Tag: Kherson

Target Transnistria: Russia’s Maskirovka and Pathways to Escalation (Threatcast)

KEY JUDGEMENTS  I. We assess that Russian intelligence staged the recent provocations in Transnistria as part of a military deception campaign (“maskirovka”). Russia aims to prevent Ukrainian forces in Odesa…

KEY JUDGEMENTS 

I. We assess that Russian intelligence staged the recent provocations in Transnistria as part of a military deception campaign (“maskirovka”). Russia aims to prevent Ukrainian forces in Odesa province from reinforcing positions in Donbas and Kherson.

II. The Transnistrian maskirovka is contingent and could escalate into more palpable operational objectives in the short term. While the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria (OGRFT) is unfit to engage in significant combat, we cannot ascertain that Moscow will see the Group’s precarious condition as an obstacle to joining the fight. One possible scenario is that the OGRFT could attempt to contest or seize the Palanca road segment of the Reni-Odesa highway – controlled by Ukraine although on Moldovan territory (Stefan Voda raion). 

III. We assess that the Kremlin retains the intention of linking up with Transnistria, but the Russian military is operationally unable to reach this goal in the medium term.  The vast majority of Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are committed to Donbas and Kherson, where they are desperately needed, and continue to suffer a heavy attrition rate. 

IV. We have threatcasted three notional scenarios that Russia might consider at any given time to link up with Transnistria:

  • landbridge from Kherson to Transnistria (via Odesa);
  • air assault into Tiraspol;
  • amphibious landing in Budjak province followed by an incursion into Moldova’s Stefan Voda raion.

These scenarios are purely imaginative and do not aim to predict to future. Instead, their role is to reduce uncertainty. 


SITUATION REPORT: RUSSIA ENGINEERS A POTENTIALLY MALIGN DISTRACTION

OGRFT: THE FORGOTTEN “LITTLE GREEN MEN”

1. The self-proclaimed and unrecognized “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” hosts roughly 1,000 to 1,500 Russian soldiers as part of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria (OGRFT). The OGRFT is the “peacekeeping force” Russia left behind after the 1992 invasion of Moldova. It is a direct successor to the locally-based Soviet 14th Guards Army, which served under the command of the Odesa Military District. The OGRFT consists of three units: 

-82nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Battalion [unit 74273]

-113th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Battalion [unit 22137]

-540th Separate Command Battalion [unit 89353]

Together these three units could likely assemble only one battalion tactical group (BTG) – Russian Ground Forces’ (RGF) combined-arms formations for combat use.  Based on our open-source research, all three OGRFT units are headquartered at Karl Liebknecht 159, Tiraspol, Republic of Moldova. However, the units are most likely garrisoned elsewhere, as the Soviet-era military quarter has been largely abandoned and re-purposed into new apartment projects.

GEOINT: Overview of OGRFT HQ and assessed affiliated sites in Tiraspol

2. The OGRFT has three operational objectives in the region: 

-Patrol the Transnistrian border (and engage in the related capacity-building efforts)

-Guard ammunition storage sites in Transnistria. 

-Serve Moscow’s interest in whatever way necessary. 

3. While the OGRFT is probably the most ill-equipped and undertrained force in the entire Russian Armed Forces, it does pose a serious threat to the Moldovan military and could become a tactical distraction for Ukraine.

MASKIROVKA: KEEP UKRAINIAN UNITS FIXED IN ODESA, AWAY FROM “REAL FIGHT” IN KHERSON, DONBAS

4. We assess that Russian intelligence staged the recent provocations in Transnistria as part of a military deception campaign (“maskirovka”). Russia aims to prevent Ukrainian forces in Odesa province from reinforcing positions in Donbas and Kherson. Russia’s remaining main lines of effort (LOEs) in the invasion are the Donbas offensive and consolidating gains in Kherson province. Ukrainian reinforcements in these theaters could put a decisive dent in Russia’s sluggish and largely unsuccessful operations. 

