What We Know About the Secret Israeli-Saudi Meeting in Neom

On 22 November 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), and Israeli Prime-Minister Netanyahu met in Neom (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The…

What We Learned From Israel’s Latest Airstrike Spree in Syria

Over the past eight years, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted over 300 “unclaimed” airstrikes against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and its axis of transnational Shiite militias (the…

Evacuation “Shattered Glass”: The US/ Coalition Bases in Syria [Part 1]

Disclaimer: This compilation is based on publicly available information collected through open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques. The release only covers the Coalition/US bases that have been sanitized and evacuated. An exception…

Is Turkey Sending Syrian Rebels to Libya?

Mounting evidence shows that Turkey is deploying “Syrian National Army” (SNA) militiamen to Libya by using commercial airlines. In December 2019, major media outlets broke the news that Ankara plans…

Iran Used Cruise Missiles, Suicide Drones in Saudi Attack

During a press briefing in Riyadh, the Saudi Defense Ministry revealed wreckage recovered after the air attack on the petrochemical facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The physical evidence suggests that…

Let the Skyfall: Radioactive Explosion in Russia Likely Connected to SSC-X-9 Missile Test

Russia’s secretive radioactive explosion is linked to the testing of a nuclear-powered unlimited-range cruise missile. 1. On August 8, 2019, around 9 AM local time, an explosion occurred on an…

U.S.-led Coalition & SDF Terminate ISIS’ Physical Caliphate, COINOPS to Follow

On March 23, 2019 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the liberation of Baghuz al-Fawqani, the “Islamic State of Syria and Iraq’s” (ISIS/Da’esh) last stronghold in Syria’s Mid-Euphrates River Valley…

Syrian S-300 Ready to Use?

Syria’s S-300PM2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system (NATO reporting name: SA20-B Gargoyle) has likely achieved initial operational capability (IOC) or is about to achieve IOC by May/June 2019. In response to…

IS-K Diverted from Nangarhar Province, Takes Korengal Valley from Taliban (COIN/OPS-BRIEF)

As key IS-K territories are under pressure by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the rival Taliban, the group is seeking to capture new high-ground sanctuaries on…

The Ayatollah’s Shield: SAM Deployments and Capabilities of the Iranian Air Defenses (IMINT)

1. Over the last years, Iran has visibly improved its air defense (AD) systems by phasing in modern indigenous surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The Iranian SAM deployments primarily safeguard the…

What We Know About the Secret Israeli-Saudi Meeting in Neom

On 22 November 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), and Israeli Prime-Minister Netanyahu met in Neom (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The…

On 22 November 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), and Israeli Prime-Minister Netanyahu met in Neom (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The meeting was the first known official or semi-official encounter between Israel and Saudi Arabia and came at a critical time for the Middle East. 

NETANYAHU’S SECRET VISIT

Although the Israeli presence was a secret, the Prime Minister’s Gulfstream IV private jet (T7CPX) was spotted on flight trackers. ADS-B data shows the flight path of T7CPX from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Neom, where the plane remained grounded for two hours. The aircraft returned to Israel around 22:05 UTC. 

Flight tracking data confirms that Israeli PM Netanyahu’s private jet travelled to Neom on the evening of November 22 (T-Intelligence)

Netanyahu’s presence in Neom has since become an open secret, as multiple sources from the cabinet confirmed the story for Israeli news outlets. Israeli media also reported that Mossad chief Yossi Cohen joined PM Netanyahu for the meeting in Neom. 

The main point on the agenda was likely the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. Secretary Mike Pompeo has pursued MBS to follow the example of his neighbors, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, to establish formal ties with Israel. However, Riyadh has publically stated that an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is a precondition for a Saudi-Israeli deal. 

GOING AFTER “PROJECT AMAD?”

There is increasing speculation that the parties also discussed the Iranian threat.

After years of backchanneling, Saudi Arabia and Israel may be negotiating the possibility of direct action against Iran’s nuclear program (Iranian codename Project “Amad”). The Israelis are interested in using Saudi airspace to refuel and return after striking the nuclear facilities in central and south Iran. 

Israel may have already discussed or will discuss similar arrangements with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

A potential Israeli campaign against Iran’s nuclear program would require more than 20 fighter aircraft, including F-35I stealth fighters, and many other logistical support assets like aerial tankers. These assets need to be forward deployed and their flight paths carefully coordinated to ensure the operation’s success and a safe return for the Israeli pilots. Additionally, the operation would likely require special operations forces (SOFs), who would insert from nearby states. 

From Israel’s perspective, the issue of military action against Iran has become more pressing after President Trump’s electoral loss. President-elect Biden will likely have a softer stance on Iran. Biden has already promised to re-join the nuclear deal with Iran if Tehran promises strict compliance. At the moment, these plans are nevertheless speculation. There are no troop movements or logistical preparations that suggest an imminent attack against Iran. Israel and Saudi Arabia are likely trying to establish common ground should the military option be on the table in the future.  

MISSILE STRIKE ON JEDDAH

Hours after the Neom meeting ended, the Yemeni Houthi militia launched a cruise missile strike on an Aramco petrochemical plant in Jeddah. Geolocation of social media material confirms the event and location. 

Geolocation confirms authenticity and location of an Instagram video that claims to show a fire at the Aramco facility in Jeddah (T-Intelligence)

The Yemeni Houthi militia claims to have debuted the Quds-2, one of the many missiles Iran is secretly developing for its proxies. Quds-2 is believed to be a spin-off of Iran’s Soumar or Ya-Ali missiles. 

Launched from an undisclosed location in northern Yemen, the Quds-2 missile traveled 640 km (400 miles) to Jeddah, the militants claim. 

While the Houthi already possess ballistic missiles (BM) that can strike targets 1,000 km away, the increased range of the militants’ low-observable (LO) munition is concerning. LO munition like cruise missiles and so-called “suicide drones” can bypass the Saudi PAC-2 air defenses designed to counter BMs. 

Battle damage assessment shows minimal damage at the Aramco plant in Jeddah. One crude oil storage tank was disabled, and the blast scarred a second tank. 

