Category: News

T-Intell’s OSINT Training Marks One Year Anniversary

On 15 November 2021, T-Intelligence’s sister branch and training service, Knowmad OSINT, marked one year since its inception. Around 100 people went through the Knowmad OSINT training to acquire or…

On 15 November 2021, T-Intelligence’s sister branch and training service, Knowmad OSINT, marked one year since its inception. Around 100 people went through the Knowmad OSINT training to acquire or enhance their OSINT skills during the past year. Students, career starters, seasoned professionals, and hobbyists took up our course. Various Individuals, private companies, and government-sector agencies entrusted us with OSINT training, including one of the world’s leading postgraduate programs in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies

 


When planning started for the course, seeing the increased interest on the civilian job market for OSINT skills, we based our training design on three main pillars:

  1. OSINT for all: we wanted our course to be accessible to beginners and bring value to established professionals. In addition, our content and lessons would be exclusively based on openly and freely available resources so that participants do not stumble across paywalls or other barriers. 
  2. INT back into OSINT: First and foremost, OSINT is an intelligence practice at its core. Our training underscores this aspect and takes an interdisciplinary and analytical approach to OSINT.
  3. More than just an INT: While honouring OSINT’s original mission in national security and defense, we choose to take an innovative approach to the field. We wanted our course to embody Mark Lowenthal’s idea from the late 1990s, namely that OSINT is slowly becoming a facet of the other collection disciplines. As a result, our course covers the open-source applications of IMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT/SOCMINT.

We’re happy to report that our training helped people break into the intelligence field, climb the job ladder or find their calling as early career-starters. We want to thank everyone, not only our Knowmads but also our T-Intelligence readers, for tuning in for our periodical articles and engaging with us on social media. It’s been a blast! 

Moving forward into Year Two, Knowmad OSINT will continue to grow and proliferate OSINT expertise to both the public and clandestine communities. T-Intelligence will continue to provide the OSINT action it has done for the past five years. 

If you or your organization is interested in developing OSINT skills, send us a message! 

The T-Intelligence & Knowmad OSINT team

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Attack at Al-Tanf Garrison

A remote U.S. military outpost in southern Syria, known as al-Tanf Garrison (ATG) has been attacked on October 20th. Initial reports, later confirmed by officials speaking on conditions of anonymity to US press, said…

A remote U.S. military outpost in southern Syria, known as al-Tanf Garrison (ATG) has been attacked on October 20th. Initial reports, later confirmed by officials speaking on conditions of anonymity to US press, said the strike included unmanned aerial systems (likely bomb-laden) and indirect fire – suggesting artillery or rockets. 

Pictures on social media show several structures destroyed. According to one official, drones may have hit both the U.S. and the Syrian opposition side of the base. No injuries or fatalities have been reported so far. 

The “Allies of Syria Operations Room,” likely an Iranian backed militia, has claimed responsibility for the attack. The operational design is consistent with past Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq. 

VISUAL EVIDENCE CONFIRMS DAMAGE

Visual forensics confirm the images’ authenticity. Reverse image searches suggest that photos are authentic and not recycled from other events, while geolocation using available overhead imagery validates that the pictured site is indeed al-Tanf. 

imagery: Maxar Technologies / annotations: T-Intelligence *The image is outdated (2020) and is only for reference

Satellite imagery allows a comparison of the location in the days preceding and following the attack. The darker areas, visible in the base’s center (see 2021.10.22), are likely impact marks or ground scarring resulting from the attack.

Preliminary-Battle Damage Assessment using Planet imagery shows an impact point in the middle of the base. Other “darkened dots” appear elsewhere in the base perimeter but we cannot validate those as impact points due to insufficient evidence.

THE CURIOUS CASE OF ATG

The Al-Tanf Garrison (ATG) and the surrounding 55 km exclusion zone are located near Syria’s border with Jordan and Iraq. Initially built to train and equip local Syrian opposition fighters, namely Maghawir al-Tawhra, and interdict ISIS activity along the tri-border area, ATG has since become a lynchpin against Iranian-backed transnational movements. 

ATG is positioned along the critical M2 highway, linking Damascus to Baghdad, a more direct route for Iranian-backed militias to move supplies and fighters in southern Syria and beyond. While ATG blocks the shortest land route from Iran to Damascus or Beirut via Iraq, the IRGC can still move forces through the strategic Al Bukamal border crossing and central Syria. Nevertheless, ATG remains an uncomfortable outpost of the Iranian operations in Syria as it provides the US monitoring and prompt attack capabilities. 


by Giulia Prior

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NATO ISR Planes Monitor Russian Military Build-Up

U.S. and British reconnaissance aircraft are intensively monitoring eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia’s Black Sea coast amid fears of a renewed Russian offensive. RUSSIA’S 2021 BEAR SCARE In the past…

U.S. and British reconnaissance aircraft are intensively monitoring eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia’s Black Sea coast amid fears of a renewed Russian offensive.