5. Russian intelligence – likely FSB units attached to the OGRFT – orchestrated a series of incidents in Transnistria

  • a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the so-called “Ministry of Security;” 
  • two destroyed antenna towers in Grigoriopol raion (used to broadcast Russian radio channels).
  • claimed gunshots towards Cobasna village which hosts a Soviet-era ammunition depot.
  • explosions at Tiraspol airfield (confirmed by Moldovan authorities). 
  • Reported explosions at a border crossing with Ukraine. 

6. The “local government” responded by placing the Transnistrian military on high alert and ramping up anti-Romanian and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Moldovan and Ukrainian press outlets report that the Transnistrians have established checkpoints throughout the region (confirmed via social media photos), and are preparing for general mobilization (claim denied by the Transnistrian “authorities”). Tiraspol has placed its military on high alert according to the Ukrainian General Staff

MASKIROVKA IS CONTINGENT, ESCALATION POSSIBLE

7. While the recent provocations constitute a benign feint, the OGRFT’s maskirovka is contingent and could escalate into more palpable operational objectives in the short term. To craft a credible threat that will force the Ukrainians to divert attention to the Dniester river, the OGRFT (with or without the Transnistrian military) could launch limited cross-border attacks. Alternatively, although less likely, the OGRFT could launch a limited land incursion. 

8. One possible scenario is that the OGRFT could attempt to contest or seize the Palanca road segment of the Reni-Odesa highway – controlled by Ukraine although on Moldovian territory (Stefan Voda raion). Chisinau transferred the 7.7 km road segment near Palanca to Ukraine as per the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border (August 18, 1999). The two parliaments ratified the AP in 2001. 

Palanca Road (T-Intelligence 2022)

The Palanca road is now the sole remaining ground line of communication (LOC) between NATO member Romania and the eastern raions of Odesa province, as Russia bombed and damaged the Pidyomnyy bridge near Zatoka on April 26. The 

Russia bombed the Pidyomnyy bridge for military and economic reasons. On the one hand, Russia wanted to disrupt the flow of Ukrainian products exported through the Romanian seaport of Constanta as Russia has blockaded Odesa and the other Ukrainian ports. On the other hand, with the bridge disabled, Russia severed NATO’s most direct LOC with Ukraine’s frontlines. 

9. While the OGRFT is unfit to engage in significant combat, we cannot ascertain that Moscow will see the Group’s precarious condition as an obstacle to joining the fight. Based on our estimates, Belarusian President Lukashenko’s war map, and other indicators, Transnistria was scheduled to join the now-failed Southwestern Operational Direction (OD). The OGRFT and the Russian Southern Military District (MD) grouping would have linked up in the process.

Transnistrian and Russian link-up to take Odesa is shown in Lukashenko’s warplan presentation (modified version of EyePress News/Shutterstock image)

RUSSIA-TRANSNISTRIA LAND-BRIDGE UNFEASIBLE IN NEAR TERM

10. We assess that the Kremlin retains the intention of linking up with Transnistria, but the Russian military is operationally unable to reach this goal in the medium term. Sandwiched between a pro-European & NATO-friendly Moldova (Maia Sandu government) and a hostile Ukraine, the OGRFT is vulnerable to an attack. However, Russian BTGs are committed to Donbas and Kherson, where they are desperately needed, and continue to suffer a heavy attrition rate. A significant portion of BTGs is combat ineffective and close to collapse. Re-deployment will most likely not be an option. On its own, the OGRFT is unlikely to be able to break through Ukrainian territory and spearhead a landbridge. The calculus could change if Russia declares a general mobilization and generates new manpower.


THREATCAST: THREE NOTIONAL SCENARIOS FOR A RUSSIA TO LINK UP WITH TRANSNISTRIA 

We have threatcasted three alternative future scenarios that Russia might consider to link up with Transnistria: 

  1. Landbridge from Crimea to Transnistria (via Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa). 
  2. Air assault on Tiraspol.
  3. Amphibious landing in Budjak. 