Battle Damage Assessment shows minimal damage on Aramco facility in Jeddah (imagery: Planet Labs, Inc.; assessment: T-Intelligence)

The attack was a clear message from Iran. It serves as a reminder of Iran’s massive missile stockpile and proxy network in the Middle East. 


by HARM

Editing by Gecko

Our findings were first published as a Facebook post on 23 November 2020.

This article was produced using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT). Learn more about OSINT here

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Azerbaijan Adds Armenian S-300 to Kill List

Azerbaijan has destroyed an Armenian S-300PS air defense system (AIFC/NATO: SA-10 “Grumble”) on 17 September 2020. The Azeri Ministry of Defense has released footage of an air strike on at…

Azerbaijan has destroyed an Armenian S-300PS air defense system (AIFC/NATO: SA-10 “Grumble”) on 17 September 2020. The Azeri Ministry of Defense has released footage of an air strike on at least two entities consistent with S-300 tractor erector launchers (TELs). The blast radius indicates that Azerbaijan has used a heavy payload, possibly the Israeli ballistic missile LORA. 

Geolocation puts the strike location in Syunik province in southeastern Armenia. The attack marks another direct engagement between Armenia and Azerbaijan outside of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. 

STRIKE THREE?

This is the third time that Azerbaijan has neutralized Armenian S-300 hardware components in the past month. On 29 September, a video of what appears to be an S-300 TEL in the crosshairs of a drone was leaked online. The footage does not show the actual strike, but the target was geolocated near Xankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh – a known S-300 site. 

On October 10, the Azeri military released several videos showing the destruction of various S-300 hardware components, including two 36D6 “Tin Shield” radars and one 5P85 TEL, based in Kaghnut, Armenia. One of the radars was active and spinning during the attack. 

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The persistent targeting of Armenia’s S-300 marks a clear change in Azerbaijan’s mission objectives. After successfully employing drone warfare in Nagorno Karabakh to clear out Armenian frontline positions, Azerbaijan is now knocking down the door of Armenia’s airspace and weakening Yerevan’s defensive position. 

Armenia’s strategic deterrent depends on the notorious Iskander ballistic missile system (SS-26 “Stone ‘) for offense and the S-300 for defense. The collapse of one of these assets would significantly weaken Armenia’s hand. 


This article was made using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools and techniques. Learn how to do that too on Knowmad OSINT

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Russia moves Troops to border with Belarus

Russian military intervention in Belarus is increasingly likely. Open-source intelligence shows significant military activity in Russia’s western military district. Eyewitnesses have documented at least three unmarked convoys of the Russian…

Russian military intervention in Belarus is increasingly likely. Open-source intelligence shows significant military activity in Russia’s western military district. Eyewitnesses have documented at least three unmarked convoys of the Russian Military Guard (RosGuard) consisting of transport vehicles and logistics trucks moving towards the border with Belarus on 16-17 August 2020. A CITEAM assessment indicates that the convoys could move approximately 600 people. 

Established on President Putin’s orders in 2016, the RosGuard is a militarized institution of the Russian Interior Ministry tasked with territorial defense, securing critical infrastructure, counter-terrorism, and “protecting public order.” 

So far, we have NOT noticed any Russian military assets operating in Belarus. However, the situation could change dramatically at any movement as pro-democracy protests continue to grow at an unprecedented scale. A crowd of over 200,000 demonstrated in Minsk over the weekend against Belorussian autocratic leader Lukashenko, and workers across the country have gone on strike.

Lukashenko branded the freedom movement as being a foreign-backed “colored revolution” and falsely claimed that NATO is preparing to invade Belarus. To back-up his conspiracy, Lukashenko ordered the army to hold a series of snap exercises near the Polish and Lithuanian borders between 17 and 21 August. Photos on social media show that the Belarusian forces are moving several Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile systems from Minsk towards the west, an alarming development for NATO. 

Unable to quell the protests, Lukashenko opened “Pandora’s box” by requesting security and military assistance from Russia on 15 August. After a second phone call on Sunday, Lukashenko claimed that Putin promised him “comprehensive security assistance.”

A Russian military intervention in Belarus will likely result in the de facto annexation of the country. Moscow has always feared that a “colored revolution” will transform its neighbor into an adversary. If Belarus slips from the Kremlin’s orbit, Russia will lose access to the Suwalki Gap, the strategic corridor linking the Baltic states to the rest of NATO, and the gargantuan Baranovichi airbase.
In the past months, Moscow has been insistently pressuring Lukashenko to bring Belarus into a new federal union with Russia. While “Europe’s last dictator” wants to keep the country under his thumb, given the new circumstances he will likely prefer to forfeit Belarus to Russia than be ousted by the population.


This report was originally published on our Facebook page on 17 August 2020.

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U.S. Maintains Pressure on al-Qa’ida’s Most Overlooked Franchise

A covert US airstrike has killed the leader of Tanzeem Hurras al-Din (HAD), al-Qa’ida’s leading Syrian franchise, in Idlib province on 14 June 2020. Abu al-Qassam (also known as Khaled…

A covert US airstrike has killed the leader of Tanzeem Hurras al-Din (HAD), al-Qa’ida’s leading Syrian franchise, in Idlib province on 14 June 2020. Abu al-Qassam (also known as Khaled al-Aruri) was a seasoned al-Qa’ida (AQ) operative who was plotting attacks against the West. 

According to social media sources, an MQ-9 Predator drone armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, likely operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), was present over Idlib that day.

Impact marks on the target vehicle, blade cuts, and ordnance debris suggest that the US employed the secretive, blade-wielding derivative of the AGM-114 Hellfire, known as the R9X

AGM-114R9X HELLFIRE AKA THE “FLYING GINSU” 

While the United States never officially acknowledged its existence, the R9X is an open secret. The R9X trades the “Hellfire” warhead for six sword-like blades that eject upon impact and slice the target into pieces. Because there is no explosion, the weapon minimizes collateral damage. 