RUSSIA’S 2021 BEAR SCARE

In the past month, Russia has moved over 14,000 soldiers and a vast array of capabilities, including Iskander ballistic missiles,  tanks, howitzers, and thermobaric rocket launchers towards the Ukrainian border. Russia then launched thousands of snap exercises countrywide and established new field camps. One staging ground in Voronezh oblast, hosting over 400 military assets, has all the hallmarks of a logistics node that could support a line of communication into Ukraine. 

OSINT map aggregating and georeferencing videos of Russian military movements near Ukraine, as documented on social media between March 27-30 (T-Intelligence)

Russia’s recent troop movements have alarmed the international community that fears a reignition of the war in eastern Ukraine or, even worse, the opening of a new front from Crimea. 

Operating from international and Ukrainian airspace, U.S. and British drones and other specialized aircraft collect updated, real-time intelligence on Russia’s nefarious activities. Given the types of aircraft visible on openly available flight trackers, the two NATO members primarily collect imagery (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). 

IMINT ON DEMAND: RQ-4 IS OUR “FORTE”

Operated by the United States Air Force (USAF), the RQ-4 Global Hawk drone is at the forefront of Washington’s ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) operations in the Black Sea region. Based in Naval Air Station Sigonella (Italy), the RQ-4 Global Hawk with registration number 11-2049, either callsign FORTE10 and FORTE11, conducts frequent flights over eastern Ukraine. 

USAF RQ-4 drone at Naval Air Station Sigonella (T-Intelligence/Maxar Technologies)

Th RQ-4 Global Hawk is a long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), meaning it has a 24 hour+ flight autonomy. Combined with hi-resolution cameras, the RQ-4 can provide a crystal-clear, live feed of Donetsk and Luhansk’s frontlines to decision-makers and commanders back at base. As seen in the screenshots attached, the RQ-4 loiters extensively and publicly over designated areas of interest. 

Example of flight path taken by a USAF RQ-4 drone on ISR mission (T-Intelligence/ FlightRadar24)

While FORTE10 was a daily visitor of the region even before the latest escalation, its recent activities are likely connected with Russia’s troop build-up. In the screenshot below (11 April), the RQ-4 (now FORTE 11) was orbiting over the Kherson-Mariupol area, north of Crimea, after completing multiple passes over the frontline in Donbas.

The drone’s flight path is unusual and suggests that U.S. commanders are seriously considering that Russia might open a new front in the war against Ukraine and seize the Crimean canal. 

The same RQ-4 drone (reg. no. 11-2049) using callsign FORTE 11 on 11 April while surveilling the area north of Crimea (source: @GDarkconrad)

Ukraine dammed the North Crimean Canal in 2014. As a result, the Russian-occupied Crimea lost nearly 90% of its fresh water supply, leaving it dry. While Moscow plans to solve this issue by re-routing four rivers into the Mezhgorny reservoir by 2024, many observers fear that Russia might use military action to seize the Crimean dam. 

Besides the “daily FORTE”, there various other NATO country platforms surveilling the Black Sea region.

POSEIDON IS WATCHING

Best known for its submarine-hunting capabilities, the U.S. Navy’s P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MAP) also packs a substantial ISR capability. Using its powerful APY-10 multi-mode synthetic aperture radar, the P-8A can detect, classify and track surfaced vessels. The P-8A Poseidon surveillance system also includes the MX-20 – a modular HD imaging system with large-aperture lenses for high magnification, laser-range finding, and laser illumination. 

USN P-8A Poseidon aircraft on the second ramp at Naval Air Station Sigonella (Italy) – T-Intelligence/Maxar Technologies via Google Maps

Besides IMINT, the P-8A can exploit emission from the electromagnetic spectrum. Thanks to its ALQ-240 Electronic Support Measure (ESM) suite, the P-8 can geo-locate and classify enemy radar emitters. On top of that, the P-8 can launch drones equipped with specialized sensors to detect submarines based on fluctuations in the Earth’s magnetic field.

This sensor fusion is invaluable to keep a watch on the Russian Navy’s activity around the Crimea peninsula and Krasnodar Krai. The Poseidon becomes an ever more relevant platform as Russia recently announced that it would deploy ten warships from the Caspian Sea into the Black Sea. 

OLD TIMERS LISTENING IN: P-3C ORION AND ARIES II

The Poseidon’s predecessor platform, the P-3 Orion, is the U.S.’s other platform tasked with monitoring Russia’s build-up from an air-naval perspective. A rare occurrence, the P-3 acts as a force multiplier for the U.S. ISR efforts.

We have observed two P-3 variants operating in the area: the P-3C Orion and the EP-3E ARIES. While the Orion is an old airframe, it can still pull its weight in maritime intelligence collection and fulfil SIGINT duties. 

Photo of the ARIES II aircraft (reg. no. 161410) conducting Black Sea missions (copyright: Levery)

The other variant observed is an evolution and conversion of the Orion, known as the EP-3E ARIES II (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System II). Operated by a crew of 22+ specialists, ARIES II provides near real-time tactical SIGINT and full-motion video intelligence to commanders. ARIES can also intercept human communications (Communication Intelligence/ COMINT) and exploit a wide range of electronic emissions from deep within enemy territory. 

