Tag: Iran

This is How Iran Bombed Saudi Arabia [PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT]

American and Saudi investigators have concluded that the air attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais petrochemical facilities originated directly from Iran – not Yemen or Iraq – sources say.  The…

American and Saudi investigators have concluded that the air attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais petrochemical facilities originated directly from Iran – not Yemen or Iraq – sources say

The cruise missile and/or drone attack was likely staged from Iran’s Khuzestan province. As unidentified flying objects (UFOs) were spotted in Kuwait just before the attack, the kinetic platforms likely avoided the Persian Gulf, which is heavily monitored by the US Navy, and exploited a gap in Saudi Arabia’s SAM deployments. As PATRIOT radars (MPQ-53/65) have a 120 degree coverage (not 360 degrees), they were likely pointed towards the southwest and east to cover threats from Yemen and the Persian Gulf, leaving the northern approach largely exposed. When the (presumed) low-flying, slow moving and small RCS (radar cross-section) kinetic platforms entered “denied airspace” at the envelope edge of Saudi air defense systems, it was too late for the PATRIOTs detect the threat and react. 

Hypothetical path of Iranian air attack on Saudi oil facilities, visualized by T-Intelligence.

Even if the MPQ-53/65 radars were pointed northwards, the PATRIOT is inadequate to intercept small drones and tactical missiles, as it is primarily an anti-aircraft and (secondary) ballistic missile defense system. Modern short-range air defense systems (V/SHORAD) are the adequate aerial defense assets for such threats, preferably aided by networked sensors and including airborne coverage from AWACS planes. While the Shahine and Skyguard SHORAD systems were guarding Abqaiq, they have a 20 km engagement range against normal sized aircraft. As the Iranian kinetic “package” consisted of low-observable munition, the engagement range was much less shorter. Alternatively, the “package’s” terrain-hugging flight profile could have masked it with the “ground clutter” or its slow speed would have filtered it out on the radar doppler. However, Saturday’s attack was as much an air defense error as it was an intelligence failure. 

As Washington and Ryad disagree on how to retaliate against Iran, an official joint announcement blaming the IRGC for the attack has been repeatedly postponed. President Donald Trump is engaged in a re-election campaign and knows that the US public would not support a new conflict or military action in the Middle East. Therefore the White House opposes the US military spearheading a kinetic retribution against Iran. This leaves Saudi Arabia to either form a coalition of the willing with other Gulf states, an exhaustive and unlikely endeavour, or to act alone, which is not an option for the monarchy.



With the critical 72-hour time window for retaliation closed, it is possible that Iran might walk away unsanctioned for the “war-opening” attack on Abqaiq and Khurais. Absent red-lines, Tehran will potentially feel emboldened to prosecute other strategic targets, such as Saudi desalination plants or US bases in the Middle East. 


UPDATE September 19, 2019 – Saudi officials have showcased the wreckage recovered from the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks, confirming that the air attack was conducted by Iranian Delta Wing drones and cruise missiles. US Intelligence sources also confirmed that the attack was mounted from Iran’s southwestern Khuzestan province and that the weapons were programmed to avoid the Persian Gulf. 

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Israel Raids Iranian Position near Syrian-Iraqi border

Yesterday night, an air attack destroyed an Iranian logistics node near Abu Kamal (Syria). The likely culprit behind the attack is the Israeli Air Force (IAF), since Jerusalem has recently…

Yesterday night, an air attack destroyed an Iranian logistics node near Abu Kamal (Syria). The likely culprit behind the attack is the Israeli Air Force (IAF), since Jerusalem has recently expanded air operations to Syria’s border region and even Iraq. The strike was allegedly conducted by F-35Is “Adir” (Israeli-modified F-35As). The Iranian logistical support operations hub in Abu Kamal had been established earlier this year. 

The Israeli geospatial company ImageSatIntel (iSi) recently released a battle damage assessment of an earlier IAF raid on the same facility, which took place on September 8, 2019. The analysis accounted for a total of eight storehouses that were completely destroyed. The structures were part of a wider military base, codenamed “Imam Ali” compound, which has been built and financed by the Iranain Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force for the purpose of weapons storage. The logistics node likely hosted missiles, small weapons, rocket launchers, and ammunition smuggled to Syria from Iran and Iraq. 