The R9X debuted in February 2017, when it neutralized AQ deputy commander Abu Khayr al-Masri near al-Mastouma in Idlib province. Since then, JSOC and the CIA have repeatedly used the weapon against high-value targets in northwestern Syria, Afghanistan, and reportedly the Horn of Africa. 

R9X schematic via The Wall Street Journal

WHY IS THE US TARGETING TANZEEM HURRAS AL-DIN (HAD)?

Tanzeem Hurras al-Din (HAD, or “Guardians of the Religion Organization”) was founded in February 2018, when a group of AQ loyalists splintered from Hay’ at Tahrir al-Sham, the most influential terrorist group in Idlib. The hardliners left because HTS publicly cut ties with AQ central. 

Now AQ’s leading Syrian franchise, HAD aims to overthrow the Syrian regime and establish a regional Islamic State. In contrast to HTS, HAD is outspoken about its intent to attack the United States and the West. 

Despite its malign intentions, international observers and the press often overlook HAD. According to a UN intelligence report, HAD’s numbers are currently small (between 1,500 and 2000 fighters), the group exercises little territorial influence and depends on HTS funds to operate.

In the long term, HAD could nevertheless establish itself as a more radical alternative to HTS. While HTS cooperates with Turkey on the Sochi peace process, HAD opposes negotiations with the “infidels.” HAD favors a full-out confrontation with the pro-government forces. Part of this strategy is to mobilize the Syrian opposition under its wing and AQ banner.

COUNTERING AL-QA’IDA IN SYRIA (AQ-S)

The United States intelligence and military collectively refer to HAD, HTS, and other ex-Jabhat al-Nusra groups as al-Qa’ida in Syria (AQ-S). Despite their different policies and marketing strategies, the jihadi groups are still cooperating to achieve AQ’s global agenda. 

In response to the growing terrorist threat in northwestern Syria, the US has deployed kinetic options to weaken AQ-S groups. The campaign began in 2014, when American drones targeted the Khorasan Group, then Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The operational tempo increased in 2019. American drones prosecuted four targets: A HAD training camp in June, a HAD safehouse in August, a foreign trainer of the “Red Bands” (HTS’ special forces) in December, and a car carrying Ahrar ash-Sham members later that month

With the latest strike on 14 June 2020, it becomes clear that HAD has absorbed the lion’s share of US airstrikes in Idlib. The focus on HAD indicates that Washington is increasingly concerned about the group’s intentions to attack the West. 



Intelligence suggests that HAD has recruited ISIS fighters who escaped from the siege on Baghuz al-Faqwani – diehards with extensive combat experience, and possibly networks of terrorist cells. HAD fighters also enjoy a fast gateway to Europe and other locations in the Middle East, due to their proximity to Turkish territory. Likely, the reduction of violence in Idlib has given HAD breathing space to build external terrorist networks and plan strikes against the West. 

Defeating HAD will require close coordination with Turkey, which de facto patrons Idlib province, and supports HTS, HAD’s “frenemy.” 


by HARM

Editing by Gecko 

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Lethal Stalkers: How Turkish Drones Are Neutralizing Haftar’s Pantsirs in Libya (BDA)

Turkish drones operating in Libya on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA) have neutralized ten of General Haftar’s Pantsir S-1E (NATO Reporting name: SA-22 “Greyhound) air defense systems…

Turkish drones operating in Libya on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA) have neutralized ten of General Haftar’s Pantsir S-1E (NATO Reporting name: SA-22 “Greyhound) air defense systems in less than a week. The Turkish aerial onslaught was the most significant suppression/ destruction of air defenses (S/DEAD) operation of the Libyan Civil War and a colossal humiliation for Russia’s prime counter-drone and short-range air defense. Forced into retreat, Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) has pledged to respond with the biggest aerial battle in Libyan history. 



OPERATION “VOLCANO OF RAGE” 

The GNA’s counter-offensive against LNA advances in western Libya and around Tripoli (“Vulcano of Rage”), which commenced in April 2019, has finally reached a breakthrough. Backed by Turkey’s S/DEAD campaign, GNA forces have secured the Tunisian border, recaptured the western shoreline, and pushed the LNA out of its strategic positions in Watiyah Air Base and south of Gharyan. GNA militias are now ready to retake northwestern Libya (Tripolitania), the country’s most populous region. 

Map of “Rage of Volcano” offensive via Rr016

BAYRAKTAR VS. PANTSIR 

Pantsirs provide point air defense for LNA tactical positions, and especially airfields. The airfields are vital for Haftar’s air wing as they host fighter aircraft refurbished with Egyptian, Emirati, and Russian assistance, as well as Emirati drones for airstrikes against the GNA. 

Emirati variant of the Pantsir S-1Export, which uses the Rheinmetal Man SX45 8×8 truck, via Portal Defensa

The Pantsir’s 96K6 surface-to-air missiles have an engagement range of up to 24 km. In comparison, Ankara’s Bayraktar 2TB unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), which was likely responsible for the strikes against Hafter, uses MAM-L Smart Micro Munition manufactured by Rokestan. The MAM-L can strike targets up to 14 km away. In theory, the Turkish UCAVs with their small warhead (max. 22 kg) and limited engagement range are not ideal for S/DEAD missions. Turkey likely leveraged the inexperience of the Pantsir crew members, who are a combination of Russian mercenaries (Wagner) and poorly trained Libyans (it is unknown whether the Emirati military advisors play an active role in operating the Pantsirs).  

Bayraktar TB-2 armed with MAM-L and MAC-C missiles via IslamicWorldNews

Part of Turkey’s tactics are long-endurance ISR sorties (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) that identify the perfect window of opportunity for a strike. The footage in the BDA section shows that most of the attacks caught the Pantsirs unprepared and inactive after the Turkish drones had stalked them for an extended time.

It is furthermore possible that Turkey used the Koral Electronic Warfare (EW) system to jam, deceive or paralyze the Pantsir’s radar. An electronic attack could explain how the drones managed to get within firing range even when the air defenses were up and running. Turkey deployed the Koral in Libya as part of a broader military assistance package, which includes frigates, air defenses, and even Syrian rebels, in early 2020. 