Disclaimer: Please note that the following scenarios are speculative and present a loose snapshot of possible war plans. This threatcast aims to consider some, but not all, of Russia’s possible actions in Transnistria – caveats apply.

LAND-BRIDGE (TRIED AND FAILED)

11. This scenario looks at a land corridor from Crimea to Transnistria, drawing from Russia’s tried-and-failed Southwestern OD. Such an objective would require an extensive, multi-stage offensive that would be costly and grinding for Russia. However, for the sake of this exercise, let us consider the conditional victories for Russian forces to “shake hands” with the OGRFT by land:

Scenario 1: Land Bridge via Odesa (T-Intelligence 2022)

a. Starting from Crimea-Kherson, Russia would need to isolate or capture Mykolaiv and cross the Bug river. Considering that Ukrainian forces would likely destroy the bridges to stall or stop the offensive, Russia would need to set up pontoon bridges in select areas while under fire from the opposite shore. 

b. Once across the Bug, Russian forces would need to cross the Tylihul. If successful here, the Russians would secure their LOCs and ensure a steady flow of logistics across the two rivers. 

c. Isolating or capturing Odesa would be the invading force’s next and most draining objective. Besieging Ukraine’s third-largest city – over 1 million people – would be a gargantuan effort in terms of time, resources, and manpower. From a humanitarian perspective,  the brutal two-month siege of Mariupol would be a cakewalk in comparison. 

d. The OGRFT could join the fight as a support element and link up with the Russian forces around Odesa in the process. However, a successful land bridge would depend on the long-term control of the Kherson-Odessa corridor. 

12. Russia has already pursued this blueprint and failed in the early stage of the Southwestern OD campaign – it cannot replicate it soon. Unable to capture Mykolaiv, Russia chose to (unsuccessfully) isolate the city and look for a gap in Ukrainian defenses up the Bug river valley. A small contingent of forces advanced to Voznesensk (March 3) in an attempt to take the city and cross the Bug. Fearing that a Russian victory in Voznesensk would greenlight the OGRFT to open the second front, Ukraine blew up the railway bridge over the Kuchurhan river on March 4. After days of fighting, Ukrainian defenders crushed the Russian advance between March 13-16 and launched a counter-attack. Ukrainian forces chased the Russians down to Mykolaiv and ultimately drove them back to Kherson, where the Russian Southern MD grouping remains today. Given the premature failure, the OGRFT was never called up to assist.

AIRBORNE ASSAULT ON TIRASPOL

13. Link-up with the OGRFT via airbridge is possible, although the operation would have a low-probability of success (LOS). The Russian Air Assault Force (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska Rossii/VDV) would spearhead the mission supported by rotary-wing units from the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) to airlift troops and equipment such as BTRs, artillery, and rocket launchers. Airfields in Crimea and Kherson are possible embarkation points, while Tiraspol airfield is the projected end destination. Infiltration routes are of two categories – through denied airspace or around it – posing a wide array of issues and hazards. 

Scenario 2: Air Assault on Tiraspol

a. Pathway 1 (Direct Flight: Chernobayanka to Tiraspol, 230 km): Probably the most LOS route. VDV would launch from an airfield regularly hit by Ukrainian artillery, flying over a high-risk air defense area. There is likely a high density of Ukrainian-operated man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) with operators on high alert and increased readiness in the Mykolaiv-Odesa area. MANPADS of various ranges and kinematic effects provide a diverse and overlapping low-altitude, short-range coverage. Russian helicopters would need to fly low to minimize exposure to the Odesa-based S-300 radars, which would bring them right into the engagement envelope of MANPADS. 

b. Pathway 2 (Avoid Odesa: Chernobayanka to Tiraspol, 340-360 km): This flight path significantly increases survivability by circumnavigating the large MANPADS concentration in the Odesa-Mykolaiv axis and S-300-controlled airspace. However, portable or mobile air defenses are likely also positioned west of Odesa, and increased flight time will limit the maximum take-off weight of the attack and transport helicopters. The longer the flight time, the higher the chances that NATO and Ukrainian sensors will detect the airborne assault from an early stage.   