Abu Kamal is located on a strategic border crossing between Syria and Iraq. Iranian-backed forces seized the area from ISIS in mid 2017. For Iran, control over the Abu Kamal area is key to solidify the “Shia Crescent” line of communication that links the Iranian homeland to Syria and Lebanon via Iraq. This “land bridge” diversifies Iran’s logistics routes, as the IAF continues to prosecute Iranian air transports to Syrian airfields.

Iran’s “Shia Crescent” land corridor visualized by T-Intelligence


Cover photo: The F-35 Integrated Test Force is completing a series of night flights, testing the ability to fly the jet safely in instrument meteorological conditions where the pilot has no external visibility references. The ITF, which has the lead on all F-35 mission systems testing, is responsible for five of the six night flights. (Courtesy photo)

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[UPDATED] Saudis To Retaliate After Iranian-Backed Drone Attack

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has announced that it is devising retaliation plans for the drone attacks on its oil refineries, which have been claimed by the Iranian-backed Houthi militants…

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has announced that it is devising retaliation plans for the drone attacks on its oil refineries, which have been claimed by the Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen. In a call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman on Saturday, United States President Donald Trump offered support for Saudi self-defense. 

According to the Houthis, the dawn attack on Saturday was carried out by ten unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from Yemen and targeted the Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The largescale attack caused major explosions and forced Aramco to cease production at the two facilities. With oil production suspended, Aramco lost halfof its crude output (5.7 million barrels per day), leading to a five percent reduction in global oil supply. 

As Saudi Arabia produces around 9.85 million barrels of oil per day, the supply reduction has caused concerns on the global energy markets. Energy experts warn that the recent attack could lead to a slight surge in oil prices. The Saudi Energy Ministry has nevertheless assured that the disruption will be offset by supplies from Saudi inventories. The attack represents a serious blow for Aramco, since the company is currently preparing its stock market debut and international listing.  

Abqaiq is pivotal for Saudi energy operations, as the facility processes crude oil from the world’s largest oil field (Ghawar) and redirects it to the world’s biggest offshore oil loading facility (Ras Tanura) and to export terminals on the Red Sea coast. Khurais, the other target, is Saudi Arabia’s second largest oil field, which is responsible for the production of over 1 million barrels of oil per day. 

While the Houthis have been conducting attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure for months and have made extensive use of Iranian supplied missiles and UAVs, their claim to the recent attack is disputed by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as well as many open-source intelligence analysts, who point towards Iraq instead. Photos on social media allegedly show the remains of an Iranian-made Quds-1 or Soumar cruise missile on Saudi soil. Analysts believe the missile was launched from southern Iraq due to its proximity to the two Saudi installations. Other sources claim that a UAV violated Kuwaiti airspace on Saturday and loitered around 250 meters above the Dar Salwa presidential palace.

The Iraqi government was quick to deny that its territory was used to attack the Saudi installations. However, this would not be the first attack on the Kingdom that was launched from Iraq. US intelligence has, for example, found that a UAV raid on a Saudi pipeline on May 14, 2019 was launched from Iraq instead of Yemen. Iraq hosts a myriad of Shiite militias, which are trained, sponsored, and coordinated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC).

Regardless where the attack originated, Iran remains the shadow culprit. The attack on the Aramco oil facilities will likely set the peace negotiations between the Arab Coalition and the Houthis back and further escalate the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the US remains committed to Saudi security, the Trump administration does not seem willing to retaliate on behalf of Riyadh. Instead, the White House has provided strong political support and military aid to Saudi forces to take matters into their own hands.

The Saudis could either re-intensify the air campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen, conduct covert operations against IRGC-backed elements in Iraq, or directly prosecute Iranian offshore oil facilities in the Persian Gulf.


Read our update on the developing situation

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Released Iranian Oil Tanker Spotted in Syria

The Iranian very large crude carrier (VLCC) M/T Adrian Darya-1 was spotted anchoring off the Syrian coast. The oil tanker, previously known as “Grace-1,” was seized by British Royal Marines…

The Iranian very large crude carrier (VLCC) M/T Adrian Darya-1 was spotted anchoring off the Syrian coast. The oil tanker, previously known as “Grace-1,” was seized by British Royal Marines in July, as it was suspected of breaching EU sanctions by transporting oil to the Syrian regime. Panama, the Grace-1’s flag country, deleted the tanker from its shipping registry and banned the vessel from using the Panamese flag. 