Plus, the EP-3E ARIES flight crew also brought some humor into the mix. During a flight around Crimea on 10 April, an ARIES II appeared on flight trackers with the callsign “AK47,” and claimed to be an “AirAsia” flight. 

ARIES II aircraft (callsign AK47, reg. no. 161410) from Souda Bay Naval Air Station on Black Sea mission on 12 April (T-Intelligence/ FlightRadar24)

ELECTRONIC STALKERS: RC-135W RIVET JOINT FLIGHTS

The last but not least platform active in the area is the Royal Air Force’s RC-135W Rivet Joint, operated by the 51st Squadron from RAF Waddington. The RC-135W is an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) aircraft that can monitor radars, communications, and other signals emitted by the Russian units in Crimea. 

ELINT aircraft are particularly good at mapping out the enemy’s Electronic Order of Battle (EOB). EOB typically includes the identity, capability, operating details, and location of enemy threat emitters and their role within an integrated air defense network.

Compilation of RC-135W Rivet Joint missions near Crimea (T-Intelligence/ FlightRadar24)

RC-135W aircraft have started regularly operating in the Black Sea in late February/early March. This is likely when the first signs of Russian troop movements became apparent to the American and British intelligence community. Two RC-135W aircraft (reg. ZZ666 and ZZ664) conducted the recon runs using at least four different callsigns – RRR7227, RRR7238, RRR7239 and RRR7240. 

ISR PARTIES

Many of the aircraft listed have also operated simultaneously in the Black Sea theater. The tweet attached shows the airspace over the Black Sea on 6 April. 

An RQ-4 UAV was completing its second orbit over Severomonsk, while the RAF’s RC-135W was active near the Kerch Strait. Outbound from Sigonella, a P-8A Poseidon was on its way to join to ISR party. 

Another mentionable ISR party took place on 14 April and featured a different assembly of allied aircraft. A U.S. EP-3E Aries II from Souda Bay (reg. no. 16140) scanned Crimea’s southern coast for signals and other emissions. Further down south, a Turkish Navy ATR C-72-600 aircraft was patrolling the Black Sea’s midsection, making a rare appearance on flight trackers. The “no callsign” aircraft is the US Navy’s P-8A Poseidon (outbound from Sigonella) on its way for another mission over the Black Sea. 

14 April: Aries II SIGINT plane (USN, not USAF as shown on flight radar), C-72-600 maritime patrol aircraft (Turkish Navy), P-8A Poseidon and a RQ-4 Global Hawk drone (NATO – not pictured) are active over the Black Sea in a joint ISR mission (T-Intelligence/FlightRadar24)

One of NATO’s few independently-operated RQ-4 Global Hawks was was also active in the region. However, the drone deactivated its transponder before we had the chance to screenshot it.

PREVENTING SURPRISES

ISR platforms such as those observed on flight trackers enable commanders and decision-makers to “see and hear” what the Russian military is preparing near Ukraine. These missions are critical to ensure that NATO will not be caught by surprise should Russia mount a new sneak attack.

While Russia’s build-up is at 2014-2015 levels and poses a credible threat, there is still no clear indication that Moscow intends to launch a new offensive in Ukraine. 

T-Intelligence will continue to monitor the situation. 


by HARM

This article has been updated on 14 April to include a new image of an ISR “party” and a paragraph explaining it. 

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Satellite Imagery shows Russian Military Staging Ground near Ukraine

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) shows a Russian military staging ground in Voronezh oblast. The newly discovered site has the hallmarks of a logistics node that could sustain a line of communication…

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) shows a Russian military staging ground in Voronezh oblast. The newly discovered site has the hallmarks of a logistics node that could sustain a line of communication to the Ukrainian border. 

A Conflict Intelligence Team (CITEAM) investigation revealed that many of the Russian military columns tracked by the OSINT community, including T-Intelligence, for the past days, have reached their destination. CITEAM’s study points to a rural location near Pogonovo training center, south of Voronezh city

Armed with this information, we pulled 3m/px satellite imagery of the site. Temporal analysis (2 April vs. 6 April) indicates a dramatic increase in vehicle activity and infrastructure on 6 April 2021. 

2 April vs. 6 April 2021: a countryside location south of Voronezh city becomes a staging ground for Russia’s recent troop build-up. (T-Intelligence)

High-resolution satellite imagery obtained by the New York Times provides a detailed look into the staging ground.    

Approximately 400 vehicles are visible on the satellite imagery. Armored personnel carriers make up the bulk of the forces amassed at the staging ground. Heavy artillery, including 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers and TOS-1 Thermobaric rocket launchers, is also present in large numbers. 

The military has also established semi-permanent living facilities such as barracks and field hospitals. With constructions visibly ongoing, the staging ground is expected to grow.

Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Samy regions are five hours away from the staging ground, significantly closer than Luhansk (under separatist/Russian control). 

If the staging ground is to support a conventional offensive in Ukraine, it will likely serve as a near-theater logistics node, facilitating the flow of assets further down the line of communication. It is possible that other, smaller nodes are already being established and serviced closer to the border.

Despite the recent findings, there is still no indication that a new Russian attack is imminent. 


by HARM

See our previous situation reports on Russia’s latest troop movements (April 2; April 7)

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Russia Brags About Bombing Syrian Hospital To Prove ‘Iskander’ Works

Armenia’s Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan shocked the Russian Defense Ministry when he complained about the Iskander-E missile system’s ineffectiveness in a public interview (23 February 2021). PM Pashinyan said that the Iskander missiles launched…

Armenia’s Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan shocked the Russian Defense Ministry when he complained about the Iskander-E missile system’s ineffectiveness in a public interview (23 February 2021). PM Pashinyan said that the Iskander missiles launched during the short war with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region “didn’t explode or maybe 10 percent of them exploded.” When asked why the Iskander disappointed, Pashniyan hinted at the missile’s old age: “I don’t know… maybe they were weapons from the ‘80s.”

“IT WORKS JUST FINE”

In response to Pashiynan’s claims, Russia has released a video montage showing two successful Iskander strikes – both ballistic and cruise missile variants – in Syria. But instead of clearing the Iskander’s name, Russia has inadvertently proved that it has targeted hospitals – an allegation that Moscow has perpetually disputed despite evidence to the contrary from open-source investigations (e.g. New York Times) and even the United Nations (UN). 

The second clip from the compilation shows an Iskander missile hitting an H-shaped building. Twitter user and geolocation wizard @obretix identified the target as a hospital in Azaz, near the Turkish border. While the footage is undated, the attack seems to match reports from early 2016 about an unclaimed strike on Azaz hospital. 

HOSPITAL ATTACK TOOK PLACE IN EARLY 2016

An Airwars assessment from 19 January 2016, quoting two Syrian sources, informs: “Russian forces targeted the town of Azaz with two ballistic missiles, causing the death of one civilian and injury of several others.”

A Reuters report from 15 Feb 2016 similarly mentions an unattributed missile strike on a “hospital and school sheltering refugees in Azaz, Syria,” quoting local residents and medics. A Physicians Across Continents (PAC) Facebook post corroborates the Reuters report and describes an airstrike on Azaz hospital. 

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from that time is sparse and does not cover every day. However, when comparing imagery from 17 January vs. 16 February, there seems to be a “splash” mark on the impact area seen in the footage.

T-Intell retroactive battle-damage assessment of Iskander strike on Azaz hospital @ Sentinel 2 satellite images via Sentinel Hub and frame extracted from RIA footage

Google Earth Pro high-resolution imagery from 20 March 2016 shows the same area at Aziz hospital visibly scared.

Azaz Hospital on 20.3.2016 © Maxar Technologies via Google Earth Pro

In conclusion, Russia’s Iskander attack on the hospital took place before mid-March 2016, and very likely between 17 January and 16 February.

Turkey has since repaired and renovated the hospital, and it is now functional again. 

BACKFIRE

The Iskander is not the first Russian system that is publicly scrutinized. Observers, including T-Intelligence, have noted the ease with which Turkish drones managed to hunt down Russian-made Pantsir aerial defense systems in Syria and Libya. The Russian Defense Ministry is growing increasingly defensive about the effectiveness of its capabilities. However, with this latest “public relations” stunt, Russia has foremost proven that it bombs hospitals, not that the Iskander-E works. 

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Russian Pipe-Layer Resumes Work on Nord Stream 2

The Russian-flagged “Fortuna” pipe-laying vessel has resumed work on the controversial “Nord Stream 2” pipeline on January 24. AIS trackers show Fortuna anchored 27 km south of Bornholm island (Denmark),…

The Russian-flagged “Fortuna” pipe-laying vessel has resumed work on the controversial “Nord Stream 2” pipeline on January 24. AIS trackers show Fortuna anchored 27 km south of Bornholm island (Denmark), where gaps remain in the 94%-completed pipeline. 

Overview of Fortuna’s location

Owned by “KVT-RUS,” a Russian company, Fortuna has been recently sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury over its involvement in the Nord Stream 2 project. Any company that does business with Fortuna or its owner, whether a port that provides servicing or an insurer, risks losing access to the U.S. financial system

Thanks to Sentinel-1’s synthetic aperture radar, we can see the ship formation through cloud cover and confirm Fortuna’s location. Dated January 24, the low-res imagery shows Fortuna positioned for pipe-laying operations and assisted by tugs, and other support vessels. 

Sentinel-1 SAR shows Fortuna initiating pipe-laying operations

Fortuna left the German port of Rostock after Danish authorities cleared further constructions on Nord Stream 2 on January 15. Berlin has also greenlighted work on the pipeline in German waters. 