c. Pathway 3a (Direct flight: Crimean airfields to Tiraspol, 350-400 km): Another low survivable flight path. Flying through the S-300 “bubble” requires significant electronic warfare (EW) and anti-radiation support. The RuAF will likely need to conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) sorties to open up the airspace for the VDV flight to Tiraspol.  For example, the VDV’s assault on Hostomel airfield through Ukrainian air defenses was also enabled by a combination of electronic and missile attacks according to a RUSI report . However, the large density of MANPADS in Odesa poses a constant threat to low-altitude air operations., especially if the assault is not done under the cover of darkness. 

d. Pathway 3b (Avoid Odesa: Crimean airfields to Tiraspol, 350-500 km): Probably the most survivable flight path but also the longest, which restricts airlift capacity (troop number and equipment quantity) and exposes the operation the most to NATO and Ukrainian radars and ISR assets (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

Note: The VDV is one of the most attrited Russian service branches in the war in Ukraine. Significant regeneration would be required before the VDV could hope to pull off such a stunt. 

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON BUDJAK

14. Following the forced closure of the ​​Pidyomnyy bridge, many have speculated that Moscow may be eyeing an amphibious assault on Ukraine’s Budjak region (southern Bessarabia) – Ismail, Bolhrad, and Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky raions in western Odesa province. Russia’s supposed bet is that the landing would be unopposed as Budjak is undermanned by the Ukrainian military and largely disconnected from the rest of the country. 

Scenario: Amphibious Landing in Budjak

15. An amphibious assault on Budjak is theoretically possible but technically difficult and of high risk. The Russian Navy would have to assemble an armada of amphibious vehicles, landing ships and craft, frigates, and other heavy warships, supported by air assets and likely surface to surface missiles. Preparations for such an operation would leave plenty of tell-tell signs that NATO could detect and forward to Ukraine. 

16. Ukraine has mined Odesa’s littoral waters and lined up its shores with anti-ship missiles (AshM), including Neptune (300 km range) and, in the future, truck-mounted Brimstones (range unknown, likely short) – as promised by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The Ukrainian Navy has also effectively posed a credible anti-ship threat, using Neptunes to sink the “Moskva” Slava-class cruiser and Bayraktar drones to destroy patrol boats near Snakes Island. 

17. Budjak’s shore is unideal for amphibious assaults. The coastline mainly consists of small and narrow beaches excavated below the street level with no connection to road networks. Most beaches are flat and lack cover or port facilities. The defender has a clear high-ground advantage. Other areas of the Budjak are dominated by lagoons where landing parties can easily become trapped. Negotiating the terrain is possible in some areas but would make for a sluggish escape from the “deathtraps” that are Budjak’s beaches.

18. Provided the landing is successful, the amphibious force would need to bolt towards Moldova’s Stefan Voda raion and link up with Transnistria. Russian troops would need to occupy Stefan Voida raion to ensure a land link to the OGRFT and deny the last LOC from Romania’s southeast (NATO) to Ukraine. The OGRFT could help by mimicking feint attacks from Bender (Tighina) towards Anenii Noi or Causeni and distract the Moldovan military. 

19. The operations’ success rests on whether the landing party could secure the Budjak bridgehead and sustain an incursion towards Transnistria at the same time. A successful Ukrainian counter-attack could split the invaders into two vulnerable pockets to be captured or annihilated. 

ENDNOTE

20. Since it further invaded Ukraine in late February, Russia has demonstrated a severe lack of risk aversion regarding military action. Moscow may continue to greenlight operations that are objectively “suicidal” or “likely to fail.” Russian military commanders might interpret the operational success probability differently and assess that the payoff would offset the costs. While these notional scenarios are purely an exercise in imagination, they could be options on the table for Russia. 


by HARM

editing by Gekco

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Ukraine Repels Russia’s Initial Blitz (What’s Next?)