Gibraltar released the Iranian vessel on August 15, after receiving written guarantees from the Iranian government that the ship would not discharge its 2.1 million barrels of oil in Syria. The tanker was renamed “Adrian Darya” and took the flag of its real patron, Iran. While the Adrian Darya did not conduct a port call in Tartus, the vessel’s close proximity to the coast suggests that it unloaded or will unload oil via a ship-to-ship transfers. The Adrian-Darya deactivated its AIS on September 2. The United States has warned that any group assisting the Iranian Guard Corps’ oil smuggling operations will be prosecuted. 

Iran has yet to release the British oil tanker that it captured in retaliation for the seizure of the Grace-1 in July. 


Photo credits Maxar Technologies 2019/ Handout via Reuters

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Israel Reveals Hezbollah Precision Missile Factory in Lebanon

Satellite imagery shared by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has revealed a precision missile factory near Nabi Chit, Lebanon. The facility is likely operated by Hezbollah with financial and technological…

Satellite imagery shared by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has revealed a precision missile factory near Nabi Chit, Lebanon. The facility is likely operated by Hezbollah with financial and technological assistance from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) irregular warfare and external branch, the Quds force. 


This intelligence confirms that Hezbollah is now attempting to “homegrow” precision guided missiles, as Israel’s raids in Syria have disrupted the IRGC’s advanced weapons transfers to its Lebanese ally. In response to the tactical air strike campaign of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), the IRGC has started to supply Hezbollah with GPS kits that can convert “dumb” rockets into precision missiles. According to a 2015 estimate by Israeli Intelligence, Hezbollah currently stockpiles around 150,000 rockets. 

Iran has deployed senior IRGC-Quds operatives in Lebanon to oversee Hezbollah’s precision missile program. Israeli Intelligence names Brigader General Muhammad Hussein-Zada Hejazi as the IRGC commander in Lebanon. Hejazi is aided by technological manager Colonel Majid Nuab and chief logistician Brigadier General Ali Asrar Nuruzi. The Lebanese cell reports directly to the infamous al-Quds commander General Qasim Soleimani. 

In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disclosed the location of three Hezbollah missile assembly and storage sites in the Lebanese capital. By building factories and warehouses in Beirut’s busy neighborhoods, Hezbollah is using the local population as a human shield against Israeli attacks. In light of these developments, Jerusalem authorized targeted assassinations of Hezbollah and IRGC operatives in Lebanon and instructed the IAF to hit IRGC logistics nodes in Iraq. 

Hezbollah Missile Sites in Beirut, Lebanon (T-Intelligence)

Hezbollah’s hybrid fusion of conventional military capabilities and irregular tactics renders it the strongest non-state actor in the world. If Hezbollah manages to convert even a quarter of its estimated 150,000 rockets into precision guided missile, it could overwhelm the Israeli air defense systems and strike any target of choice. The joint Iranian-Hezbollah operation is in direct violation of the United Nations Resolution 1701 and threatens to destabilize the fragile Lebanese security environment.

 
An Israeli Intelligence source told Hareetz that Hezbollah has started to evacuate the production site near Nabi Chit location. By publicly disclosing the facility’s location, the IDF has thus disrupted Hezbollah’s missile manufacturing efforts without engaging in a direct attack in Lebanon (that would virtually certain trigger retaliatory violence).

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Iranian Space Launch Fails Again and the CIA Was Watching

On August 29, 2019, Iran failed to launch a satellite, as the “Safir” space launch vehicle (SLV) exploded at Semnan Launch Site One. Commercial satellite imagery published by Planet and…

On August 29, 2019, Iran failed to launch a satellite, as the “Safir” space launch vehicle (SLV) exploded at Semnan Launch Site One. Commercial satellite imagery published by Planet and Maxar Technologies confirms an explosion on the launch pad. The Iranian government only admits to the “loss of a satellite” and has not addressed the explosion. 

The August 29 incident marks the third launch failure of the Iranian Space Agency this year. During a launch attempt in January, Iran lost a “Simorgh” rocket, followed by the explosion of another “Safir” SLV in February. Earlier this month, satellite images confirmed that the Imam Khomeini Space Port (part of the Semnan Launch Site) received a fresh paint job, leading analysts to believe that a new launch is imminent. 

