

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Cold War 2.0 Euro-Atlantic

Why Romania’s Defense Procurement Matters for NATO (and Should Worry Russia)

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In 2017, Romania initiated a visionary defence procurement program that will reinforce NATO’s Eastern flank and make the Romanian military a leading force in the Black Sea by the early 2020s….

In 2017, Romania initiated a visionary defence procurement program that will reinforce NATO’s Eastern flank and make the Romanian military a leading force in the Black Sea by the early 2020s. The $11.6 billion shopping list includes top-of-the-line products such as Raytheon’s latest Patriot air defense system. The assets are specifically tailored to counter the Russian threat in the Black Sea – namely Russia’s naval supremacy, anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and theater ballistic missiles (TBM) deployed in Crimea. While ambitious in nature, Romania’s procurement program is continuously disrupted by governmental corruption and mismanagement resulting in indefinite delays for strategic air-naval programs.  

1. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has shaken the Black Sea region from its century-long geopolitical slumber. Moscow’s military build-up in Crimea – only 400 km from the Romanian coast – has transformed the Black Sea into a substantial missile engagement and interdiction zone, placing the region at the very top of NATO’s agenda.

2. The Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) and Russian Navy (RuN) currently operate more than 15 naval and air bases in Crimea. The port of Sevastopol hosts the RuN’s 30,000 men strong Black Sea Fleet (BSF), which is responsible for operations in the Black Sea, Azov Sea and the Mediterranean.

3. Concerned about the mounting Russian presence at its doorstep, Romania has welcomed a number of strategic U.S. and NATO military installations on its soil. Over the past years, Bucharest has promised to allocate 2% of its GDP to defense in order to boost its naval warfare, missile strike and air defense capabilities. While the Romanian Ministry of National Defense (MoND) has made progress in all fields, systemic corruption and administrative inability continue to obstruct the procurement program. The naval branch remains notably exposed.

 VISUAL COMPARISON: Drag the bar left to see how Romania's defense procurement will change the regional air defense and artillery outlook

SEA COMMAND

4. Russia strives to establish naval supremacy in the Black Sea. The BSF currently consists of 47 warships and seven submarines, most of which are stationed in the strategic city-port of Sevastopol and the Novorossiysk auxiliary naval air base. While the fleet is largely outdated, around 18 new or modernized warships are expected to join the BSF by 2020.

5. Even in its current state, the Russian BSF holds strike superiority in both surface and subsurface naval warfare. All major vessels stationed in Crimea are equipped with standoff range anti-ship missiles (ASM) and anti-submarine weapons (ASW). The naval assets are supported by land-based (road-mobile, naval infantry and coastal batteries) and airborne (mostly Mi-14, Mi-24 and Su-30) ASM/ASW units. The large number and variety of surface and subsurface missiles pose an acute threat to NATO and the neighboring countries.

6. Consequently, Romania promised to prioritize naval defence procurement. The Romanian Navy’s (RoN) surface warfare capabilities will be enhanced by the acquisition of four multi-purpose corvettes, worth $2 billion, and an unspecified number of naval strike missile (NSM) coastal defense batteries. Two existing Type-22 corvettes,  the Regele Ferdinand and Regina Maria, will be modernized in the course of the same program. The corvettes are scheduled for commission between 2021 and 2023.

7. The missile type deployed on the new assets will be a decisive factor for the success of the surface warfare program. Given the BSF’s mass proliferation of supersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles (such as the 3M-14 Kalibr/ NATO reporting name: SS-N-30), the RoN’s corvettes require adequate shipborne interceptors,  high-frequency surface wave radars and a potent striking capability. The tumultuous competition was won by Naval Group’s Gowind 2500-class multimission corvettes. Armed with MDA MM40 Exocet anti-ship missiles, VL Mica ship-based SAMs, torpedos and two cannon systems, the Gowind promises a low-observability system integration. The Egyptian Navy is the only other Gowind-operator.