Russia has failed to break through Ukrainian defenses in Kiyv and Kharkiv, despite successive airborne and armored assaults backed by artillery, since 24 February 2022. The Ukrainian military has significantly…

Russia has failed to break through Ukrainian defenses in Kiyv and Kharkiv, despite successive airborne and armored assaults backed by artillery, since 24 February 2022. The Ukrainian military has significantly decelerated Russia’s offensive and brought it to a near standstill on most fronts. What Vladimir Putin expected to be a blitz is turning into a slow grind for the Russian military. Ukraine’s defenses prove robust, and the military’s willingness to fight is unshattered. 

Military aid from NATO will provide much-needed replenishment for anti-tank, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles ahead of a likely beefed-up Russian assault. 

Russia will likely also escalate violence, relax the rules of engagement, and increase the use of heavy artillery like thermobaric munition, cluster submunition, and ultimately, ballistic missiles. The objective will be to break the Ukrainian military’s and population’s will to resist.

FOUR DAYS OF WAR, ONE FAILED BLITZ 

1. The past 100 hours have shown that Russia’s campaign has been governed by overconfidence that Russian forces would move fast and seize key objectives, including Kiyv, and a severe underestimation of the Ukrainian military’s ability and will to fight. Moscow’s buoyancy racked up a hefty bill, which includes thousands of Russian soldiers killed in action and loss of military hardware such as aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles. Grave symptoms of Russia’s misguided optimism are: 

INABILITY TO ACCEPT FIERCE UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE 

2. Russia’s biggest miscalculation was to doubt Ukraine’s ability and willingness to fight. Russian commanders have likely forecasted an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian military or a chain-surrendering of the units posted on the frontline, similar to Crimea in 2014, facilitating a quick advance on Kiyv. Besieging Kiyv, forcing the Zelensky administration out of office (even through assassination), and installing a pro-Russian government is undoubtedly the main objective of the Russian invasion. 

3. Most Russian war plans seem to have been based on the assumption of weak resistance, which led to poor logistical planning, a “restrained” offensive counter-air (OCA), incomplete suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), the inability to establish complete air superiority, and ultimately, failure to reach key objectives. 

FAILURE TO SEIZE KIYV AND MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS

4. Four days into the invasion, Russia has not managed to seize and control any of Ukraine’s major population centers, including Kiyv.

KIYV: Ukrainian forces have heroically repelled multiple Russian charges on Kiyv. The Ukrainians fought off at least three major airborne assaults (two on Hostomel airfield, which was ultimately captured, and one on Vasylkiv airbase) and three to five mechanized and/or motorized operations. Russia’s assaults on Kiyv have exclusively come from the northwest as Russian troops have failed to surround the capital thus far. Ukraine’s victories resulted in tactical defeats and massive casualties for Russia’s tip-of-the-spear units, the special operations forces (SOFs), and airborne assault troopers.

Ukraine has also managed to hit deep beyond Russian lines, including with a Bayraktar TB2 and anti-tank ambushes.


CHERNIHIV: Despite several attempts, Russia did not manage to break through Ukrainian defenses at Chernihiv.

KHARKIV: Despite several attempts to encircle Ukraine’s second latest city, Russian forces have failed to besiege or establish a foothold in Kharkiv. Ukrainian defenses repelled all attacks and resisted multiple artillery strikes from across the border. The 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), Russia’s most capable armored formation, is spearheading the Kharkiv operation.

The failed “thunder run” towards downtown Kharkiv by Russian light infantry on 27 February showcased a lack of imagination and quick solutions for breaking Ukraine’s local defenses.

KHERSON: Russian forces were unable to fully control and hold Kherson despite a small incursion. 

RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY

5. Russia has failed to establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. Multiple social media videos from the past days have shown Ukrainian Su-25 attack aircraft, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets, and Mi-24 utility helicopters engaged in operations against Russian forces. The Ukrainian Armed Forces recently released footage showing three separate strikes on Russian positions using Bayraktar TB-2 combat drones. News that NATO (likely Poland) has resupplied Ukraine with air-to-air missiles indicates that more Ukrainian fighter aircraft survived Russia’s pre-assault Offensive Counter Air (OCA) strike. 

Insufficient OCA: While we are still reviewing satellite imagery, our preliminary assessment is that the vast majority of Ukrainian Air Force (UkAF) bases are still operational. As most runways are intact, flight operations can take place. 

Craters and impact points are only visible on tarmacs, indicating that Russia’s missile strikes have damaged and disabled some aircraft. The strikes also destroyed fuel and ammunition storage facilities in annex sites. 

Russia likely planned this outcome. As many analysts have pointed out, Russia probably expected to seize the airfields and use them immediately. Instead of destroying the runways, Russia preferred to render the UkAF fighter jets ineffective by leaving them without fuel and ammunition. 

Nevertheless, this “restrained” OCA has boomeranged on the advancing forces who continue to face aerial bombardments from Ukrainian attack aircraft, helicopters, and drones. 

Unsuccessful Suppression of Air Defenses: Amid continued reports of Ukrainian air defense activity, including the S-300 and Buk-M1, it is highly likely that Russia did not manage to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s defenses completely. These systems are highly mobile. Ukraine probably moved some systems to hideouts to survive “the first day of war.” It is also likely that Ukraine baited Russian missiles with dummy targets, even radar-emission-rich, to improve the survivability of its air defenses. 

POOR LOGISTICAL PLANNING

6. Another key symptom of Russia’s overconfidence is the derelict logistical situation of its troops in Ukraine. There are reports that Russian soldiers lack fuel and food and therefore have to source resources locally. This does not come as a surprise, as the Ukrainian military has scored big hits on Russian supply lines, destroying scores of fuel trucks and utility vehicles lagging behind assault troops. In “blitz” offensives, the infantry pushes forward towards the objective, leaving the logistical units behind in a highly vulnerable position. If the logistical support units are destroyed, the assault becomes unsustainable despite significant territorial gains of the advancing force.

One iconic video shows a conversation between the crew of a stranded Russian armored personnel carrier that ran out of fuel and a Ukrainian citizen. 

Another video shows Russian soldiers looting a convenience store in Kharkiv. 

Expecting a “blitz” offensive with a quick victory, Russian commanders possibly ignored the need to ensure a steady stream of supplies. 

FRUSTRATION & ESCALATION: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR

NORTH-EAST AXIS OF ATTACK COULD SPELL DOOM FOR KIYV

7. A Russian breakthrough on the Chernihiv-Hulkhiv-Sumy frontline could mark the beginning of the end for Kiyv. If these forces are freed up and reach the capital, the Russian military could surround Kiyv. Thus far, the Ukrainian army has managed to keep the Russian advance from southeastern Belarus, Yelnya and Kursk, in check. However, this is an area of operations that require close attention 

AVOID CITIES, RACE FOR KIYV

8. There are reports that Russian forces have been ordered to bypass regional cities and race towards Kiyv. A rush for Kiyv would leave the flanks and rear of the Russian columns extremely exposed to Ukrainian attacks, but the pay-off would be huge. A multi-axis convergence on the capital would very likely break the capital’s defenses. The presence of Russian troops beyond cities that they have not captured, such as Chernihiv and Kharkiv, are clear indicators of a rush for Kiyv. 

COUNTER-LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

9. Stopping the flow of ATGMs and MANPADs from NATO to Ukraine will become a priority for the Russian military in the coming days. Small teams of Russian Special Operations Forces (SOFs) will likely infiltrate to interdict Ukraine’s supply lines from Poland. They will recon Ukraine’s supply routes and storage and distribution hubs and pass on intelligence for air or artillery strikes. Russian SOFs could also provide terminal guidance for RuAF strikes, especially in the case of precision-guided munitions. It is also possible that Russian SOFs could take matters into their own hands and seek to destroy munition transports. 