President Donald J. Trump mocked the Iranian failure on Twitter and shared declassified geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) of the wreckage site. Critics claim that Trump’s tweet may have leaked a previously unknown deep-look capability of US spatial assets or revealed a clandestine flyover by a US aircraft. 

As Iran has significantly improved its air sensor network and aerial defense capabilities, it is unlikely that the US would risk losing another unmanned aerial vehicle. Recently, Iran unveiled a new foreign-inspired long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system (“Bavar 373”), which was tested near the Semnan Launch Site. The Bavar 373 was likely deployed to provide area air defense for the formerly undefended space facility. The US’ very high resolution GEOINT was therefore likely collected by either a low-Earth orbit satellite or the U-2 spy plane “Dragon Lady”. Defense journalist Babak Taghvaee has pointed towards the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) KH-12 Block IV as Trump’s “eye in the sky.” 

Why is the US Intelligence community interested in Iran’s space program? 

As SLV technology is interchangeable with ballistic missiles, there are concerns that Iran’s space program is intended to increase the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles. Classified sources indicate that the first stage of the ill-fated “Safir” SLV is based on Iran’s “Shahab 3” medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The same sources suggest that the SLV’s second stage is inspired by a North Korean variation of the Soviet-made R-27 (NATO Reporting name SS-N-6), which Iran acquired from Pyongyang.

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Analysis of Iran’s Bavar 373 SAM: Indigenous Design or S-300 Copycat?

On August 21, 2019, the Iranian Defense Ministry revealed the “Bavar 373” long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, claiming that both design and production are completely indigenous. Iranian President Rouhani and…

On August 21, 2019, the Iranian Defense Ministry revealed the “Bavar 373” long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, claiming that both design and production are completely indigenous. Iranian President Rouhani and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami were present at the unveiling.  


The Bavar 373 solves two problems for Iran, one military and one of political nature. On the one hand, the Bavar will augment Iran’s small inventory of long-range SAMs, providing much needed coverage for the undefended sections of Iran’s airspace. Tehran hopes that the Bavar 373 will have a deterrent effect, raising the costs of foreign military attacks. On the other hand, the indigenous system renders Iran independent from foreign technology, a lesson that Tehran learned the hard away when Russia stalled the sale of the S-300PMU2 (NATO Reporting name SA-20B Gargoyle) from 2007 to 2011 due to US sanctions. 

Bavar 373 Battalion Set: 

  • 6 x tractor erector launchers (TEL). Each TEL consists of four SAM canisters towed by a 10×10  “Zoljanah” truck. 
  • Undesignated active electronically scanned array (AESA) engagement radar, likely operating in X-band frequencies. 
  • Undesignated AESA acquisition radar, likely operating in S-band frequencies. The 8×8 “Zafar” truck serves as the radars’ transportable electronics tower (TET). 
  • Command & control unit, towed by an 8×8 “Zafar” truck. 

Bavar 373 Performance and Specifications (according to the Iranian Defense Ministry):

  • Maximum search range: 320km
  • Maximum tracking range: 260km
  • Maximum Interception range: +200km
  • Maximum Interception altitude: 27km
  • Number of tracking and engagement targets: 300 and 6 targets

TECHNICAL EVALUATION:

Contrary to critics, who have labelled the Bavar 373 an S-300 copycat, Tehran claims that the system is an original design. All officials speaking at the August 21 unveiling emphasized this fact and claimed that the Bavar 373 is superior to the S-300. While the Bavar 373 does indeed feature original elements and was produced by Iranian defence contractors, the system’s development would have been impossible without foreign technology. The Bavar 373’s dual-band sensor suite seems to be the system’s most valuable asset. The originality of the Bavar’s TEL and the claimed operational performance of the Sayyad-4 SAM are nevertheless disputable. 

HOT VERTICAL LAUNCH/SQUARE CANISTERS. While the Bavar is widely believed to be a S-300PMU2-inspired design, the system’s rectangular launch tubes more closely resemble the M901 launcher unit of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 configuration. Like the Patriot, the Bavar 373 uses a hot launch technique instead of the cold ejection typical for Russian SAM launchers.