The Egyptian Navy future GOWIND class corvette. They will be fitted with 8x Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles, 16x VL MICA surface to air missiles (both by MBDA), Torpedoes, a 76mm main gun (Oto Melara) and 2x 20mm remote weapon stations. Image: DCNS

8. While the corvettes will be an important addition on the surface, the RoN remains critically under-equipped for subsurface warfare in the short to medium term. The MoND’s ambitious submarine program aims to build three submarines and modernize the only existing one, the Kilo-class Delfinul, which is currently used for training. However, the lack of financial resources and technological know-how render it highly unlikely that Romania will commence with the submarine program before 2026.

9. The RoN’s seaborne (surface and subsurface) capabilities will be augmented by the Romanian Air Force (RoAF), which is responsible for policing the maritime airspace. In the past years, the Romanian maritime airspace has been repeatedly violated by the Russian Aerospace Force (RuAF) - especially when the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet and NATO’s Maritime Standing Group 1 and 2 conduct semi-permanent sea patrols in the region and dock in Romanian ports.

10. As part of its multirole fighter program aimed at increasing its maritime security and air defense capabilities, Romania purchased twelve F-16 A/B Block 15 Mid Life Upgrade (MLU) Fighting Falcons from the Portuguese Air Force. The combat weapons system acquired by the MoND for the Fighting Falcons consist of 30 AIM-120 AMRAAM and 60 AIM-9M Sidewinder air to air missiles and 10 GBU-12 and 18 AGM-65H/KB Maverick ground attack ordnance. The F-16s, assigned to the 53rd Warhawks Fighter Squadron have achieved operational capability in 2018 and later assumed air policing duties over Romanian airspace in mid-March 2019. The MoND plans to increase the RoAF’s F-16 inventory with 36 newly-built airframes needed to replace its obsolete MiG-21 Lancer C (NATO reporting name: Fishbed). 

11. While the F-16 AM/MB is a suitable for boosting inter-operability and for basic mission profiles such as air policing, close air support and ground attack, it does not sufficiently threaten Russia’s Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2AD) zone in Crimea. The RoAF would have required fifth or fourth generation “plus” fighter jets or the latest block versions of the Fighting Falcon, capable of carrying anti-radiation missiles (ARM), ASM and standoff air-launched cruise missiles, in order to credibly challenge the BSF and SAM fortifications in Crimea. 

ANTI-ACCESS/ AREA DENIAL (A2AD)

12. The Russian forces in Crimea are safeguarded by a robust, multi-layered and augmented network of integrated area and point air defenses. Three Russian forces in Crimea are primarily defended by the S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) the Kremlin’s latest SAM technology. The S-400 Triumf creates an impenetrable area air defense (AAD) cover, capable of parrying multiple airborne assets, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in a 400 km radius. Furthermore, numerous S-300 (SA-20) SAM systems are scattered throughout the region, providing  an additional AAD layer. A very high, but unknown number of Pantsir S-1s (SA-22), BUKs (SA-11), 9k33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) and anti aircraft artillery (AAA) provide point air defense (PAD) for military installations, artillery batteries and SAM sites.

13. The ground-based air defenses in Crimea are supported by a layer of electronic warfare (EW) and EW-countermeasure (EWCM) systems. The Russian tip-of-the-spear EW capability is the Krasukha 2/4, which is able to jam communications, low earth orbit spy satellites, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). As EWCM, the Russians have installed radars that provide frequency diversity across the Crimean peninsula and interlink with the AAD and PAD layers.

14. A Podsolnukh over-the-horizon radar stationed on Crimea’s Southwestern coast furthermore provides early warning data, reaching as far as the Bosphorus. Supported by airborne and seaborne radars, the BSF can thus detect and - in case of war - rapidly engage adversaries entering the Black Sea.

15. In response to Russia’s A2/AD zone, Romania saw it necessary to acquire a long-range rocket artillery system capable of contesting Russian air defenses in Crimea. In order to pose a credible threat, the artillery system has to be battle-proven, technologically superior to its competitors and able to fire smart and cluster munition with a range of 400 km. As the U.S. High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) ticks all these boxes, Romania has placed a $1.5 billion order for 54 HIMARS and ammunition.