The KORAL Mobile Radar Electronic Warfare System is composed of Electronic Support and Electronic Attack System each mounted on an eight by eight tactical truck (photo credits: ASELSAN)

THE HUNT: BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

The GNA claims that the drone campaign neutralized ten Pantsir S-1E air defense systems (9 destroyed, one captured) in four days, between 16 and 20 May. 

The GNA and affiliated press outlets released footage that confirms seven drone strikes, most of which have been validated through geolocation. Analysis of the footage, coupled with social media photos from the target sites, irrefutably prove that the raids hit five Pantsir batteries – four destroyed, one damaged. However, this does not mean that the rest of the strikes did not take place or that other missiles did not reach their targets. It is uncommon for militaries to publish targeting footage from all of their operations. 

We estimate that the loss of Pantsirs racks up a bill of at least $140 million for the United Arab Emirates, which supplied the systems to Haftar. 


16-18 MAY: RAID ON WATIYA AIR BASE

The GNA resumed its counter-offensive against the LNA in early May, pledging to recover Haftar’s gains from the past year. On 15 May, GNA forces encircled the LNA-held Watiya Air Base (WAB) in western Libya and called in Turkish air support to soften the enemy’s defenses. On the night of 16 May, Turkish drones took to the skies of Watiya and raided the strategic airbase. The drones struck two clamshell hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) in WAB’s southeast corner, damaging a Pantsir S-1E. The GNA captured the Pantsir (and a makeshift user manual) after the LNA withdrew from WAB on 20 May. 

The Pantsir S-1E system damaged after the drone raid on al-Watiya Air Base

The next day, Turkish drones bombed a third hangar, causing it to collapse on a Pantsir. Photos from the site show the Pantsir buried in concrete, seemingly totaled. This attack raised many questions, as the micro-munitions used by Turkish drones, do not pack a punch big enough to crumble a HAS. Possibly, a Turkish frigate off the Libyan coast launched a cruise missile that destroyed the “clamshell.” Alternatively, the drone attack triggered a series of secondary explosions, which caused the hangar to implode. 

BDA of the Al-Watiyah raids via ImageSat International

Left without anti-air cover and surrounded by the GNA, Haftar’s LNA withdrew from WAB on 18 May 2020. GNA militias secured the airbase immediately after. Social media postings of GNA fighters provide an on-site Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), which confirmes that one Patnsir was damaged and another destroyed (third hangar). 

The second Pantsir S-1 targeted, covered in concrete

The photos also showcased other military hardware left behind by the LNA, including several decommissioned Mirage-F1 and Su-22 (Fitter) aircraft and Mi-24 (Hind) and Mi-35 helicopters (Hind-E) dating back to the Gaddafi-era. 


18 MAY: SOUTH OF SIRTE

Hours before the LNA withdrew from WAB and some 300 km east, a Turkish drone executed another operation. The UCAV was monitoring an LNA military transport carrying an inactive Pantsir S-1 on its trailer. The truck was moving the Pantsir from Ghardabiya AB, near Sirte, to al-Jafra AB in central Libya. When the vehicle stopped around 70 km south of Sirte, the Turkish drone scored a direct hit on the Pantsir.

20 MAY: RAIDS ON TARHUNAH AND ELSEWHERE

Videos released to the press on 20 May, show a series of drone strikes that neutralized four Pantsirs in the town of Tarnurah. The airstrikes intended to soften Haftar’s defenses in the area.

The attack destroyed one inactive Pantsir, which was on the move in an intersection west of Tanurah. Two other Pantsirs were supposedly destroyed while sheltered in hangars. The videos show the missiles hitting the structures, but do not offer proof that confirms the “kills.” However, if the hangars were harboring Pantsirs, the air defense systems likely did not survive the attack. 

The fourth engagement shows an irrefutable kill of an active Pantsir – radar spinning and scanning. The official release claims that this strike also took place near Tarnurah.

The GNA also announced that it destroyed three other Pantsirs on the same day: two in “Wishka” and one in Suk el-Ahad. As they did not provide visual proof, we are unable to confirm the outcome or the location of the strikes. 


HAFTAR TO STRIKE BACK? 

The chief of the LNA’s air wing, Saqr Al-Jaroushi, vowed to unleash the “largest aerial campaign in Libyan history” with all Turkish positions now “legitimate targets for our airforce.” 

The GNA’s Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha said at least six MiG-29s (Fulcrum) and two Su-24s (Fencer) have flown into eastern Libya from Russia’s 55th Hmeimim Airbase in Syria, to bolster the LNA’s offensive capabilities. He added that Russian Air Force Su-35 air superiority fighters (Flanker-E) escorted the flight group. 

Mr. Bashagha’s accusations are consistent with unconfirmed reports from earlier this week, which claimed that six MiG-29s flew from Russia to Syria with a stop in Iran’s Hamadan Air Base. This formation may have continued to Libya. 



However, Scramble Magazine claims that the fighters jets were sent from Belarus, and not Russia. The aviation magazine assesses that the UAE procured MiG-29BM (Bolyshaya Modernizaciya) and Su-24M variants from the Belarussian Air Force for the LNA. They also said that Belarussian and Syrian pilots familiar with the airframes are likely involved in the operation. 

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) released by Maxar Technologies partially confirmes the reports. Satellite imagery of the LNA-held al-Jufra Air Base (JAB) shows at least one MiG-29 taxied on the runway as of 19 May. 

MiG-29 at al-Jufrah Air Base, Libya, on 19 May, via Digital Globe/ Maxar

Likely, JAB was also the destination of the Pantsir S-1E intercepted on the move south of Sirte on 18 May. It is possible that the Pantsir had been re-deployed to reinforce JAB’s aerial defenses before the aircraft build-up. 

Haftar’s aerial reinforcements signal that the Libyan Civil War will likely re-escalate. It remains to be seen how the GNA’s main allies, Turkey, Qatar, and Italy, will react. 