CLOSE UP: PAC-2 M901 launching station vs. Bavar 373

The S-300PMU2 uses gas to eject the SAM from a round cylinder, before the missile fires its thrusters. As the demonstration on August 21 showed, the Bavar’s Sayyad-4 powers its rocket engine inside the tube. The Bavar does, however, bear similarity with the S-300 when it comes to the full vertical launch position. In contrast, the American M901 fires from a 70 degree angle, a design feature copied by another Iran air defence system (Talash). 

COMPARISON: S-300PMU2 TEL vs. Bavar 373 vs. PAC-2 M901 Launching station

SENSOR SUITE. For the public demonstration, the Bavar 373 was augmented by two AESA radars, one engagement and one acquisition radar. This configuration is similar to the Russian S-300. The MIM-140 Patriot uses only one radar. Both of the Iranian radars are unique in their design and show little to no similarity with their American or Russian counterparts. it is possible that Iran’s decade-long effort to develop AESA radars has finally paid off. Due to the AESA’s frequency-agility and low-probability of intercept, the Bavar’s radars are – at least in theory – highly resilient to jamming and anti-radiation missiles.  

The Iranian defense company Iran Electronics Industries has previously listed the Meraj-4 sensor as part of the Bavar 373. In the public demonstration of the Bavar, the Meraj-4 did however not feature. The Meraj-4 is a road-mobile S-band early warning 3D AESA radar. The manufacturer claims that is has a 400-500 km detection envelope, a 200 km tracking range, and a 360-degree azimuth. The Meraj-4 design shows undeniable resemblance to the Chinese-made JYL-1, a long-range S-band 3D air surveillance radar that has nearly identical specifications.  While the Meraj-4 was spotted as a road-mobile version, it is likely an element of Iran’s integrated air defence network rather than a permanent subsystem of the Bavar 373. 

COMPARISON: Meraj 4 (Iran) vs. JYL-1 (China)

MULTI-MISSION. The Bavar’s diverse sensor and kinetic solutions will enable the Iranian air defence units to conduct both anti-aircraft and missile defence missions. The Sayyad-4, in particular, was developed to intercept large radar-cross section targets at the engagement envelope edge, e.g. ballistic missiles in lower endo-atmospheric space. However, doubts remain whether the Sayyad-4 has the manoeuvring capability to prosecute evasive ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. The Sayyad-4’s demonstrated thrust vectoring control is only used for initial trajectory alignment. 

Bavar 373 live test compilation based on official footage.

Iran’s Sayyad SAM series is based on the US-made Standard Missile 1 (RIM-66) naval SAM acquired by the Imperial Iranian Navy prior to the 1979 Revolution. However, the Sayyad-4 is double in size compared to its predecessor and bears resemblance with the Russian long-range Fakel 48N6E/E2 SAM. 

COMPARISON: Sayyad 4 vs. Sayyad 2 and 3 vs. SM-1

VALIDATION AND SUSTAINABILITY. The recent downing of a RQ-4 Global Hawk drone by the Iranian Khordad the 3rdSystem (similar to the Russian Buk-M2) has validated Iran’s research and development efforts in air defence technology. Building a dual-band long-range SAM system based on multiple foreign sources is nevertheless significantly more complex than replicating short- and mid-range legacy systems. The Bavar 373 still has to prove its performance in actual engagements and deployments. 

Remote sensing operations using geospatial imagery will reveal in time how confident the Iranian Armed Forces are of the system’s performance. If the confidence level is high, the Bavar will likely be deployed as a solo long-range air defense asset for the poorly defended airspace in the east and south (protected by Khordad the 3rd or Talash mid-range SAMs for point air defence). If the system is deemed unreliable, it will likely supplement existing S-200 and S-300 deployments.   