16. The HIMARS is the Pentagon’s long-range artillery of choice in the hottest conflicts. The system is currently stationed near the 38th parallel (South Korea) and the al-Tanf garrison (Syria) and is used to engage ISIS and Taliban targets in Syria and Afghanistan. After receiving its HIMARS batteries in 2019, Romania will be the first European operator of the system. The coast-based Romanian Marines Regiment will likely receive most of the HIMARS batteries, bringing the Western coast of Crimea within range.

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE (TBM) THREAT

17. According to NATO, Russia has moved the Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) nuclear-capable mobile ballistic missile system to Crimea. Two videos, which surfaced on social media in 2016, show that at least five MZKT-79306 Iskander launcher trucks and support vehicles are present in Crimea. The domestic version of the Iskander-M has a maximum range of 450 km. The system is able to bypass enemy air defense systems by releasing decoy clusters at 30G speed in the terminal phase. The agile and evasive artillery system is considered to be the most dangerous theater ballistic missile (TBM) in Russia’s arsenal.

18. With its range of 450km, the Iskander-M directly threatens Southeastern Romania, where a number of high-value U.S., NATO, and Romanian military and command structures are located:

  • The NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) for the NATO Response Force  - Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (NRF-VJTF) in Bucharest;
  • The U.S. operated Mihail Kogalniceanu air base and the Babadag, Capu Midia and Smardan training ranges;
  • The RoAF’s 86th air base in Borcea - a NATO-interoperable airfield that hosts Romania’s F-16 squadron;
  • The RoN’s command headquarters for river boat patrol (Tulcea, Braila), the corvette squadron (Mangalia) and the frigate flotilla (Constanta).

19. To counter the Russian missile-threat, Romania has ordered seven MIM-104 Patriot 3 (PAC-3) long-range SAM systems manufactured by Raytheon. The PAC-3 is the latest configuration of the Patriot system. The PAC-3 updates are based on more than 20 years of U.S. battlefield experience and feedback from 13 foreign customers. The $3.9 billion order will be delivered to the Romanian Land Forces and the RoN in 2019.

MIM-104 Patriot Launcher
by CSIS
on Sketchfab

20. The PAC-3 is highly efficient against evasive and fast-moving TBMs such as the Iskander-M and the Kalibr (in all versions). The PAC-3 batteries fire rockets equipped with Missile Segment Enhancements (MSE) to intercept and destroy enemy TBMs in their terminal phase. The MSE increases velocity, extends the flight range by 50% and has a lethality enhancer warhead to guarantee hit-to-kill performance. For now, Romania has ordered 165 MSEs for the newly acquired PAC-3 batteries.

21. The PAC-3 uses the C-band passive electronically scanned phased array AN/MPQ-65 radar, which is difficult to target for enemy anti-radiation missiles (ARM). The AN/MPQ-65 radar can track over 100 targets at high-altitude, without emitting signals that radar-homing missiles can lock on. This capability potentially discourages adversarial Suppression/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (S/DEAD) sorties.

22. The PAC-3 batteries will form an area air defense (AAD) barrier over Southeastern Romania, which will cover the highly populated and strategically important region. The PAC-3 AADs will receive short and medium-range point-area defense (PAD) from Romania’s existing SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery such as the MIM-23 Hawk and Soviet-made assets. Ultimately, the Romanian AAD- PAD bubbles will work interlinked with the U.S-operated Naval Support Facility in Deveselu (Romania) and the guided missile destroyers based in Rota (Spain) as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. Together, the PAC-3-Aegis duo will provide a reliable, multi-layered, and integrated air defense network for NATO’s Eastern flank.

by HARM and Gecko

This assessment has been updated. 

This assessment does not include the products ordered by the Romanian Land Forces (RLF).  The RLF is currently operationalizing the first 12 of the total 227 8x8 Piranha V infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) purchased from General Dynamics. Starting in 2020, the land forces will also receive 347 8x8 Agilis vehicles (armored transporter, amphibious and IFV variants) jointly produced by the Romanian Military Vehicle Systems and Rheinmetall Defense.