UNSTOPPABLE

It seems that the Nord Stream 2 will go ahead despite bipartisan U.S. sanctions, criticism from Eastern European states, and even a recent resolution passed by the European Parliament that urges Brussels to halt the project. While opposition to the project grew in Germany following Navalny’s poisoning and arrest, Chancellor Merkel remains steadfast.  

The German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpomman even plans to establish an “expandable” foundation to shield the companies involved in Nord Stream 2. The German foundation “for environmental protection” will absorb the heat of U.S. sanctions such as freezing assets, as it does not have commercial plans beyond the pipeline. As a result, the real stakeholders will be unharmed – at least in theory. This operation’s success will largely depend on the Biden administration’s willingness to sanction Germany over Nord Stream 2. 

KEY BACKGROUND

What is Nord Stream 2?

Nord Stream 2 is a submarine pipeline that will carry natural gas from Siberia to a terminal on Germany’s Baltic sea coast. Russian energy giant Gazprom owns 50% of the pipeline. Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper SE, Engie SA, and Wintershall AG hold the rest. Nord Stream 2 is 1,200 km long and will double the throughput of Nord Stream 1.  

Nord Stream 2 map (source: Gazprom)

Why did work on Nord Stream 2 stop?

U.S. sanctions temporarily froze the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In December 2019, the Swiss company “Allseas” suspended pipe-laying operations after it came in the crosshairs of U.S. departments of State and Treasury. Since then, the Nord Stream 2 consortium has scrambled to devise countermeasures against U.S. sanctions, and searched for a new pipe-laying vessel. 

The consortium contracted Fortuna and the Gazprom-owned Akademik Cherskiy” to complete the job. T-Intelligence wrote about Akademik Cherskiy’s entrance into the Baltic Sea in March 2020, after a nine-month voyage from Russia’s far east. The pipe-layer is currently docked in Wismar, Germany. 

Why is Nord Stream 2 a problem?

  • The project strengthens Russia’s grip on European energy. Nord Stream 2 goes against NATO’s and the European Union’s energy security policies that call for diversifying suppliers so that 30 or 27 nations are not at the mercy of one supplier. As the dominant force on Europe’s energy market, Russia has a long history of using gas exports as a tool of coercion. Gas is also a significant component of the Kremlin’s broader “hybrid warfare” strategy that aims to expand its influence using means other than military. 
  • It undermines Transatlantic unity. A highly divisive topic, Nord Stream 2 exacerbated existing rifts between the U.S (supported by Eastern European states) and NATO’s European core, led by Germany. 
  • It weakens Eastern Europe. Nord Stream 2 will reduce Russia’s dependence on Ukraine and Poland to transport gas into Europe. This could open up eastern Europe to more strong-arm tactics, including further aggression against Ukraine. 

by IRT

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Azerbaijan Adds Armenian S-300 to Kill List

Azerbaijan has destroyed an Armenian S-300PS air defense system (AIFC/NATO: SA-10 “Grumble”) on 17 September 2020. The Azeri Ministry of Defense has released footage of an air strike on at…

Azerbaijan has destroyed an Armenian S-300PS air defense system (AIFC/NATO: SA-10 “Grumble”) on 17 September 2020. The Azeri Ministry of Defense has released footage of an air strike on at least two entities consistent with S-300 tractor erector launchers (TELs). The blast radius indicates that Azerbaijan has used a heavy payload, possibly the Israeli ballistic missile LORA. 

Geolocation puts the strike location in Syunik province in southeastern Armenia. The attack marks another direct engagement between Armenia and Azerbaijan outside of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. 

STRIKE THREE?

This is the third time that Azerbaijan has neutralized Armenian S-300 hardware components in the past month. On 29 September, a video of what appears to be an S-300 TEL in the crosshairs of a drone was leaked online. The footage does not show the actual strike, but the target was geolocated near Xankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh – a known S-300 site. 

On October 10, the Azeri military released several videos showing the destruction of various S-300 hardware components, including two 36D6 “Tin Shield” radars and one 5P85 TEL, based in Kaghnut, Armenia. One of the radars was active and spinning during the attack. 

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The persistent targeting of Armenia’s S-300 marks a clear change in Azerbaijan’s mission objectives. After successfully employing drone warfare in Nagorno Karabakh to clear out Armenian frontline positions, Azerbaijan is now knocking down the door of Armenia’s airspace and weakening Yerevan’s defensive position. 

Armenia’s strategic deterrent depends on the notorious Iskander ballistic missile system (SS-26 “Stone ‘) for offense and the S-300 for defense. The collapse of one of these assets would significantly weaken Armenia’s hand. 


This article was made using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools and techniques. Learn how to do that too on Knowmad OSINT

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Russia Sends Fighter Jets to Libya

Russia has deployed military aircraft to Libya to support General Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) from the United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM) shows. The new…

Russia has deployed military aircraft to Libya to support General Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) from the United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM) shows. The new intelligence confirms claims, previously made by the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, that Haftar is receiving aerial reinforcements from Russia. 

