Tag: CIA

U.S. Kills Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Leader in Yemen

The United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Yemen that eliminated Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a deputy to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri….

The United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Yemen that eliminated Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a deputy to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The operation took place on January 29, 2020, as a kinetic strike, but al-Raymi’s death was only confirmed on February 7, 2020. His death further degrades AQAP, the global al-Qa’ida (AQ) movement and their ability to stage external attacks. 

T-Intelligence has reported about the growing U.S. counterterrorism mission in Yemen since 2018, when we exclusively presented an airfield near Mukalla used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to eliminate AQAP targets, including Qasim al-Raymi. You can find that assessment here



Qasim al-Raymi is the latest foreign terrorist leader and high-value target (HVT) to be neutralized by the U.S in the past year. JSOC and CIA killed several Tanzeem Hurras al-Din (THD) and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants in Idlib province (Syria) throughout 2018 and 2019. The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta (or “Delta Force”) neutralized ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a direct action raid on his compound in Barisha (Idlib) in late 2019. A U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone killed IRGC-Quds Force Major-General Qassim Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020.

High-value targeting (HVT) operations aim to throw organizations in disarray by “beheading” leadership figures and therefore complicating ongoing or planned operations. In the case of highly personalized groups, HVT campaigns can demoralize their supporters. HVT campaigns should not be viewed as a solution to a problem, but as an instrument of pressure that is highly efficient in the short-term. 

HVT- QASIM AL-RAYMI

  1. Born and raised in Yemen, Qasim al-Raymi was a veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, where he fought and trained alongside AQ central headed by Usama Bin Laden. 
  2. Returned in the Arabian peninsula, Raymi became a major jihadi figure in southern Yemen, orchestrating attacks and seizing territories. In 2005, Raymi was imprisoned on terror charges. 
  3. A year later, Raymi and other 22 AQ-affiliated figures broke out of prison and worked towards creating AQAP. 
  4. Al-Raymi became the group’s top emir in June 2015, after Abu Basser al-Wuhayshi was killed in a U.S. kinetic strike. Under his leadership, AQAP reached an apogee of territorial expansion, which included Yemen’s fifth-largest city, al-Mukalla in 2015. The seizure or urban locations enabled AQAP to impose ISIS-style governance over large populations. 
  5. AQAP was only forced out of Mukalla in April 2016, when the Arab Coalition-backed by U.S. air power launched an offensive to recover the city. Since then, al-Raymi has been the target of an aggressive U.S. SOF campaign.
  6. In January 2017, the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, or “ SEAL Team Six”) launched a direct action operation on the village of Yalka to capture or kill Raymi. While the target was not found, the operation was a major success in terms of intelligence collected. 

Qasim al-Raymi in a 2017 video via The Long War Journal

THE AQAP TERRORIST THREAT

AQAP is a foreign terrorist group and one of the strongest AQ affiliates worldwide. The group was formed in 2009 from the merger of AQ’s cells in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Yemen. As a militant jihadi group, AQAP plans to purge the Arabian peninsula of “Christians and Jews” and establish an Islamic Caliphate. AQAP’s strategy includes disbanding the Yemeni state, overthrowing the Saudi royal family, assassinating Western nationals and striking Western targets at home and abroad. The terror group has been actively plotting and executing both internal and external attacks intended to cause mass casualties. The group’s most infamous attacks include:

  • October 12, 2000: a water-borne improvised explosive device manned by two AQ operatives rams into the USS Cole in the Port of Aden, killing 13 U.S. service members. 
  • December 6, 2004: A group of AQAP gunmen attacks the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, KSA, killing 5 non-American staff members. 
  • September 17, 2018: AQAP militants detonate two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) outside the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. 
  • August 27, 2009: AQ militant Abdullah Asiri attempts to assassinate KSA’s Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, then Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, by detonating an explosive belt. Bin Nayef was only injured. 
  • December 6, 2013: AQAP ram a VBIED into attack into a hospital of the Yemeni Defense Ministry in Sana’a and then storm the building with assault rifles. The attack left over 50 people dead. 
  • January 7, 2015: Said and Cherif Kouachi attack the office on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing at least 12 people. The Kouchi brothers received firearms training in Yemen and were acting on behalf of AQAP. 
  • December 6, 2019: A Saudi airman opens fire on a classroom building at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, U.S, killing three people. 