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A ‘Swift Response’ from the ‘Saber Guardian’: Recognizing the Strategic Importance of the Black Sea Region

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Strategic Analysis – Saber Guardian 2017 (SG17) is an annual, multinational exercise held in the Black Sea region as pat of the U.S. European Command Joint Exercise Program. This year’s…

Strategic Analysis – Saber Guardian 2017 (SG17) is an annual, multinational exercise held in the Black Sea region as pat of the U.S. European Command Joint Exercise Program. This year’s iteration took place between July 11 – 20. The exercise’s aim was to assure allies and partners of the enduring U.S. commitment to the collective defense at the Black Sea region, to enable the Alliance’s command and control functions, and to reinforce deterrence measures agreed to by NATO  allies at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. The exercise was organized by the U.S. Army Europe and co-hosted by Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, that saw numerous drills and simulations taking place all over these countries.

Approximate 25,000 troops participated in the exercise, while 14,000 of them being U.S.forces; the rest coming from member or partners countries of NATO: Armenia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, FYRO Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

Throughout this analysis we explore the Saber Guardian exercise through the ‘Swift Response’ mission that took place at the 71st ‘Emanoil Ionescu’ Air Base in the village of Luna, near Campia Turzii town, Cluj county (Romania), where Transylvania Intelligence was present obtain exclusive footage and information. Moreover, the massive military effort will later in this article be explained through the geopolitical lens as it relates to the Black Sea, as ‘Saber Guardian’ upholds its exclusive dedicated nature for this expanded region.

 

‘Swift Response’: a ‘Saber Guardian’ exercise

Swift Response is a series of airborne operations and joint force entries that functions within the framework of ‘Saber Guardian’ and took place in Papa Airbase (Hungary), Bezmer & Shabia (Bulgaria) and Campia Turzii-Luna & Cincu (Romania).

The mission that Transylvania Intelligence had the chance to assist to, took place from the 21st to the 22nd of July, 2017 in Luna, near Campia Turzii, Cluj county, Romania, at the 71st ‘Emanoil Ionescu’ Airbase of the Romanian Air Force. The employed scenario foresaw an Allied operation to attack and capture the airbase that was occupied by enemy forces. The operation involved 800 U.S. Troops from the 143rd Texas Regiment and the 2nd Cavarly Regiment, and it stretched on three main phases, the first two referring to the ‘Joint Forcible Entry’ while the last to the ‘Airfield Seizure’ objective:

1.For 3-minutes, eight AC-130’s parachuted  hardware, supplies and logistics at 11.00 A.M., July 21st on a plain-field near the Airbase. These resources were to be collected by units already on the ground and be used in the airfield seizure.

2.Later that day, a night airborne operation took place around 23.00 A.M, that saw 500 paratroopers insert the area previously used to deploy the supplies. These forces regrouped with friendly troops on the ground and used the collected logistics to prepare and later execute the main objective: ‘Airfield Seizure’

3.Around 4.00 AM, July 22nd, the joint Romanian-US force conducted a dawn raid on the airbase that lasted 4 hours and saw the capture of strategic 71st Base.

The exercise was deemed as a huge success in regards to accomplishing the planned timeline, maneuvers and tactics. This scenario was one of the vastly different and creative operations sketched throughout the ‘Saber Guardian’ framework. Other missions that enabled or took place within ‘Saber Guardian were:

  • Szentes Axe, Danube crossing in Gyor, Hungary, U.S. and Hungarian troops;
  • Olt crossing in Bordusani, Romania U.S. and Romanian troops;
  • Night crossing of Olt, Valcea, Romania, U.S. and Romanian troops;
  • Live Fire Exercise at Novo Selo training field, Bulgaria;
  • A Mass Casualty and Air Defense exercise at Mihail Kogalniceanul Airfield, Romania.

Other parallel exercises that enabled and supported ‘Saber Guardian’ as presented by the U.S. Army Europe – see the last map.

Black Sea Region: An emerging strategic vector? 