Recently, the LNA has been caught on their heels by the GNA. Backed by Turkish airpower, the GNA has forced the LNA out of strategic positions in northwestern Libya. The GNA’s successful offensive and Turkey’s aerial onslaught have marked the most significant setback for Haftar yet. The Russian intervention aims to tip the balance back into the LNA’s favor. 



FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE: A FOURTH GENERATION PACKAGE

The flock of Russian fourth-generation aircraft deployed to Libya consists of at least four MiG-29 multi-role fighters (NATO Reporting name: Fulcrum) and an unknown number of Su-24 (Fencer) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers. Two Su-35 air superiority fighters (Flanker-E) of the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) provided counter-air escort for the formation. 

The aircraft first relocated from Astrakhan (Russia) to Hmeimim Air Base near Latakia, Syria with a stopover at Hamadan Air Base Iran) to refuel on 12 and 14 May.

At Hmeimin Air Base, they received a new paint job to camouflage their origin and refueled before continuing to Libya on 18 May.

When they entered Libyan airspace, the unmarked Russian aircraft made another refueling stop near Tobruk. They then resumed their journey to al-Jafra Air Base on the same day. At least 14 unmarked Russian aircraft were delivered to al-Jafra using this air bridge, according to US AFRICOM. 

On the next day, satellite imagery showed a MiG-29 Fulcrum on the taxiway of the LNA-held al-Jafra Air Base. The geospatial imagery prompted extensive speculations regarding the ownership of the aircraft on social media. Some claimed that the MiG-29 is a RuAF jet. Others argued that the United Arab Emirates bought it from Belarus for Haftar’s air wing. 

While we know that the aircraft belong to the RuAF now, it is still unknown who will operate them. Faced with a massive shortage of trained personnel, the LNA has previously hired mercenary pilots for its legacy Su-22s and MiG-23s. Fourth-generation fighter jets are nevertheless a completely different league. Even the most experienced pilots require months of training to master these machines. While Russia may have sent pilots, the Kremlin traditionally prefers to operate in the shadows. Russia makes extensive use of state-backed private military corporations (PMCs) and irregular forces to do dirty work overseas instead. 

STATE-BACKED MERCENARIES 

It is noteworthy that US AFRICOM specifically identified the “Wagner Group” PMC as the primary beneficiary of Russia’s new air power in Libya. While the Russian government has never officially acknowledged the existence of Wagner, the PMC has been the go-to choice of the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU), when it comes to outsourcing politically sensitive external operations. Wagner is known for fighting in Eastern Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, and other countries. 


The article was updated to include the latest information released by US AFRICOM on 27 May 2020.

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NATO Special Operators Among First Responders at Kabul Maternity Ward Attack

American and possibly British, Norwegian, and Australian special operations forces (SOF) were part of the reaction force that responded to the maternity ward attack in Kabul (Afghanistan) on 12 May…

American and possibly British, Norwegian, and Australian special operations forces (SOF) were part of the reaction force that responded to the maternity ward attack in Kabul (Afghanistan) on 12 May 2020, according to Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). In the early hours of Tuesday, unidentified gunmen disguised as police officers stormed the Barchi National Hospital in Kabul. The attackers killed 24 people, including medical personnel, patients, and even two newborn babies. 



THE TIER ONE COUNTER-FORCE

In the SOF counterattack that ensued, the foreign and Afghan operators of the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222 managed to rescue 100 women and children, including three foreigners.

SOFs regularly operate without national identification and wear masks to conceal their identity for operation security (OPSEC) reasons and to preserve political deniability. Yet, there are still plenty of elements that can help identify a SOF group’s nationality, such as uniform camouflage patterns, gear, weapons, accessories, and other equipment pieces. 

Twitter users with knowledge of tactical equipment have recognized the country and units of the SOFs deployed on-site. As the tweets below show, one of the first special mission units identified is the Combat Applications Group(CAG) or 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), which is more commonly known as “Delta Force.” Specializing in counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and counter-proliferation, Delta is among the most secretive and lethal American SOF groups.

Twitter users recognized the American SOFs by their distinctive night-vision goggles (NVGs), custom pistol stock, pouch, and holster.  Social media speculations also place British SOFs, likely the Special Air Service (SAS) alongside Delta in one of the photos.

The Norwegian Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) is another foreign SOF group recognized by Twitter users. While less known than its anglophone counterparts, the FSK is one of the most experienced NATO special mission units. Besides Afghanistan, they also operated, and are probably still active in Syria and Iraq.  

As Twitter users pointed out, at least one Australian SOF was also present during the counter-terrorist raid. If indeed from the land down below, the operator was likely part of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), Australia’s equivalent of the British SAS. Australia is one of NATO’s closest strategic partners. Australian SOFs have seen extensive service alongside their Euro-Atlantic allies in the Global War on Terror.  

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION 

Regardless of their exact unit or nationality, it is virtually certain that foreign SOFs played a significant role in neutralizing the terrorist threat in Kabul. Without them and their Afghan counterparts, the death toll would have been dramatically higher. 