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NATO Special Operators Among First Responders at Kabul Maternity Ward Attack

American and possibly British, Norwegian, and Australian special operations forces (SOF) were part of the reaction force that responded to the maternity ward attack in Kabul (Afghanistan) on 12 May…

American and possibly British, Norwegian, and Australian special operations forces (SOF) were part of the reaction force that responded to the maternity ward attack in Kabul (Afghanistan) on 12 May 2020, according to Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). In the early hours of Tuesday, unidentified gunmen disguised as police officers stormed the Barchi National Hospital in Kabul. The attackers killed 24 people, including medical personnel, patients, and even two newborn babies. 



THE TIER ONE COUNTER-FORCE

In the SOF counterattack that ensued, the foreign and Afghan operators of the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222 managed to rescue 100 women and children, including three foreigners.

SOFs regularly operate without national identification and wear masks to conceal their identity for operation security (OPSEC) reasons and to preserve political deniability. Yet, there are still plenty of elements that can help identify a SOF group’s nationality, such as uniform camouflage patterns, gear, weapons, accessories, and other equipment pieces. 

Twitter users with knowledge of tactical equipment have recognized the country and units of the SOFs deployed on-site. As the tweets below show, one of the first special mission units identified is the Combat Applications Group(CAG) or 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), which is more commonly known as “Delta Force.” Specializing in counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and counter-proliferation, Delta is among the most secretive and lethal American SOF groups.

Twitter users recognized the American SOFs by their distinctive night-vision goggles (NVGs), custom pistol stock, pouch, and holster.  Social media speculations also place British SOFs, likely the Special Air Service (SAS) alongside Delta in one of the photos.

The Norwegian Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) is another foreign SOF group recognized by Twitter users. While less known than its anglophone counterparts, the FSK is one of the most experienced NATO special mission units. Besides Afghanistan, they also operated, and are probably still active in Syria and Iraq.  

As Twitter users pointed out, at least one Australian SOF was also present during the counter-terrorist raid. If indeed from the land down below, the operator was likely part of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), Australia’s equivalent of the British SAS. Australia is one of NATO’s closest strategic partners. Australian SOFs have seen extensive service alongside their Euro-Atlantic allies in the Global War on Terror.  

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION 

Regardless of their exact unit or nationality, it is virtually certain that foreign SOFs played a significant role in neutralizing the terrorist threat in Kabul. Without them and their Afghan counterparts, the death toll would have been dramatically higher. 

The foreign SOFs are in Afghanistan as part of their respective national military deployments. Their objective is to conduct counter-terrorism missions and train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army and Security Forces (ANASF). 

RSM Commands via NATO

Following the end of major combat operations, NATO initiated the Resolute Support Mission at the invitation of the Afghan government in 2015. RSM is a capacity-building operation and consists of 39 NATO and non-NATO participating states. RSM advisors train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Air Force (ANAF) so that Kabul can defend itself after the end of NATO’s military mandate. The RSM also helped the ANA build its first-ever SOF component, including the Crisis Response Unit 222, that spearheaded the response to the maternity attack. 

Afghan CRU 222 operators via Recoilweb.com

Apart from the RSM, the U.S. SOFs are also engaged in Operation “Freedom’s Sentinel,” an overseas contingency counter-terrorism mission against ISIS’s regional franchise, the “Islamic State-Khorasan” (IS-K).

IS-K LIKELY BEHIND THE ATTACK

While the horrific attack is still unclaimed, “Islamic State-Khorasan” (IS-K) is the likely culprit. The Dashti Barchi Hospital sits in a predominantly Shia neighborhood – an area that IS-K has also attacked in the past. 

Afghan intelligence has captured the IS-K commander and two of his aides in Kabul, just a day before the attack. The senior operatives were likely in Kabul to oversee the execution of the mission. 

Another circumstantial piece of evidence linking the massacre to IS-K was a second attack on 12 May 2020. A suicide bomber killed at least 32 people at a funeral in Nangarhar province. While Afghanistan experiences sporadic countrywide violence daily, the funeral and hospital attacks may be connected. 



Shiite communities are IS-K’s main targets apart from political institutions, according to our assessment from 2019, which you can find here. The attack is consistent with IS-K’s strict interpretation of Sunni Islam, militant Salafism, which views Shiites and other Muslim sects as heretics. IS-K uses sectarian and takfiri violence to mobilize hardcore Salafists/ Deobandi and establish an Islamic State in South Asia, encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region. 

IS-K has refrained from taking credit for its attacks in the past. In this case, the unclaimed attack on the maternity ward likely aimed at sabotaging the Afghan-Taliban peace process. By not claiming the attack, IS-K wanted to cast suspicion on the Taliban. IS-K has no interest in seeing a reduction of violence in Afghanistan. IS-K consists of disenfranchised Pakistani Taliban, splinter groups from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and a few foreign fighters. The Taliban is not only IS-K’s main competitor on the extremist market but also its existential threat. 

Afghanistan conflict map as of 29 February 2020 via Al-Jazeera

The Taliban has publicly denied involvement in the attack. While many Taliban cells continue to defy the “reduction of violence” agreement with Kabul, it is unlikely that the group was involved in the maternity ward massacre. Afghan President Ghani has nevertheless ordered the Afghan military to resume offensive operations against all militant groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. President Ghani was likely concerned to look weak in the face of Tuesday’s bloodbath in the center of Kabul. 

The Afghan peace process remains as fragile as always. 

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What We Learned From Israel’s Latest Airstrike Spree in Syria

Over the past eight years, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted over 300 “unclaimed” airstrikes against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and its axis of transnational Shiite militias (the…

Over the past eight years, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted over 300 “unclaimed” airstrikes against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and its axis of transnational Shiite militias (the Iranian Threat Network/ITN) in Syria. Israel’s covert air campaign aims to avert an Iranian entrenchment in Syria and prevent the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah and other militias that threaten Israel. 

In 2020, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted 14 operations in Syria (by the date of the publication of this analysis). The IAF operations have targeted at least 23 different locations all over Syria, except for the northeast corner. Five of the 23 airstrikes occurred in the two weeks between 20 April and 4 May, indicating an increase in Iranian threat network (ITN) activity. 