COVER PHOTO: As seen through a night-vision device, U.S. coalition forces and Afghan commandos get dropped off at their target by a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter to conduct a night operation in the Sairobi district of Afghanistan’s Kabul province, Dec. 2, 2013. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Please follow and like us:
No Comments on U.S. Kills Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Leader in Yemen

CIA Declassifies Records About the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March…

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released samples from over 100 National Intelligence Daily (NID) articles about the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (CCEE) between February 1989 and March 1990. The collection represents much of the Agency’s short-term analysis of events unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as popular opposition to Soviet misrule erupted and quickly surpassed anything the Communist regimes were prepared to understand or to which they could respond. The material also represents a major source of information and insight for US policymakers into what was happening in these countries, where they were heading, and which implications the collapse of Communist rule in Europe and the beginnings of the breakup of the Soviet Union had for Europe and the United States.

The CCEE refers to a series of demonstrations and revolutions that ended the Soviet-imposed Communist rule in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, and paved the way for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The CCEE also marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War between the Western liberal democracies and the Soviet Union and its satellites (Warsaw Pact). 

The newly declassified intelligence demonstrates the accuracy of the Agency’s collection and analysis of the events unfolding in the padlocked CEE states. Despite the large volume of materials released, this is only a fraction of the CIA’s reporting on the CCEE. 

After going through the more than 100 documents, we can draw the following conclusions: 

  • Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) collected by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was the backbone of the NDIs. 
  • The developments in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania drew extra attention from Washington due to their specific geopolitical importance.
  • East Germany was the main “frontline” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a particular issue of concern for West Germany, a key US ally in the region. If the Communist regime in Berlin was to fall, the Agency was confident that re-unification with Bonn was a strong possibility.

Germans stand on top of the Wall in front of Brandenburg Gate in the days before it was torn down.

  • In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which experienced the mildest revolutions, over 135,000 Soviet Army troops were stationed. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from CEE would have significantly altered the balance of power in Europe in NATO’s favor. The three countries were also the fastest to enact unprecedented constitutional amendments and legislation in support of economic reform. 
  • Despite being affected by the domino effect of anti-Communist uprisings, Romania was seen as the Bloc’s last holdout due to the Ceausescu regime’s violent crackdown on protests. Not only was the Ceausescu regime strongly entrenched, but it also sought external support from other rogue regimes – particularly North Korea, Iran and Libya – to escape international isolation. Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country whose citizens overthrew the Communist regime violently. 
  • The CIA did not only extensively cover the Romanian revolution, but it also issued periodic situation reports and net estimates. One of the many valid assessments of the Agency analysts was that sustained violence against demonstrators would result in an alliance between the Romanian Armed Forces and disgruntled Communist officials (such as Ceausescu’s successor, Ion Iliescu, who was identified as a potential supporter in the CIA analyses) against Ceausescu and his family. 

December 1989: Thousands of Romanians rallied in front the the Communist Party’s politburo in Bucharest.

  • The Western Balkans were sparsely featured in the NDI dump. However, the risk of prolonged conflict as an effect of the CCEE was judged to be the highest in this region. The CIA feared that Albania would become a “second Romania” due to the regime’s opposition to change, while Yugoslavia was believed to be on the brink of collapse, leaving behind a mosaic of inter-ethnic armored conflicts. 
  • The CIA was confident that the Kremlin, paralized and weak, would not risk everything by launching punitive actions to suppress the revolutions that were overthrowing its “satellite” regimes in the Warsaw Pact. One analysis even observed how Lithuanian and Baltic nationalists were capitalizing on the Kremlin’s weakness by “pushing towards de facto independence, as a prelude for outright separation”.
  • The CIA was concerned that expectations among CEE populations were dangerously high. In the Special Analysis “Long Road Ahead to Economic Well-Being”, the Agency argued that the benefits of economic transition from a command economy to a free market system was a long-term game with few immediate positive effects. The Agency certainly remained open to the possibility that disenfranchised workers could stage counter-revolutions. 
Please follow and like us:
No Comments on CIA Declassifies Records About the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

Iranian Space Launch Fails Again and the CIA Was Watching

On August 29, 2019, Iran failed to launch a satellite, as the “Safir” space launch vehicle (SLV) exploded at Semnan Launch Site One. Commercial satellite imagery published by Planet and…

On August 29, 2019, Iran failed to launch a satellite, as the “Safir” space launch vehicle (SLV) exploded at Semnan Launch Site One. Commercial satellite imagery published by Planet and Maxar Technologies confirms an explosion on the launch pad. The Iranian government only admits to the “loss of a satellite” and has not addressed the explosion. 