It took Iran more than 10 years of design flops, development limbo, and dire financial conditions to produce the Bavar 373. There is no information on how many systems exist and will be produced. It is also unknown whether Iran is even able to mass-produce the system and maintain it. As the country remains under though political and economic pressure from the international community, Tehran frequently exaggerates its military capabilities for foreign policy and deterrence reasons.


by HARM and Gecko

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Israeli/ U.S. airborne SIGINT on station for High-Value TEHRAN flight

1. At least two U.S. Air Force Boeing signals intelligence aircraft (SIGNT) – Boeing RC-135V (callsign: TIMEX21) and RC-135U (EXTRO21) – conducted SIGINT collection sorties over the Eastern Mediterranean between…

1. At least two U.S. Air Force Boeing signals intelligence aircraft (SIGNT) – Boeing RC-135V (callsign: TIMEX21) and RC-135U (EXTRO21) – conducted SIGINT collection sorties over the Eastern Mediterranean between 9 and 11 AM UTC time today. An Israeli Air Force (IAF) Gulfstream G550 Nachshon Aitam 676 SIGINT platform was also spotted over central and northern Israel. These platforms were on station, after a Syrian Air Ilyushin-76 heavylift cargo aircraft (RB/SYR9824) took off from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport (THR).

IAF-USAF SIGINT runs in Eastern Mediterranean captured by T-Intelligence via ADS-B exchange

2. The SIGINT platforms likely attempted to intercept communications between Syrian military and air control units to determine whether the cargo plane is a high-value target (HVT) that carries heavy weapons such as ballistic missiles (BM) destined for Iranian-affiliated paramilitary units. Should the presence of a HVT be confirmed, the IAF will likely conduct a tactical air strike to destroy the package. Both SIGINT collection sorties and air strikes have become common practices, as the IAF is attempting to curb the Iranian entrancement in Syria. Most of the Iranian military cargo eventually ends up in the hands of militias that operate against Israel, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Organization.

3. Syrian Air flight RB/SYR9824 (registration YK-ATB) left THR at 8:43 AM (UTC) westbound with no destination listed. When approaching the Syrian-Iraqi border around 10:12 AM, the flight turned its AVB transponder off. Twenty minutes later, the flight re-apparead over Homs province, Syria. Around 10:35 AM, the aircraft went dark again, while dropping to an altitude of 6,800 meters. As the aircraft made a northern course correction, the flight path of RB/SYR9824 suggests a destination north of Damascus. Whether this is indeed true or just a counter-surveillance maneuver to deceive its U.S. and Israeli watchers, is unknown.

Flightpath of RB/SYR9824 via FlightRadar24

5. In conjunction with its land-corridor, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) also operates an air route to supply its external branch, the al-Quds forces (IRGC- Quds), and affiliated Shi’a militias operating in Syria. Common destinations for the flights from Tehran and Kermanshah are the main Damascus airports (International and Mezzeh), Basil Al-Assad Airport in Latakia province and other airfields in Hama and Aleppo. Besides the civilian companies Mahan Air, Syrian Air and Fars Air Qeshm, Iran  is also known to use military aircraft operated by the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) and the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF).

IRGC land-coriddor known as “Shi’a Crescent” via T-Intelligence

6. The presence of IAF/USAF SIGINT platforms does not automatically indicated that a HVT is onboard and that an Israeli air strike will follow. The IAF is tracking all suspicious flights inbound for Syria and Lebanon, many of which do not carry HVT cargo or whose payload does not mandate immediate kinetic action. The IAF/USAF SIGINT collections efforts could also be related to rumors indicating an imminent operationalization of the SyAAF’s S-300PM2 (SA-20B Gargoyle) surface to air missile system.  


by HARM

Editing by Gecko 

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Forensic Video Analysis: Syrian Air Defense Unit Abandoned Pantsir S-1 under Israeli IAI Harop Fire

During a raid in the night of January 20th 2019, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) prosecuted Iranian and Syrian ground targets in southern Syria. The operation included both ground attack…

During a raid in the night of January 20th 2019, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) prosecuted Iranian and Syrian ground targets in southern Syria. The operation included both ground attack and suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses (S/DEAD).


1. A video released by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shows two SAM systems destroyed by Israeli missiles. The first one, either a 9K33 Osa (NATO reporting name: SA-8) or a 96K6 Pantsir S-1 (SA-22), was overwhelmed by an IAF saturation strike. The SAM system, based 5 km south of Damascus International Airport, fired for effect, but missed the interception. The SAMs detonated in mid air. The site coordinates are 33°20’54.4″N 36°28’08.1″E

2. The second target was a Pantsir S-1 (SA-22) stationed on the grounds of Damascus International Airport. Forensic video analysis shows three interesting details:

  • Heat signature: either the driver’s door is left open, with heat emanating from the cabin, or the vehicle’s power generator is left running.  
  • The planar array search radar antenna is switched off.
  • A vehicle is parked 3-5 meters behind the Pantsir – possibly a missile transloader.