Thanks to ImageSatInternational’s battle-damage assessments and reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as well as social media intelligence (SOCMINT), we were able to draw the following conclusions:

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME

The recent Israeli airstrikes in the provinces of Quneitra, Suweida, Da’ara, and the Damascus area indicate that the IRGC’s external operations branch, the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), and the ITN still hold positions near the Israeli border despite Russian statements to the contrary. 



Southern Syria has been the IAF’s primary area of operations for the past eight years. The vast majority of IRGC weapon shipments end up in Syrian military bases around Damascus and warehouses across the Lebanese border. With the Israeli-held Golan Heights just a stone’s throw away, Jerusalem is concerned that the ITN will use southern Syria as a springboard to attack Israel.

The IAF has also raided Damascus International Airport (DAI), where IRGC-linked airliners deliver missiles, munitions, and other weapons. While DAI is probably one of the most recurrent targets of the IAF, the airstrike on 13 February 2020 marked a premier. After years of hesitation, the IAF bombed the IRGC’s headquarters in Syria, a three-floor glasshouse near the airport entrance. By the time of the strike, the Glasshouse had nevertheless become a symbolic target due to extensive media coverage. 

Like before, the IAF has also prosecuted high-value targets (HVT) targets on Syrian soil. In late February, the IAF successfully neutralized the local Hezbollah operative Imad Tawil who was driving in the town of Hader, near the Israeli border. Imad Tawil was facilitating Iran’s efforts to secure a foothold on the Golan Heights, according to local media reports.  

On 18 April, an Israeli drone unsuccessfully targeted Hezbollah commander Mustafa Mughniyeh, son of the group’s late second-in-command Imad Mughniyeh near the Lebanese border. As video surveillance seems to show, Mustafa Mughniyeh and his security detail managed to flee the vehicle before the bombs hit. 

ABU KAMAL IS THE NEW FLASHPOINT

The Syrian-Iraqi border became the IAF’s new focal point after IRGC-backed forces captured the town of Abu Kamal from ISIS in late 2017. Because of its geostrategic position, the border crossing near Abu Kamal is a critical node in Iran’s logistical land-bridge, which stretches from Iran to Lebanon (the “Shiite Crescent”). All Iranian weapons that enter Syria via Iraq have to pass through Abu Kamal. 

In 2019, Iran built an underground super-warehouse, called “Imam Ali” garrison, to shelter some of the cargo entering Syria. The Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), an umbrella of over 60 Iraqi (mostly) Shiite militias loyal to Iran, control the Imam Ali site as well as the entire Syrian-Iraqi border. Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr Organisation, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asaib al-Haq, and the Imam Ali Brigades (IAB) are some of the most influential PMU groups invested in Syria.

Key Iraqi PMUs, also known as “Special Groups” by the CIA (T-Intelligence). NOTE: Kataib Hezbollah’s Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis died in a US airstrike in Baghdad in January 2020.

Other Shiite militias, including Brigade 313 (Syrian), the Liwa Fatemiyoun (Afghan Shiite Hazaras), and Liwa Zainbiyoun (Pakistani Shiite Zaidi) are also operating in the area and elsewhere in Syria. SOHR estimates that the Iranian threat network (ITN) has around 6,200 fighters in the Mid-Euphrates River Valley (MERV) area. 

Naturally, the target-rich Abu Kamal area has become a hotspot of IAF activity. In 2020, the IAF bombed IRGC-QF and PMU positions in eastern Syria on three different occasions (January, March, and May). 

In January, Israeli aircraft destroyed an IAB convoy near Abu Kamal, resulting in 8 Iraqi militiamen KIA. The Iraqis were reportedly delivering missiles to Hezbollah. During the same raid, the IAF also struck an arms depot in the same area. 

On 11 March, the IAF prosecuted PMU installations around Abu Kamal again, including the “Imam Ali” garrison. Later in May, Israel raided a series of militia positions throughout the MERV. Overall, the three operations killed at least 48 Iraqi militiamen and Iranian operatives. 

Maintaining maximum pressure on the Abu Kamal logistic node is imperative for denying Iran freedom of movement in Syria. The IAF needs to demonstrate that no matter the distance, Israel is willing and able to prosecute targets anywhere in the region. To make the point even clearer, Israel raided IRGC and PMU positions in Iraq five times last year. 

THE IRGC IS MOVING UNDERGROUND

The IAF’s recent airstrikes revealed that the IRGC is increasingly relying on underground storage solutions to protect its weapons from Israeli attacks. While the Imam Ali garrison is the largest storage facility, Iran has built many other underground depots throughout Syria. 

Battle damage assessment (BDA) of the 20 April 2020 strike shows that Israel bombed nine underground storage facilities north of Palmyra. The bunkers likely harbored weapons delivered either by land via Abu Kamal or by air to the nearby Tyias Air Base.

A week later, on 27 April, Israel bombed a similar facility in Mezzeh Air Base in Damascus. While the airstrike damaged the entrance to the depot, it is unknown whether it also destroyed the underground bunker. Partly operated by the SyAAF Intelligence Directorate, one of the IRGC’s closest Syrian partners, Mezzeh Air Base is a safe-haven for Iran’s militias.  

If Iran continues to build storage bunkers, it will force Israel jets to fly with ground-penetrating ordnance instead of cruise missiles. As bombs have a smaller operational range than cruise missiles, the Israeli jets will need to fly closer to their targets, which will expose them further to Syrian air defenses. For example, the Delilah cruise missile can be fired from a maximum distance of 250 km away. In comparison, the GBU-39 small diameter bomb, which has a warhead four times bigger than Delilah’s, is only capable of traveling 64 km in ideal circumstances. A hardened penetration bomb as the BLU-109, with an 874 kg warhead, will require a release from an ever closer range. An increased payload also translates into a larger aircraft radar-cross section, making it easier for Syrian radars to detect the IAF jets, and a decreased flight maneuverability and range. 

An Israeli F-16I armed with a BLU-109 forged steel point tip, and a BLU109 JDAM, 2000lb bunker-buster penetration bomb.