The August 29 incident marks the third launch failure of the Iranian Space Agency this year. During a launch attempt in January, Iran lost a “Simorgh” rocket, followed by the explosion of another “Safir” SLV in February. Earlier this month, satellite images confirmed that the Imam Khomeini Space Port (part of the Semnan Launch Site) received a fresh paint job, leading analysts to believe that a new launch is imminent. 

President Donald J. Trump mocked the Iranian failure on Twitter and shared declassified geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) of the wreckage site. Critics claim that Trump’s tweet may have leaked a previously unknown deep-look capability of US spatial assets or revealed a clandestine flyover by a US aircraft. 

As Iran has significantly improved its air sensor network and aerial defense capabilities, it is unlikely that the US would risk losing another unmanned aerial vehicle. Recently, Iran unveiled a new foreign-inspired long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system (“Bavar 373”), which was tested near the Semnan Launch Site. The Bavar 373 was likely deployed to provide area air defense for the formerly undefended space facility. The US’ very high resolution GEOINT was therefore likely collected by either a low-Earth orbit satellite or the U-2 spy plane “Dragon Lady”. Defense journalist Babak Taghvaee has pointed towards the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) KH-12 Block IV as Trump’s “eye in the sky.” 

Why is the US Intelligence community interested in Iran’s space program? 

As SLV technology is interchangeable with ballistic missiles, there are concerns that Iran’s space program is intended to increase the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles. Classified sources indicate that the first stage of the ill-fated “Safir” SLV is based on Iran’s “Shahab 3” medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The same sources suggest that the SLV’s second stage is inspired by a North Korean variation of the Soviet-made R-27 (NATO Reporting name SS-N-6), which Iran acquired from Pyongyang.

Please follow and like us:
No Comments on Iranian Space Launch Fails Again and the CIA Was Watching

White House cancels CIA Covert Program aiding anti-Assad Syrian Rebels

Situation Report – Starting from the unconfirmed reports that have surfaced today that a month ago, the Trump administration has decided to cancel the CIA covert program through which various Syrian…

Situation Report – Starting from the unconfirmed reports that have surfaced today that a month ago, the Trump administration has decided to cancel the CIA covert program through which various Syrian Rebel groups were provided with weapons, ammo and aid in order to fight the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Reportedly, the decision has been taken after President Donald Trump consulted with National Security Advisor MacMaster and CIA Director Mike Pompeo. The story is taken by the public as another piece of the ‘Russian collusion’ puzzle and creates additional pressure on the White House and the Campaign team that is now under scrutiny for its undeclared discussions with individuals from Russia. However, this memo will express the background and incentives of the covert program in order to clarify the situation from a technical point of view: retrospective summary, consequences/ benefits and it’s overall projection.

The first things which should be clarified through the complex and entangled U.S. covert plans in Syria is that there were three such initiatives, the early one, run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) included the transfer of weapons, ammo and aid to the Rebels fighting Assad, and two sanctioned by the Department of Defense (Pentagon) that foresaw an ambitious  but failed approach of training 5,000 vetted and hand-picked Rebel fighters per year, and the successful revamped version, through which the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were born, set exclusively in combating ISIS, benefiting from U.S. air support . The one reported to have been canceled by the Trump administration is the CIA-sanctioned one.

Summary

The program has been theorized by the Obama Administration in 2013 when aiding Syrian Rebels was a more practical, credible and efficient solution that would be now. The context of 2013-2014 Syria War is fully opposite to today’s situation. Just until mid-2015, the Assad government had yet to receive direct military support from the Kremlin while Iranian aid consisted mostly in weapons, ammo and a small contingency of Shi’a militias from Iraq, leaving the weary Syrian Arab Army opened to defections and an overwhelming assaults of various opposition forces. Following Washington’s policy throughout the Arab Spring and reflecting on its resolve to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya through an extensive air campaign, the context was there for a regime change and state building option in Damascus. But as the situation in Syria grew intensively complex and given the commitment of ‘no boots on the ground’ from the Obama administration, the American strategists faced a difficult task ahead. Moreover, the configuration of the combatant forces was largely ambiguous, and their ideologies or allegiance were at least blurred, bringing an additional layer of difficulty in identifying a compatible native force.