The foreign SOFs are in Afghanistan as part of their respective national military deployments. Their objective is to conduct counter-terrorism missions and train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army and Security Forces (ANASF). 

RSM Commands via NATO

Following the end of major combat operations, NATO initiated the Resolute Support Mission at the invitation of the Afghan government in 2015. RSM is a capacity-building operation and consists of 39 NATO and non-NATO participating states. RSM advisors train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Air Force (ANAF) so that Kabul can defend itself after the end of NATO’s military mandate. The RSM also helped the ANA build its first-ever SOF component, including the Crisis Response Unit 222, that spearheaded the response to the maternity attack. 

Afghan CRU 222 operators via Recoilweb.com

Apart from the RSM, the U.S. SOFs are also engaged in Operation “Freedom’s Sentinel,” an overseas contingency counter-terrorism mission against ISIS’s regional franchise, the “Islamic State-Khorasan” (IS-K).

IS-K LIKELY BEHIND THE ATTACK

While the horrific attack is still unclaimed, “Islamic State-Khorasan” (IS-K) is the likely culprit. The Dashti Barchi Hospital sits in a predominantly Shia neighborhood – an area that IS-K has also attacked in the past. 

Afghan intelligence has captured the IS-K commander and two of his aides in Kabul, just a day before the attack. The senior operatives were likely in Kabul to oversee the execution of the mission. 

Another circumstantial piece of evidence linking the massacre to IS-K was a second attack on 12 May 2020. A suicide bomber killed at least 32 people at a funeral in Nangarhar province. While Afghanistan experiences sporadic countrywide violence daily, the funeral and hospital attacks may be connected. 



Shiite communities are IS-K’s main targets apart from political institutions, according to our assessment from 2019, which you can find here. The attack is consistent with IS-K’s strict interpretation of Sunni Islam, militant Salafism, which views Shiites and other Muslim sects as heretics. IS-K uses sectarian and takfiri violence to mobilize hardcore Salafists/ Deobandi and establish an Islamic State in South Asia, encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region. 

IS-K has refrained from taking credit for its attacks in the past. In this case, the unclaimed attack on the maternity ward likely aimed at sabotaging the Afghan-Taliban peace process. By not claiming the attack, IS-K wanted to cast suspicion on the Taliban. IS-K has no interest in seeing a reduction of violence in Afghanistan. IS-K consists of disenfranchised Pakistani Taliban, splinter groups from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and a few foreign fighters. The Taliban is not only IS-K’s main competitor on the extremist market but also its existential threat. 

Afghanistan conflict map as of 29 February 2020 via Al-Jazeera

The Taliban has publicly denied involvement in the attack. While many Taliban cells continue to defy the “reduction of violence” agreement with Kabul, it is unlikely that the group was involved in the maternity ward massacre. Afghan President Ghani has nevertheless ordered the Afghan military to resume offensive operations against all militant groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. President Ghani was likely concerned to look weak in the face of Tuesday’s bloodbath in the center of Kabul. 

The Afghan peace process remains as fragile as always. 

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Mission Failed: Inside Silvercorp’s Bizarre Plan to Overthrow Maduro

The Venezuelan authorities announced that they thwarted a coup against the Maduro regime, on 4 May 2020. Venezuelan forces captured eight and killed two men who tried to infiltrate the country’s…

The Venezuelan authorities announced that they thwarted a coup against the Maduro regime, on 4 May 2020. Venezuelan forces captured eight and killed two men who tried to infiltrate the country’s seacoast by boat. Among the arrested were two American citizens, both former U.S. Army Special Forces. Caracas claims that the infiltration attempt is proof of the Trump administration’s plan to overthrow the Venezuelan government. While the raiding party intended to oust Venezuela’s Socialist dictator, Nicholas Maduro, no evidence links the United States government to the operation. Instead, a group of Venezuelan dissidents led by the Florida-based security company “Silvercorp USA” is to be blamed.  

The recent events are nevertheless an excellent opportunity for the Maduro regime to stir anti-American fervor and to move against the opposition.   



SILVERCORP USA: FROM SECURITY AT CONCERTS TO REGIME CHANGE

Silvercorp, a Florida-based security company, was founded by former U.S. Green Beret Jordan Goudreau. Silvercorp has operated in over 50 countries and provided protection services for several Trump campaign rallies in 2018, as Bellingcat discovered. In early 2019, Silvercorp ran security for Venezuela Aid Live, a charitable concert on the Venezuelan-Columbian border. Through this Columbian connection, Silvercorp CEO Goudreau met with Venezuelan military dissidents to plot the overthrow of the Maduro regime in Carcass.

Goudreau at a Trump rally in Pennsylvania on 10 March 2018 (source: Bellingcat)

Goudreau liaised with retired General Cliver Alcala, the ringleader of a hotchpotch of Venezuelan military dissidents and former politicians. Alcala, who was a former associate of Hugo Chavez, claimed to be representing Juan Guaido, the leader of the Venezuelan opposition.