The Black Sea region has a unique tradition and history as a geopolitical entity. It was in the 18th Century when the Ottoman Empire lost its hegemony over this sea as a direct result of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) that gave the Russian Empire access to its first warm water port in the Black Sea, and the status of protector of the Orthodox Christians living under the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman-Russian rivalry is directly linked to these area , and spilled-over to the Balkans and to the Caucasus, attracting external inputs that tried to maintain a balance of power in the region, or internal elements that marched to form their own states and movements. As it was the case of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, when France and the United Kingdom intervened in favor of the Ottoman Empire in order to defeat Russia and avoid a hegemony over the region by Sankt-Petersburg.

The Black Sea was also a significant front in the First World War when the Ottoman Navy engaged the Russian ships stationed in Sevastopol. But while witnessing a declining importance in the Second World War, the Black Sea region essentially vanished as a geopolitical entity in the Cold War. The traditional Turkish-Russian balance of power disappeared and instead, a Soviet and Warsaw Pact hegemony was installed. However, the situation changed when the URSS collapsed, despite the Russian Federation’s desperate attempts to conduct damage control over its ex-territories. One one hand, Moscow saw how its strategic territories as Crimea taken away, how ex-Soviet Republics, as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or ex-Warsaw Pact allies, notably Poland, Romania, became hardened Euro-Atlantists that integrated in NATO, the European Union and called for a significant increase of U.S. troops on the Eastern Flank.

The critical ‘belt’ that Moscow looked after was its ex-Soviet Republics. While enjoying a friendly government in Kiev and Minsk for most of the time, the Romanian sentiment swiftly grew in Moldova upon assuming its independence in 1991, which triggered an immediate Russian invasion. While not managing to fully subdue Chisinau, a breakaway region was created east of the Dnister that would hold a perpetual leverage over the country. The Republic of Transnistira still hosts today thousands of Russian troops from the 14th Army. Similar interventions also took place in Azerbaijan (much more indirectly) or Georgia, a conventional invasion that sought to cripple the small republic’s future of joining NATO. After the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, two breakaway republics were formed under Moscow’s direct military and political foothold: South Ossetia and Abkhazia; these regions still host a number of Russian basses and thousands of troops eyeing Tbilisi.  Then, came the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia that crippled the country’s infrastructure.

However, the Black Sea began to fully resurface as a geopolitical battleground when Russia lost Ukraine. After the radical decision by the Yanukovitch government to go ahead with the E.U. association protocol, protests from Moscow made the government reverse the decision, but instead stirred massive street movements in Kiev and all over the country. The crisis of 2014 escalated when the government began shooting at the over 1 million demonstrators in the main square of the capital. In support of the ‘Euromaidan’ movement came opposition parties, the United States and the European Union. And as Yanukovitch flew to Russia in an attempt to escape the angry population, it became clear the Ukraine was now radically driving out of the Kremlin’s sphere of influence and into the Euro-Atlantic one.

Vladimir Putin ordered a seizure of Crimea in yet another attempt of damage control of it’s weakening influence. Under a strict political deniability complemented by an ambiguous informational campaign, topped by targeted cyber and electronic warfare, Russian forces stationed in Sevastopol alongside incoming troops from the mainland managed to encircle Ukraine bases in the peninsula. And under a mock-referendum guarded by the Russian troops and local separatist groups, the population of Crimea, indeed overwhelmingly ethnic Russian, voted in favor of uniting with the Russian Federation.

A similar strategy was applied in Eastern Ukraine, in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, but given the immense Euro-Atlantic support for the Ukrainian Army, and without a doubt, the fierce resistance put by the National Guard and Armed Forces at Mariupol, Ukraine managed to keep the Kremlin in check, and contain the malign separatist conflict. Through the DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) and the LNR (Luhansk People’s Republic) Russian attempted to create a land bridge to Crimea. And from there, according the Vladirim Putin’s speech, to form a New Russia (Novorossyia) for all the Russian speaking people in Ukraine – from Harkov, through the Black Sea littoral (Prychornomoria) and that of the Azov Sea (Pryazovia), including Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, all the way to Odessa Oblast.The two hybrid republics, LPR and DPR formally formed the Federation of Novorossyia in 2014; this ended in January 2015 after it failed to expand the project. Attempts of Russian separatist movements were made in Odessa (strategic to this plan) and all over the Russian-speaking regions, however, those have failed to escalate and evolve in armed uprisings similar to what caused the crisis and the de facto succession in Eastern Ukraine