In 2013 the White House authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to arm selected Syrian Rebel groups against the forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad. The beginnings of the initative four years ago were officially a secret, authorized by President Barack Obama through a “finding” that permitted the C.I.A. to conduct a deniable program through-which opposition fighters received weapons, ammo and aid, fueling the war against Assad while not committing the U.S. politically against a single-handed overthrow of the dictatorial regime. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified friendly assets that would act as liaisons for the United States and which received a constant flow of logistics through Turkey and Jordan, both countries that supported such programs and had similar arrangements with own assets themselves. But given the rise of ISIS, that threatened Euro-Atlantic security interests, and the overall polarization of the opposition camp, that left merely a few ‘moderate’ Rebel groups in play in stark contrast to the powerful, well funded and armed Salafists or political islamists, Washington’s priorities changed.

In this context, the Department of Defense was authorized to develop a ‘train and equip’ program that would build a new opposition army from scratch that will focus on combating ISIS and other terrorist groups.

In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These objectives include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.  The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Apropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to $500 million could be transferred from the newly-established Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to train and equip such native forces. Therefore, the covert program did not just refer to training and aiding indigenous elements, but also to undertake the human resources pre-selected, through a strict screening process that would eventually leave only the most ‘moderate’ fighters, in terms of ideology, to receive Washington’s ‘carepack’. This incentive produced two consequences: the recruitment of a small contingency of rebels, and a time-spawn until the force was operational and battle-ready. The training took place on the territory of two regional allies, Turkey and Jordan, which were also the staging areas of detachement of deployment until these new forces set-up forward operating bases (FOBs) in Syria by themselves.

The plan was to train 5,000 such troops, per year. On June 2015, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s testimony in front of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee expressed that at that time, only 60 Syrian Rebel fighters have been trained. As expressed above, the vetting and screening process makes it extremely difficult to identify compatible peers.

On July 2015, the first batch of Syrian Rebels trained called ‘Division 30’ numbered around 200 fighters of Sunni Turkmen or Arabic background, were deployed over the Turkish border. As soon as they steeped in Syria they were violently ambushed by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda. As a result, their weapons were stolen, some of them got killed and their field commander was kidnapped. As Asmed Shaheed, an Al-Nusra jihadi that posted a photo with his recently capture M-16, many boasted only about their ‘war spoils’ online. The U.S. air cover failed to protect the Rebels, as a retaliatory strike only came the day after. The operational disaster draw comparison between the ‘Divison 30’ episode the massacre of the ‘Bay of Pigs’, Cuba 1961.

Due to its complete failure and its inefficient spending of 500$ million of the taxpayer’s money, the program was suspended in October 2015. This was also regarded at that time as a sign of weakness towards the recent intervention of Russia’s aerospatial forces and expeditionary units in support of Bashar al-Assad. In reality, the suspension of the program was followed by a rational course of events.

In 2016, the White House asked Congress for an additional ‘train and equip’ program, enforced by the same Department of Defense.“This is part of our adjustments to the train and equip program built on prior lessons learned,” said Col. Steve Warren, spokesman for the U.S.-led military coalition in Baghdad. Starting from early 2015, The United States managed to gain a major ally, the ‘Euphrates Volcano’ – a joint war room formed by Kurdish militias as YPG/ YPJ and several Sunni Arab groups in order to coordinate in their fight against ISIS in Tel Abyad after relieving the siege of Kobane. By late-2015, these groups united their efforts in a framework called ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF). Both DoD and the White House believed that this was a group that deserved their support in order to combat ISIS, given their eficiency and numbers, already proven in previous battle in the region, so that in June 2016 the ‘Train and Equip’ Program was rebooted. U.S. Special Operators, present in Syria since 2015, continued their efforts to train and equip them from Jordan and northern Syria. These now embedded forces would also act as a compact outsourced infantry of the Pentagon’s air campaign.

 

Quality-test

Through this US-SDF partnership, ISIS has lost every battle against them in the past 2 years. The terrorist saw their caliphate shrink into a besieged enclave ‘capital’ of Raqqa, and sparsely spread in villages and towns around the Euphrates Valley. This cooperation has also given the US the chance to build military bases in northern Syria, the largest ones being in Sarrin, near Kobani and Rmelah, near Qamishli. But for reasons of operational secrecy, Transylvania Intelligence chose not to disclose their complete locations.

Just to clarify as an end note: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the entire anti-ISIS effort has nothing to do with the CIA cover program that was canceled.