3. We assess that the Pantsir (SA-22) was active and engaged in air defense. After consuming the munnition and receiving homing alerts, the crew deactivated the system’s antenna and fled. The crew was not caught off guard due to lack of personnel or low readiness, contrary to what some observers suggests.

4. Due to its location, the Pantsir (SA-22) was one of the most tactically important point air defense (PAD) systems in southern Syria. The system provided PAD for local long-range systems such as the S-200 (SA-5) and covered Damascus International Airport, which has been a bi-monthly, if not weekly, target of the IAF. If any crew was kept on high readiness, it was this Pantsir (SA-22) crew. The site coordinates are 33°22’56.5″N 36°29’38.4″E

5. As the IAF targeted the system, the Pantsir’s counter-D/SEAD protocol kicked-in and alerted the crew that enemy anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) were homing on its sensor emission. In such situations, the crew needs to deactivate the radar (flip the antenna off) and go mobile, leaving the position acquired by the enemy ARM. The crew indeed turned the radar off, but then – most likely – panicked and abandoned the Pantsir, leaving the door wide open/ the generator running. 

6. The supply vehicle spotted in the footage suggests that the Pantsir was about to be re-armed. The 2F77M is the designated transporter/transloader for the Pantsir (SA-22) and Tunguska (SA-19) SAM system family. The transloader is a 6×6 KamAZ-43101B truck.

Video Forensic Analysis via T-Intelligence (corrected)

7. The Syrian Pantsir (SA-22) air defense systems were likely targeted by the Israeli-made IAI Harop loitering ammunition, a low-observable (LO) anti-radiation “suicide” drone. The drone is designed to bypass enemy radars and loiter around the battlefield to find and engage evasive SAMs. For guidance, the drone can autonomously home on the enemy’s radar emission or be remote-controlled by a human operator (human-in-the-loop mode). The IAI Harop does not carry a warhead but self-destructs when reaching the target. This drone was credited for destroying another Syrian Pantsir (SA-22), during Israel’s Operation House of Cards on May 10, 2018.

T-Intelligence compilation of Harop drone demonstration by IAI

8. During the current raid, the IAF also destroyed a 3D long-range JY-27 early warning radar near Damascus International Airport. The JY-27 “Wide Mat” works at a very-high frequency (VHF) and can theoretically detect LO and very LO aircraft. The system is heavily inspired by Russia’s own VHF-band counter-LO aircraft radar, the “Box Spring” (1L13 Nebo SV and 1L119 Nebo SVU). The site was a key component of Syria’s evolving air defense network. With the JY-27 destroyed, the IAF mitigates the risk of having its F-35I Adir LO RCS detected.

Key takeaways from the January 20th raid:

9. The SADF has visibilly improved its effectiveness in countering ordinance. This is due to sustained Russian training, through which the Syrian Air Defense Forces (SADF) of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) learned how to operate advanced point air defense SAM systems, namely the SA-22 and SA-17.

10. The SADF’s improved capability has a considerable tactical impact, as it forces the IAF to conduct saturation strikes in order to guarantee that the missiles reach their targets. In turn, more aircraft, heavier payloads (leading to an increased radar-cross section) and multiple bombing rounds will be necessary for future raids.

11. The repeated destruction of Syria’s Pantsir S-1 (SA-22) air defense systems will potentially discredit the newest generation of Russian-made systems in the eyes of Middle Eastern customers. The Pantsir S-1 is a highly-mobile low-altitude medium-range self-propelled SAM system. Armed with twelve 57E6 SAMs and a 30mm autocannon, the system was designed to counter precision-guided munition. It is marketed as an effective solution to defend against U.S.-made maneuvering cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk and ARMs (U.S-made AGM-88 HARM or British ALARM), which have historically overwhelmed Soviet-made SAM systems. The latest Israeli raids have however repeatedly overwhelmed and destroyed the system.


by HARM and Gecko 

CORRECTION: It is likely that the element marked as an open door is the vehicle’s running generator. While this does not dispute the analysis, the content has been edited accordingly