The combination of international pressure and fierce resistance from Kiev, managed to cancel Novorossiya; at least for now. The self-declaration of ‘Little Russia’ (Malorossyia) as an independent state, made by the leader of DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, draw hostilities (at least publicly) from the LPR and Moscow, dully because it might have been a sign of abandonment of the larger, grand project for a patch of stable influence. Althought Kiev is still facing with a fragile and status quo-friendly treaty, the Minsk Agreement 2, and a potential volatile breakaway territory in the east, it’s maintaining its path of Euro-Atlantisism; with U.S. forces regularly conducting joint drills in the western region and on the seaboard, while cooperation with the E.U. is unprecedented.

The Black Sea region has recently emerged as a potential energy hub in regards to natural gas and even oil. The underwater deep shells have attracted interests from the biggest energy investors as Lukoil, OMV and Exxon Mobil to contract the licenses. After years of research and drilling, Romania’s maritime shell was confirmed and estimated at around 20 billion metric cubes of gas, enough to make the already energy sufficient country, a gas exporter. Together with Exxon Mobil, Bucharest will begin to exploit the deposit as of 2018. On the other side, Russian companies are already drilling into the shells near Crimea, and could have extended more if Odessa entered the separatist project, and would have changed the Black Sea’s exclusive economic zones in Moscow’s favor. Such a move would have offered Russia the opportunity to contest Romania’s maritime exclusivity and  claim the deep water gas deposits thanks to an island, the Snake’s Island, that sits within the Romanian EEZ and next to XXI Pelican shell, but belongs to Ukraine.

Additional military moves from Moscow are expected in NATO’s maritime perimeter. And as both Bulgaria and Romania suffer from an outdated, weakened and underwhelming military force, a stronger NATO presence is needed in the area. Romania’s sole objective at the 2016’s Warsaw Summit was to receive support for a Black Sea Fleet framework to be formed within the Alliance. Given Bulgaria’s opposition, skeptical of military build-ups in the area, Bucharest only received a multinational battlegroup in Craiova, formed by American, British, Polish and Bulgarian troops. But Washington’s aid had doubled in size in regards to military and political cooperation. Furthermore, the latest two National Security Strategies of Romania named as an objective for the country to become ‘a strategic vector of the Black Sea’.

Black Sea region exercises; source: U.S. Army Europe press kit

Saber Guardian, the largest exercise ever held in the Black Sea area was organized by U.S. Army Europe and co-hosted by Hungary (logistic hub for south-east Europe), Romania and Bulgaria. It massed 25,000 troops in additional to the already many ongoing exercises by NATO in the area. All the simulated scenarios tested,  subjected crisis situations and responsive actions to aggression emanating from the Black Sea. It simulated how logistics could be swiftly transferred from the main U.S. military hubs in Germany, to coordination centers in Hungary and then to the hypothetical frontlines of Romania and Bulgaria. It tested and exercised inter-operability and battle-space versatility, in critical and diverse missions as: air defense operations, mass casualty situations, seizures and counter-offensives; taking place in diverse regional realms, from the Hungarian Danube, to the Romanian plains or Carpathian mountains, to the Black Sea’s ports or waters.

Black Sea Area Support Team (ex- Joint Task Force-East), the operational unit within U.S. Army Europe, that deals with Romania and Bulgaria, had its most busy days from its founding in 2007. Together with local allies, it attempts to stop the maritime area from becoming a ‘Russian Lake’, as an ex-Romanian President once referred to Russia’s resurgent posture in the Black Sea. The region is one of the few that indeed resurfaced after decades of strategic ‘sterilization’ into a vital geopolitical vector.

 

 

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