However, the Rebels have been sequentially losing ground in face of the Loyalist offensives, and became dominated by the Salafist segment, as the ex-al-Nusra, now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Islamic Turkistan Party, Ahrar ah-Sham or Jaysh al-Islam, that have share the Idlib governorate into sectors of influence, setting checkpoints, imposing their own social judiciary based on Sharia Law and even fighting each other – as the current Ahrar vs. HTS clash in east Idlib. Other small pockets of Rebels still survive around Damascus in East Ghouta, Da’ara and Quneitra, but are critically besieged and weakened under a constant rain of barrel bombs and mechanized attacks.

 

The Rebels that Matter:

1. The only part were Rebel fighters that bear a strategic importance to American security interests is the desert area around the tri-border of Syria-Iraq-Jordan, notably around the al-Tanf crossing. The area was seized in March 2017 by Sunni Arab Rebels from the Amman-based Meghawir al-Thawra group, trained, armed and assisted by U.S. forces in camps built in Jordan. The role of this American-Rebel contingency on the border is to block Iran’s geopolitical gamble and deny Tehran a ground supply line for Hezbollah and Shi’a militias operating in Syria. In early June, given the relative cease-fire produced by the Astana Agreements, Loyalist forces spearheaded an operation through the Syrian desert and captured the territory north of al-Tanf, therefor blocking the frontline that the al-Tanf based Rebels had with ISIS, consequently denying their official purpose of their presence. Some strategist could consider that the border territory is now lost to Iran, due to the blockade imposed north of al-Tanf and because the Syrian Democratic Forces firstly need to liberate Raqqa before commencing on the Euphrates Valley and on the border – which could take too long, time in which the Syrians and Iranians could have already secured the frontier. It is also publicly known that President Trump and Putin negotiated a truce, a cease-fire between Loyalist forces and Rebels in that area. Which could equal in an abandonment of support for the al-Tanf contingency, that just months ago, was defended by  bombing the Iraqi Shi’a militias backed by Iran, and that were threatening the local U.S. presence.

A contingent of Sunni Arab Rebels and U.S. forces at the al-Tanf border checkpoint to Iraq.

However, it is not clear whether the southern Rebels are  part of the ‘Train and Equip’-Pentagon sanctioned program, or of the CIA’s covert action?

(a) In the case of the later, and their presence or functionality are affected by the cancellation of the CIA’s covert program, than the White House is making a serious mistake, with potential strategic dangers.

(b) On the other hand, the Jordanian-based Rebels have been used to fight ISIS, notably on the Syrian-Iraqi border and hopefully through Abu Kamal, Mayadin the the Euphrates Valley, and benefited from a close coordination with the U.S. Special Operators. It is highly possible that given the level of support and the stated objectives, these Rebels were trained under the Pentagon-backed ‘Train and Equip’ Program, thus being sheltered from any potential damage that the recent decision could have projected. Whereas the CIA convert operation only provided weapons and ammo to Rebels notably fighting Assad.

2. The Rebels from Quneitra also have a distinctive feature. They act as buffer elements between Israel and Hezbollah, that operates near-by. A defeat for the Rebels based there could trigger an Israeli intervention in the conflict and could upper the demands of Jerusalem for ‘safe-zone’ in the area, similar to what Turkey did in northern Aleppo governorate, even through direct action. A weakening of the Rebels fighting in the area could expose Israel’s Golan Heights to Iran’s proxy’s. However, Israel unveiled it’s massive humanitarian operation, code-named Operation ‘Good Neighbor’ through which the IDF provides health care, food and fuel for the Syrians.

 

Key Judgement:

  • Decision to end CIA covert program was most likely taken from a technical point of view, but could have been capitalized in the Trump-Putin negotiations on Syria in Hamburg.
  • In a stark paradox, the Trump administration campaigned that it will renounce state building and regime change activities. Translated in Syria, this is a result to the fact that since 2013, there is no viable and legitimate alternative to Assad at the moment, nor there is one proposed by the Turkey-based Syrian National Coalition, not even as an interim figure; and as the Rebels are on the imminent brink of defeat, democratic elections are no longer a viable or possible option.
  • The impact of the decision to cancel the CIA covert program is currently difficult to asses. The framework has been loose in its technicalities and details, dully in order to arm Syrian Rebels wherever and whenever needed. Moreover, given the clandestine and potentially classified nature of the program, it is highly unlikely to perceive the effects on the short-term.
  • Syrian Rebels from Maghawir al-Thawra stationed in al-Tanf to guard the border crossing from Iranian elements and launch an offensive against ISIS, are most probably funded and protected under the Department of Defense framework.
  • Rebel factions from the radical ‘safe haven’ of Idlib, the de facto buffer zone of Quneitra, Da’ara, or the suburbs of Damascus as East Ghouta, could potentially face significant challenges given the cancellation. However, given Israel’s escalation of aid (even publicly) to Syrians (even under the auspice of humanitarian aid) and taking into consideration that most of these Rebel groups have been formed and initially funded by the rich Gulf States, it is also safe to assume that the financial gap could easily be filled by the other external backers.
  • On the other hand, the Rebels based in Jordan have been promoted as being
  • In contrast, the cease-fire in south-western Syria brokered between Trump and Putin is difficult to interpret as a strategic action. One significant fear is that the White House won’t fall for Moscow’s apparently but questionable good-will to appease its concerns in regards to Iranian activities on the border. Notably given the lack of leverage that Russia has above Iran in the first place.
  • Abandoning the support for anti-Assad efforts of the Syrian Rebels could make sense from a technical point of view given the current context, however, it does not hold significant benefits for the U.S., other than facilitating a closer cooperation with the Loyalist Coalition, and implicitly, with Russia.
  • The cancellation of this program also strips the White House from a low-to-medium leverage over the Assad regime, which should have been kept.