THE $212 MILLION CONTRACT

Reports suggest that the two sides signed a contract, which promises $50 million to Silvercorp in exchange for undisclosed security services. If successful, Silvercorps was to receive a total of $212 million, “backed/secured by Venezuelan barrels of oil.”  A scan of the contract was shared by @FactoresdePoder on Twitter. Guaido’s people argue that they only signed an exploratory contract and that they broke ties with Silvercorp in late-2019.

SILVERCORP’S UNILATERAL ACTION

Venezuelan military dissidents first met with the Trump administration to discuss military options against the Maduro regime in 2018. The White House nevertheless declined to partake in a coup. When the CIA learned of Silvercorp’s operation, it urged Mr. Goudreau to abort the plan, according to the website Connecting Vets.

Sources told Associated Press that Columbian intelligence also warned Alcala, Silvercorp’s Venezuelan accomplice, to stop promoting an invasion of Venezuela. Columbian authorities eventually arrested Alcala in March 2020 and extradited him to the United States to face drug-trafficking charges. 

Eventually, the Venezuelan opposition withdrew support for the operation and refused to pay even the contract retainer. Silvercorp’s CEO Goudreau nevertheless refused to drop the job, stating that he was a “freedom fighter” and wanted to liberate Venezuela. 



Preparations, therefore, continued on a tight budget. Goudreau allegedly raised funds from Roaen Kraft, a descendent of a cheese-making family, and his associates. The Associated Press suggests that Kraft lured further donors with promises of preferential access to the Venezuelan energy market. 

With funding secured, Goudreau recruited a few former Green Berets buddies to help him prepare the operation. After they drafted a plan, Gaudreau opened training camps in eastern Columbia, where Silvercorp trained around 300 Venezuelan dissident soldiers. 

OPERATION GIDEON

Silvercorp commenced with Operation “Gideon” on 3 May 2020 at 1700 hours local time. Mr. Goudreau publicly announced the operation in a Tweet (now deleted) on the same day. He tagged President Trump, probably a last attempt to secure political backing. 

3 MAY 2020: 62 Silvercorp operatives (60 Venezuelans, and two former U.S. Army Special Forces) left Columbia. 

The first of two amphibious assault groups attempted to disembark in the Bay of Macuto, four kilometers east of Venezuela’s main port (La Guaria), and 42 km north of Caracas. The Venezuelan Navy and Coast Guard captured them as soon as they began “hugging” the coastline.

4 MAY 2020: A video on Twitter showed Jordan Goudreau and a Venezuelan commander of the assault, Javier Quintero Nieto, claiming responsibility for the incursion. Despite the setback, Goudreau and Nieto announced that the operation would go forward. They added that many other units are active in southern, western, and eastern Venezuela. The objective of the raid, as described in the video, was to prosecute Maduros’ hardline loyalists, free the political prisoners and spark a revolution to overthrow the regime. 

Later that day, the second assault force approached Playa de Chuao, a coastal town north of Caracas (Venezuela). Local security forces also interdicted this element. Eight men were captured, including the two former Green Berets, Luke Denman and Aaron Barry. 

BOUNTY HUNTING?

In an interview with Venezuelan state media, Luke Denman later stated that the team’s objective was to seize an airstrip and bring in a plane to fly Maduro to the United States. In his own televised confession, Airan Berry names “La Carlota” (Air Base Generalisimo Francisco de Miranda) as being the airstrip they had intended to seize.  He also added that seizing Maduro however necessary was the operation’s end goal. The cells referenced by Goudreau and Quintero were likely responsible for getting a fix on Maduro, capturing him and bringing him to the airport. It is unknown why the objective was not to neutralize Maduro but to bring him out of the country – an infinitely more difficult task. There is reason to believe that Silvercorp was hoping to claim the $15 million bounty that the U.S. Department of Justice placed on Maduro’s head for narco-terrorism. The reward would have been an instant pay-off for Silvercorp’s “suicide mission.”



THE VENEZUELANS KNEW

It is virtually certain that the Maduro government was aware of the plot. Whether they collected intelligence on Silvercorp’s preparatory work in Columbia or were tipped off by the Associated Press reporting (the article appeared on 1 May 2020), Carcass prepared for the impending assault. 

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) suggested the Venezuelan Navy and Coast Guard were on high alert for the past five weeks. On 30 March 2020, the Venezuelan Navy attempted to intercept the Portughese-flagged “RCGS Resolute,” an empty cruise ship en route to Curacao. A Venezuelan destroyer attempted to push the RCGS Resolute into Venezuelan waters but sank after ramming the cruise ship. The Venezuelans accused the cruise ship of transporting mercenaries and weapons but were unable to detain it.


On 29 April 2020, the Venezuelan Coast Guard moved two speedboats from Guiria to La Guaria, the approximate objective of Silvercorp’s first landing party.

In hindsight, Silvercorp should have read these movements as a sign that Caracas had caught up with its plot.

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