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Israel’s Christmas Raid in Syria: Target Assessment and Russian Reaction

In the night of December 25th, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) delivered its first clandestine strike on Syrian targets after President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops. As assessed…

In the night of December 25th, The Israeli Air Force (IAF) delivered its first clandestine strike on Syrian targets after President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops. As assessed in our latest policy impact analysis and recently reinforced by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the U.S. withdrawal will force Israel to ramp up its counter-Iran operations in Syria. The “Christmas raid” is as much a political statement as it is a continuation of the over 100 Israeli covert airstrikes in Syria. The Syrian Air Defense Forces (SADF) showed a mixed performance, but managed to intercept the majority of Israel’s air-launched missiles.


1. The IAF operation took place between 2200 and 2300 local time and targeted a ammunition warehouse in southern Syria. Israeli F-16 Sufa fighter aircraft fired Delilah cruise missiles – and possibly GBU39 glide-bombs –  from Lebanese airspace, using the IAF’s traditional standoff strike path. 

2. The SADF responded with surface-to-air (SAM) missile fire from its Pantsir S-2 and Buk-M2 systems,  intercepting the majority of Israeli missiles. The SADF’s S-200 and S-125 were also activated, but failed to affect the IAF’s fighter aircraft. This prompted the IAF to initiate a second wave of strikes at approximately 2240 local time. Social media sources claim that an unknown number of F-35I Adir joined the second round as counter-air escorts. 

3. We asses that the second bombing run reached its target. According to official statements, the IAF destroyed an ammunition cache and a parking lot on the Syrian Arab Army’s 4th Armoured Division base, injuring three Syrian soldiers. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) suggests that the targeted warehouse hosted Iranian-made Fajr-5 unguided surface-to-surface missiles that were scheduled for delivery to Hezbollah.

Target 1: Warehouse containing Fajr-5 SSMs (source: ImageSatInternational)

Target 2: Parking lot (source: ImageSatInternational)

4. According to Newsweek (quoting a U.S. defense source), the IAF targeted a Hezbollah delegation, which was boarding a flight to Tehran Mehrabad Airport to attend the funeral of Ayatollah Hashemi Alshaharoudi. While we cannot conclusively confirm this information, Iranian “Air Bridge” activity was indeed spotted during Christmas night. A Qeshm Fars 747 cargo plane [flight number QFZ9951]  from Damascus International Airport immediately after the IAF raid at 2334 local time. 

Screenshot of flight QFZ95591 egressing after the IAF raid

5. Yesterday’s raid revealed several problems of Syria’s aging SAM inventory. As video material shows, at least five failing SAMs crashed into the ground in Damascus instead of detonating in mid-air. One rogue missile even crossed the border into northern Israel and was intercepted by a Hadera-based air defense system. Contrary to initial claims, there is no evidence that the rogue SAM was a Syrian retaliatory strike.

The footage shows a Syrian SAM crashing on a residential area near Damascus: 

6. However, the SADF was generally successful in damage control. Familiar with the IAF’s flight paths, the Syrians focused on countering enemy ordinance  rather than enemy aircraft, relying heavily on point air defense systems.

7. Russia’s harsh reaction to the IAF’s “Christmas raid” testifies to the growing rift between Moscow and Jerusalem. In accordance to the deconfliction agreement, Moscow has thus far turned a blind eye to Israeli strikes in Syria, unless they were unannounced or engaged Syrian targets directly.  However, in response to the “Christmas raid” Russia has escalated its public rhetoric and reportedly considers tit-for-tat retaliations.

8. In the future, Russia will  potentially support Syria to engage IAF fighter jets when they enter Lebanese airspace. The imminent operationalization of the Russian-made S-300PM2 SAM system will provide the SADF with advanced long-range acquisition and engagement radars. It is virtually certain that the SADF will deploy at least one S-300 regiment in Damascus to provide area air defense over Syria’s most vital region.


By HARM and Gecko

The cover photo is a compilation of screenshots showing missile footage from the Christmas raid. Photo 1 shows an Israeli SAM launched from Hadera to intercept a rogue Syrian SAM. Photo 2 shows a Pantsir missile in flight, while 3 shows a Buk M-2 SAM launch in Damascus. 

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