ISRAEL CONTINUES TO DEFY THE SYRIAN S-300

Israel’s daring strikes near Homs and Shayrat, deep inside the engagement range of Syria’s S-300’s (NATO reporting name: SA-20B “Gargoyle”), have proved again that the IAF enjoys air superiority over Syria. While there are also topological and tactical factors at play, it is virtually certain by now that Russia, who gifted the S-300 to the SyAAF, has forbidden the Syrians from using it against Israeli aircraft (read more about the S-300 issue here).

Masyaf-based SA-20B approximate engagement range via T-Intelligence. (Radar detection is not modeled on the area’s topography)

On 31 March, the IAF disrupted flight operations at Shayrat Air Base by bombing the runway and air traffic control equipment. The attack also destroyed a warehouse, likely harboring Iranian weapons. However, after the Syrians patched the runway craters up and replaced the navigation beacons, aerial activity at Shayrat resumed within two weeks. 

On 1 May, another Israeli raid, this time near Homs, shook the earth when it destroyed a weapons depot, setting off a chain of secondary explosions. As the BDA shows, the Israeli attack has completely wiped out the warehouse and the adjacent parking lot.

HEZBOLLAH IS STILL RECEIVING PRECISION-GUIDED MISSILES 

On 4 May, Israeli missiles struck a missile production facility in al-Safirah, an area south of Aleppo. The al-Safirah plant is one of three facilities that are associated with the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the regime’s prime proliferator of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). While the SSRC has traditionally focused on producing Scud ballistic missiles and chemical agents for the Syrian regime, it now works under Iranian control to “home grow’ precision-guided munition (PGM) for Hezbollah and other groups. 

Back in 2016, Iran initiated a back-up plan to funnel PGM technology to Hezbollah, as a response to the relentless Israeli raids. Instead of struggling to deliver ready-made missiles, the IRGC shifted to smuggling GPS conversations kits and missile components to Hezbollah. Under Iranian supervision, Hezbollah engineers learned to produce the weapons themselves. Using specialized facilities, they aim to convert Hezbollah’s inventory of 150,000 “dumb” rockets into PGM (you can read more about the Iran-Hezbollah PGM program and Israel’s response to it, here).

In 2019, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) publicized the location of four such missile conversation and production sites in Lebanon, indicating that Iran PGM’s program is bearing fruit.

The PGM program, as all Iran extraterritorial activities, was directly supervised by the late Gen. Qasim Soleimani. Likely, his sudden assassination in Baghdad earlier this year interrupted the operation.  



However, the IAF’s airstrike on 4 May brought new evidence that Iran’s PGM “do-it-yourself” program is continuing and proliferating also inside Syria. If this is true, then Hezbollah and other militias hostile to Israel are still obtaining advanced striking capabilities from Iran despite Israel’s extensive air campaign for nearly a decade. 

Should Hezbollah manage to convert even a quarter of its inventory of 150,000 “dumb” rockets into missiles that can strike targets with pinpoint accuracy, Israel’s national security will be severely threatened.  


by HARM

Editing by Gecko

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Russian Pipelaying Vessel Enters Baltic Sea to Complete North Stream 2 

Gazprom’s pipelaying vessel “Akademik Cherskiy” is entering the Baltic Sea. The Russian-flagged vessel was likely dispatched to complete the remaining 6% of the controversial North Stream 2 gas pipeline. The…

Gazprom’s pipelaying vessel “Akademik Cherskiy” is entering the Baltic Sea. The Russian-flagged vessel was likely dispatched to complete the remaining 6% of the controversial North Stream 2 gas pipeline. The Akademik Cherskiy’s arrival in the Baltic Sea marks the end of a trip around the world that started in February 2020, when the vessel left its homeport Nakhodka on Russia’s Pacific coast. It is possible that the pipelayer will first conduct a port-call for maintenance and repairs in Kaliningrad or Sankt-Petersburg, before commencing work on the last segment of North Stream 2 near the Danish island of Bornholm. 


NORTH STREAM 2: A THREAT TO EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY 

North Stream 2 is a submarine pipeline that will carry natural gas from Russian fields to a terminal on Germany’s Baltic sea coast. The pipeline will more than double the existing capacity of the original North Stream, which was completed in 2011. Besides the Russian energy giant Gazprom, five European companies (OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper SE, Engie SA and Wintershall AG) participate in the North Stream 2 project.  

North Stream 2 route (source: ICIS.com)

North Stream 2 will significantly increase the EU’s dependency on Russian gas, which the Kremlin has never shied away from using as leverage. Considering the potential geopolitical impact of the pipeline, the Western European support of North Stream 2 has left the Eastern European countries feeling aghast and betrayed. While the EU has been advocating for the diversification of energy sources and suppliers for years, the Union’s core members now seem willing to continue embracing Russian gas.
Ukraine’s national security, in particular, will be impacted by North Stream 2. Before Russia’ annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of Eastern Ukraine, Gazprom was sending 60 percent of its gas exports to Europe through pipelines in Ukraine. While deliveries will continue until 2024, Ukraine’s status as a transit state for Russian gas will be weakened by the new pipeline. As a result, Kyiv will lose whatever geopolitical leverage it has against its hostile neighbor.  

US SANCTIONS FROZE PIPELINE AT 94%

Roughly 94 percent of the 1,230 kilometers (764 miles) long North Stream 2 pipeline was completed when the Trump administration put the companies of the consortium under sanctions.  The Swiss company Allseas Group SA stopped the process of laying underwater pipes in late December 2019, leaving a small gap in the pipeline located in Danish waters around the island of Bornholm (between Sweden and Germany’s Baltic coast).  Since then, the Kremlin has been scrambling for options to continue construction. The delay will push the opening to mid-2020 at the earliest. In 2019, the Russian Foreign Minister named the pipelaying vessel Akademik Cherskiy, which has now arrived in the Baltic Sea, as one of the available options to complete the pipeline. 