Renewed Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s western airfields, or even attempts to shoot down cargo jets are likely also on the table, as a way to disrupt Ukraine’s logistical connection with NATO. 

TROOP & VIOLENCE ESCALATION

10. As Russia becomes frustrated with the Ukrainian resistance, it will likely ease rules of engagements (ROE) and phase in more heavy artillery strikes on populated centers. In such a calculus, we would see widespread use of ballistic missiles (BMs), including the Iskander systems, which have been forward-positioned along Ukraine’s borders for weeks. Mounting evidence suggests that Russia has already launched BMs from Belarus, some of them impacting Zhytomyr airfield and Chernihiv. 

11. Russia will likely allocate more forces to the offensive. Currently, only 50 to 70 percent of the troops amassed around Ukraine are engaged in the offensive. As more Russian troops from staging grounds in southern Belarus, Yelnya, Kursk, Voronezh-Belgorod, and Crimea cross the border, Russia will need to rebuild its reserve force. An indicator of this will come in the form of eyewitness videos from Russia showing new troop movements or mobilizations, as we have recently seen with the Chechens. A higher troop count (over 200,000 soldiers) combined with overwhelming artillery and missile strikes is likely Putin’s ultimate bet to break Ukraine’s will to fight.


by HARM

editing by Gecko

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Russia Invades Ukraine: First Day of War Through OSINT

In the early hours of 24 February 2022, Russia commenced a series of pre-assault operations to soften Ukrainian defenses ahead of an all-out, multi-axis invasion, which is now in progress….

In the early hours of 24 February 2022, Russia commenced a series of pre-assault operations to soften Ukrainian defenses ahead of an all-out, multi-axis invasion, which is now in progress.

This course of events was extensively threatcasted by the OSINT community weeks in advance, including us. Those familiar with our estimates from January 2022, see here, would have expected a Russian invasion and the subsequent operational and tactical developments. 

DAWNBREAKER: PRE-ASSAULT OPERATIONS

Cyber attacks & Electronic Warfare (EW): 

1. The opening salvos of Russia’s invasion were cybernetic and electronic and were initiated on 23 February 2022. Russia launched Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attacks on the Ukrainian government, jammed military communications, and psychological operations against Ukrainian troops.

2. One notable EW attack was conducted by a Leer-3 which spammed Ukrainian troops with SMS calling them to surrender or be killed.

Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (S/DEAD)

3. In the dead of night, Russia launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) at Ukrainian integrated air and missile defenses. They likely disabled several early warning, tracking, and engagement radars, rendering Ukraine’s sensors and SAM systems ineffective (S-300, Buk M-1). However, some might still be functional or serviceable. 

Debris is consistent with Kh-31PD anti-radiation variant

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)

4. Russia launched massive strikes against airbases to ground the Ukrainian Air Force (UkAF). Damaged runways prevent Ukrainian aircraft from taking off and landing. Follow-up salvos disabled the grounded aircraft and cleared facilities for occupation by airborne troops. 

5. Visual evidence suggests that Russia fired ballistic missiles, likely Iskanders (SS-26 Stone), at airbases to cause structural damage – a textbook use of BMs for anti-runway operations. 

6. Latest satellite imagery of Chuhuiv Air Base near Harkhiv shows that Russia did not crater the runways of all airports, instead it destroyed fuel depots and munition storage. 

7. One Ukrainian Su-27 flew into Romanian airspace where it was intercepted by Romanian F-16s and forced to ground at Bacau Air Base. As per Romanian government accounts, the pilot’s homebase was destroyed and had nowhere else to land. 

Counter-C3

8. Russian LACMs also leveled command, control, and communication nodes (C3). These attacks aimed to separate the higher echelons from battlefield units, behead the leadership, and throw the military in disarray. This was another textbook pre-invasion tactic.