Briefing is a short-to-medium assessment that presents a sharp overview of a recently occurring event with the objective of providing timely information with additional comments, rather than a comprehensive in-depth analysis. Such a paper does not regularly exceed 1,100 words. 

Please follow and like us:
No Comments on White House cancels CIA Covert Program aiding anti-Assad Syrian Rebels

Towards a New Strategy for Afghanistan: ISIS-K, Taliban Resurgence and Geopolitical Competition

(1) The security landscape in South Asia and the Far East is continuously degrading under transnational militant activity and competing geopolitical Chinese and Russian ambitions. (2) The fugitive US pull-out has…

(1) The security landscape in South Asia and the Far East is continuously degrading under transnational militant activity and competing geopolitical Chinese and Russian ambitions.

(2) The fugitive US pull-out has accelerated the Taliban’s resurgence and has fertilized the ground for other third parties to enter the stage. Some of these parties is the local franchise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), additionally named “Khorasan Province” or generally addressed in the Euro-Atlantic community as “ISIS-K”. Khorasan is the historical generic term that refers to the region of western Iran to Eastern Afghanistan and holds great value for the Islamic civilization both historical and dogmatic, as Khorasan is subjected in several Hadiths as where the “black flags rise” to establish the Calipath, a prophecy largely capitalized for PR purposes by many militant Salafist groups.

(3) The Trump presidential administration will attempt to address these issues within the upcoming South Asia strategy. While previous administrations have promised new directions, there are several key problems that distinguishes the current Afghan security dynamic as opposed to the previous years:

  • The rise of ISIS-K on the regional jihadi scene and its competing nature with the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan;
  • The increased and looming Russian and Chinese interests over South Asia;
  • The current Transatlantic vital security interests in the regard to the Afghan war.

THE RISE OF ISIS-K IS IN DIRECT COMPETITION WITH THE TALIBAN RESURGENCE 

The first sights of ISIS emergence in Afghanistan have been noticed since 2014 yet the official semi-consolidated structure only appeared in 2015, in a time of weakness and infightings within the Taliban. Consequently, ISIS-K is strongly linked to the Taliban struggle in Afghanistan, as even Hafiz Saeed Khan the founder of the local ISIS franchise was a senior member of this group. Born and raised in the Pashtun dominated FATA region of Pakistan, Saeed traveled after the 9/11 attacks to join the Afghan Taliban in the fight against the United States. Being a Pakistani himself, Saeed did not hesitate to join the Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistani Taliban or TTP) upon its founding, gradually working his way up to the upper ranks. Following the death of Baitullah Mahsud the founding mullah of whom Saeed Khan was an apprentice, he grew entangled into the internal in-fights and became dramatically alienated from the group when in 2013 he was denied the leadership position by the Shura. In effect, the boisterous rift materialized in a splinter group led by Khan himself and joined by TTP’s former spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, Gul Zaman (Chief of Khaibar), Mufti Hassan (Chief of Peshawar), Hafiz Quran Daulat (Chief of Kurram), and Khalid Mansoor (Chief of Hangu). Based on their vast cross-border networks stretching from major Pakistani city of Peshawar to all over Afghanistan, the group grew and eventually declared allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a bid to potentiate competition with the Taliban and establish its own hegemony. The declaration came on January 11th 2015 through a video released by the group where they explicitly announced their allegiance to ISIS and outlined their plans towards Khorasan, similar to those of al-Qaeda in the past: extending a jihadi network with transnational ambitious from Afghanistan, Pakistan to the Indian Subcontinent; the confirmation followed on January 16th 2015 through an interview with the alienated ex-Pakistani Taliban, now named Emir of ISIS “Khorasan Province”,  in the 13th issue of Dabiq (ISIS magazine), titled “The Rafidah from Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal”. In the interview he goes on to speak about his regional ambitions and to calls out his enemies:

“It had once been under the authority of Muslims, along with the regions surrounding it. Afterwards, the secularist…the cow-worshiping Hindus and atheist Chinese conquered other nearby regions, as is the case in parts of Kashmir and Turkistan,” In addition he offers a sneak peak to the growing Taliban-ISIS tensions in the area, considering the Pakistani Intelligence manipulators of Islamists and the Taliban’s as an obstruction to the a Caliphate in Afghanistan. Throughout the years we will come to learn extensively of how ISIS perceives the Taliban, namely as a “nationalist jihad” – Inherently due of their ancestral Pashto tribal code of conduct known as Pashtunwali, prioritized over the confessional one of Sharia Law, and also due to their lack of expansionist ambitions to India, China and the surroundings.  Accurately described, the Taliban settled for a national liberation movement throughout Afghanistan with limited engagements in Pakistan that in effect had more to do with the first objective rather than a regional outlook, while being deeply rooted in local tribal affairs and catalyzed within the societal layers through their ancestral customs, identity and configuration.  In effect, ISIS-K has shown great hostility towards the tribal system throughout the Afghan mountains which indirectly fueled the population’s dependency on the Taliban for security yet again. Tribal leaders were beheaded and villages were terrorized if they didn’t submit to Da’esh. This is a practice that ISIS-K has continued to echo regardless of its lack of pragmatism or rationally notably given the context of the human deficit that the local branch faces. 

In the beginning ISIS-K quickly gained support among other disenfranchised Taliban (especially Pakistani) fighters as the founders themselves, intrigued by the allure and successive victories of Da’esh in the Middle East. However ISIS-K remained in the eyes of the locals as a foreign construct with no presence in Afghan history and huge hostility towards local customs and affairs. Per contra, ISIS-K manages to win the alliance and partnerships of other “underground” Islamists groups that were looking for a way to challenge the Taliban’s hegemony, as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

The malign, mosaic and fast-shifting expansion of ISIS-K on Afghan territory was based on the established militant cross border networks stretching from the Afghan eastern provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar, where many T.T.P. militants had settled following Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan Agency, all the war through north-eastern FATA and Peshawar. While the Afghan Taliban resurfaced in the traditional Pashtun areas, far from the country’s center but concentrated on periphery, mountains and border crossings.

White = Taliban, al-Qaeda and allies / Red = Afghan Government / Dark = ISIS-K

ISIS-K Emir Hafiz Saeed Khan and his associates utilized this model that established ISIS-K as worrying presence on the war map, securing a presence in over 11 provinces, even if those had little significance on the ground. As a guerilla structure based on a asymmetrical nature,  ISIS-K could not survive long enough to develop hybrid characteristics as the central branch in Syria & Iraq, surely due to the lack of local support and rival clashes. ISIS-K has continuously faced these major operational obstacles that have proven to be more damaging than any conventional military campaign. In addition, unable to effectively blend within the societal fabric, ISIS-K members became much more easily to track, both for the Taliban and the United States/ Afghans. A mentionable influx of Pakistani Taliban came in middle-2015 due to several offensives launched by the Pakistani Armed Forces in the bordering area of FATA. In face of the aggressively growing foothold of ISIS-K, the Afghan Talibans sent their best fighters in the eastern mountains of Nangarhar that waged long and violent military campaigns.

U.S. Secretary of  Defence at that time, Ash Carter described IS presence as ‘little nests, of small rural isolated and dispersed incubators, that could flourish towards urban settlements, as Kabul and Jalalabad. According to former commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, IS was acting on a strategy to “move into the city of Jalalabad, expand to neighboring Kunar Province and eventually establish control of a region they call Khorasan.” Those being the exact provinces were ISIS-K still holds a consistent presence.