EURO-ATLANTIC SPLIT 

If work on North Stream 2 resumes, the split between the United States and the EU countries that participate in the energy project will likely deepen. The Central and Eastern member states of the EU will continue to side with the U.S. and promote the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The 3SI’s main project is to facilitate the influx of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the Eastern European energy market as an affordable alternative to crude Russian gas. To this end, Poland has invested generously in its Swinoujscie LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea coast, where vessels from the United States can unload cargo.

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Iran’s Space Launch Advances Ballistic Missile Tech, Violating U.N Sanctions

With the successful space launch of the “Nour-1” spy satellite on April 22, the Islamic Republic of Iran has likely violated international sanctions. The trouble with Iran’s recent space launch…

With the successful space launch of the “Nour-1” spy satellite on April 22, the Islamic Republic of Iran has likely violated international sanctions. The trouble with Iran’s recent space launch is the delivery platform – the Qased Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) – not the payload – the “Nour-1” military satellite (mil-sat). As SLV technology is interchangeable with ballistic missile (BM) technology, space launches can help to extend missile range, increase stability and payload capacity. 

Noor/ Nour-1 mil-sat launch on 22 April 2020. GEOINT analysis by T-Intelligence / Image courtesy of Planet Labs.



SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE: FROM AND FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES

The “Qased” SLV (Courier in Persian) is a hybrid between the “Shahab-3” medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), with which it shares the first liquid-fuel stage, and the “Salman” solid rocket engine that provided the technology for the second stage. The third stage is likely also solid-fuel based. The multi-stage rocket allowed Qased to reach an apogee of over 420 km, despite its heavy payload. 

Iran’s proven ability to develop three-stage solid-fuel rockets, capable of boosting the payload at longer ranges and to higher altitudes than before, is a breakthrough in the pursuit of long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which could reach the United States and all of Europe.

Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, stands in front of the Qased before launch. Photo credit: Tasnim news.

This is why Iran violated UNSC Resolution 2231, which calls on Iran to avoid “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.”

PAYLOAD ENABLES IRANIAN GEOINT CAPABILITY

Having the Nour-1 satellite in space is not a game-changer, although this will enable Iran to collect Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) without depending on third-parties. The mil-sat operates in the Low-Earth Orbit, namely in a 444 x 426 km orbit at 59.8 degrees inclination, and circles the Earth every 90 minutes (high temporal resolution), which makes it ideal for remote sensing. Nour-1 is believed to have a reasonably high resolution and will reportedly be joined by two other spy satellites in the future.

The upper photo shows Nour-1 completing a pass over the continental United States. The lower photo shows the satellite high above the northern Arabian peninsula. (Screenshot from a satellite tracker)

Nour-1’s success is, however, largely political and for domestic consumption. On the one hand, the launch has broken the decade-long spell of unsuccessful launches and stagnant research. On the other hand, it validated the IRGC-AF’s space program, which was responsible for the space launch, to the detriment of the Iranian Space Agency.

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Kim Jong-Un: Chilling in Wonsan or Secretly Dead?

More and more reports about North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s deteriorating health are surfacing. U.S intelligence and recently South Korean and Japanese press have suggested that Kim Jong-Un (KJU) is…

More and more reports about North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s deteriorating health are surfacing. U.S intelligence and recently South Korean and Japanese press have suggested that Kim Jong-Un (KJU) is in critical condition after a failed emergency heart surgery in mid-April. China, North Korea’s main ally, has reportedly sent a medical team led by a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department to check on KJU’s health. 

Standing at 5-foot-7 and weighing roughly 300 pounds, KJU is considered “severely obese.” He was last seen on April 11, when he presided over a party meeting and has reportedly visited a military airbase north of Pyongyang the next day. 

Bearing in mind that KJU disappeared from public life before, the rumors of his death should be taken with a grain of salt. In 2014 he was not seen for nearly six weeks, reportedly due to cyst removal surgery, before reappearing with a cane. 

What makes things different this time is that KJU missed the country’s most important holiday on April 15, the birthday of North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-Sen. 



ALIVE AND WELL IN WONSAN?

The South Korean Presidential Palace has been quick to dismiss the reports, claiming that KJU is “alive and well” and that he has been residing at his seacoast villa in Wonsan since April 13. 

Satellite imagery pulled by 38thNorth confirms that KJU’s train is indeed at the Leadership Railway Station in Wonsan, but it only arrived between April 15 and 21. 

The South Korean statements and the geospatial intelligence are consistent with other reports that the North Korean dictator has been out of the country’s capital Pyongyang for the past weeks. However, they do not clarify KJU’s health status or his whereabouts.   

 

NO CLEAR SUCCESSION PLAN

In the event of KJU’s death, the North Koreans would likely delay the official announcement until an heir to the throne is chosen. 

The lack of a clear successor is the main critical uncertainty that would result from KJU’s death.  This question is particularly worrisome, as the succession will determine who is in control of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the arsenal of ballistic missiles, and other WMD programs. That person would also inherit one of the most repressive totalitarian regimes and a starving population caught in the middle of a pandemic. 

Photo of Kim Yo-Jong’s via Reuters

It is unknown whether KJU named a successor in the event of his demise, but the options considered in intelligence circles are the following:

  • His sister, Kim Yo-Jong. 
  • A general or a military junta with or without the support of the Korean Workers Party. 
  • A regency between Kim Yo-Jong and senior military heads backed by the Korean Workers Party. 

Any succession would be temporary until one of KJU’s two children will be old enough to take power. The continuation of the Kim dynasty (or Paektu bloodline) is critical for the survival of the regime in Pyongyang. 

MILITARY READINESS AT HISTORICAL HIGH

The United States, South Korean, and Japan fear that the death of KJU could cause the collapse of the regime and result in a vacuum of power with multiple factions fighting for power. North of the 38th parallel, the North Korean military, and the Korean Workers Party fear that any vacuum, even if temporary, would embolden their enemies to pray on the leaderless and mourning nation. 



The signs of anxiety on Pyongyang’s part are clear. The North Korean military readiness remains at a historical high, with the air force and artillery units showing an unusual increase in operations.

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