Counter-Logistics

9. Many videos emerged online showing LACMs pounding ammunition depots and warehouses, resulting in massive secondary explosions. Attacks to bleed Ukraine’s logistical supply lines have occurred nationwide, including Lviv (near Poland), Ivano-Frankivsk (close to Romania), Melitopol, and Odesa. 

10. Our previous T-Intelligence analysis anticipated this tactic to diminish Ukraine’s growing ATGM stockpile.

MIDDAY RUMBLE

11. Shortly after the crack of dawn, the Russia commenced a multi-axis ground offensive, moving tanks and armored vehicles along select axis of attack. 

Russian operational directions and screengrabs from select videos showing military attacks in Ukraine

Air superiority

12. As OCA was largely successful and grounded most of the UkAF’s extensive fighter fleet, the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) could establish air superiority. Otherwise, we would not have seen a major helicopter assault on Kiyv and nearby airports. However, a video emerged showing a UkAF MiG-29 buzzing the skies of Kiyv and allegedly dogfighting an alleged Russian Su-35, which means that not all fighters are grounded or destroyed (update: a re-examination of the video concludes that both aircraft are Ukrainian).

Manoeuvre

13. Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) have advanced from nearly all operational directions:

  • Belarus (to Kiyv, the Pripyat area, Chernihiv)

14. Russian forces in Belarus crossed the border towards Chernihiv, seized the Chernobyl exclusion zone following a heavy armored battle with Ukrainian forces, and deployed a massive airborne assault on Kiyv. 

  • Voronezh (to Kharkiv and Sumy)

15. Under the cover of rocket artillery, tank columns crossed into Ukraine and rapidly approached the country’s second-largest city, Kharkiv. The battle for Kharkiv is still raging on, with Russia facing losses. Intrusions have reportedly also occurred further north on the frontier near Sumy. 

  • Don (further into Donbas)

16. Recently reinforced by Russian troops, Luhansk and Donetsk separatists have launched a tandem assault across the demilitarized zone. Operational objectives are to capture Kramatorsk and Severodonetsk, and secure the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Splinter groups will likely then follow up to hit Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv from the rear, and separately, besiege Mariupol.  

  • Crimea (to Kherson & Melitopol)

17. Russia made significant territorial gains north of Crimea, towards Kherson city and most adjacent areas. A separate line of the assault went eastwards and arrived at Melitopol. Beyond Melitopol, Russian forces aim to encircle Mariupol with Donbas formations.

  • *Black Sea Fleet

18. An amphibious assault on Odesa is still expected but would likely come later to complete the pincer movement with troops advancing from Kherson. 

Close Air Support (CAS)

19. Ka-52 attack helicopters, Su-25 attack aircraft, and a myriad of ground-based artillery provide overwhelming fires to the advancing columns. Russia’s successful OCA and subsequent air superiority enabled aerial CAS platforms. Without a permissive aerial environment, Su-25s and attack helicopters would have been easy targets for Ukrainian fighter jets. 

Airborne assault

20. Russian Airborne Forces aboard Mii-8 helicopters and escorted by attack helicopters have assaulted key areas around Kiyv. Russian paratroopers achieved a breakthrough at Hostomel airfield/Antonov International Airport, but lost three helicopters to ground to air fire in the process. Russia’s airborne assault seemed rushed, albeit speed is key to maintaining the initiative, and faced heavy resistance. 

Securing these facilities is key to airlift tanks, personnel, and the necessary equipment to besiege Kiyv.

NIGHTFALL: OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CONTINUE

Tactical defeat

21. Russian airborne units have lost Hostomel airfield after a strong counterattack from the Ukrainian military. If sustainable, the loss of Hostomel is a significant blow to Russia’s plans to quickly amass and encircle Kiyv before Ukrainian forces establish better defenses. 

EPILOGUE

For reasons of operation security, we will not comment on Ukraine’s military movements. We urge OSINT analysts not to share videos or images of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.


by HARM 

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