However, starting with 2015 we see an intensified US air campaign in the region that “decapitated” the senior leadership of this new and fragile jihadi force, which effectively weakened the group’s web of network and strategic thinking:

Because of their brutality and anti-tribal approach, a consistent force of fighters defected back to the Talibans which led us to believe that the actual number of ISIS-K fighters, not sympathizers or supporters, dropped to several hundred. In addition, the enhanced US presence in the area has also forced many of the jihadists to move back over the border in Pakistan. However given the

Opium cultivation map

complex relation between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban, the future of ISIS-K allegiance towards the later is open for speculation, even though that implies to move under Pakistan’s Deep State, were a vast array of security institutions and actors would provide a constant flow of logistics and a stable sanctuary in the area, with the price of submission and surveillance.

The territory controlled by ISIS-K is strategically located and agriculturally self-sufficient, consisting of a complex web of caves, passes, villages, and routes stretching from Khost, Paktia, and Logar provinces via Nangarhar to Kunar and Nuristan. It is easily accessible from the already-established proxy routes across the Durand Line. Pachir wa Agam district of Nangarhar province borders the infamous Tora Bora mountains and cave complexes, which have proven to be the perfect sanctuaries for militants and jihadi elements. Second, Pachir wa Agam serves as a vantage point to reach Achin and Nazyan districts to its east, Surkhrod district and Jalalabad city to its north, and Sherzad and Khogyani districts to its west. The Afghan Armed Forces do not have the capacity to fully exercise control over these regions and it is unlikely that the United States will launch new infantry-centered operations that cleared the area in 2001. (Further reading on ISIS-K in Afghanistan at this Middle East Institute Report from 2016)

 

As expected in face of diminishing control and presence, ISIS-K launched a series of attacks against Afghan, US installations and civilian targets throughout the country; actions rivaled by similar Taliban operations in order to maintain the relevancy in terrorism practices and project power. On March 8th 2017, gunmen dressed in white hospital robes stormed the Sardar Daud Khan Military Hospital in Kabul, killing over 100 people. ISIS-K indirectly claimed the attack through the Amaq Agency but Government officials had reasons to suspect the Afghan Taliban Haqqani Network instead. Throughout 2016 to 2017 Afghanistan began to be hit weekly if not daily with low-level attacks against civilian and military targets alike. According to US watchdog SIGAR, casualties among Afghan security forces rose by 35 percent in 2016, with 6,800 soldiers and police killed. With a slighter less robust counter-insurgency approach, the United States has actively tasked Special Operators to capture or kill leading high value targets (HVTs) in the area. In March, one such operation in Nangarhar ended with the death of a Green Beret. However, his death was not in vain; thanks to the human intelligence collected through a deep-behind-enemy-lines reconnaissance they have discovered a vast network of underground tunnels going through a mountain in Nangarhal; through this cave-system ISIS-K hosted dozens of fighters and maintained a regional control & command outpost.

The US CENTCOM (Central Command) determined that the mountain was too dangerous for an infantry-based sweep & clean mission that would put in additional American lives in harm’s way, therefore the operational solution remained an air force one. On April 13th 2017 CENTCOM announced that they have dropped for the first time their biggest non-nuclear weapon in the arsenal, generically named “MOAB – Mother of All Bombs”, the GBU-43 Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb was the most suitable choice, being developed exactly to destroy underground facilities such as missile-silos, bunkers, or tunnels in this case. According to Afghan officials the blast neutralized 94 ISIS-K fighters and destroyed most of the tunnel network. Going beyond the strike’s operational role for the Afghan theater, this action was undoubtedly an embedding geopolitical power projection with international ramifications: in the context of US-North Korean tensions, but also for other actors lined up for opportunities in Afghanistan.

On April 22nd 2017, The Taliban attack an Afghan Army bases in Balkh province killing 140 fighters and wounding 160 others. On May 3rd, ISIS suicide car hits a military convoy killing 8 Afghan soldiers and wounding 3 US soldiers. On April 29th 2017, ISIS has claimed the assassination of a senior Afghan Taliban individual in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, escalating the jihadi war between the two. May has been no different, new suicide attacks or convoy ambushes have resulted in casualties for Afghan soldiers or US personnel alike. It is clearly that the competition of “who’s hitting more” between Taliban and ISIS has lost balance in face of ground loss for the later. After several offensives launched from early 2016 to recapture land, on April 28th 2017 they announced a country-wide spring offensive named operation ‘Mansoori’ organized in two phases:

  1. a civilian phase to provide good administration and support to the civilians in areas under their control;
  2. the military phase would focus on seizing more areas and carrying more attacks in the form of coordinated attacks, guerilla attacks, suicide bombings, insider attacks and target killings.

An additional problem in the Afghan situation is the external now-found openness towards the Taliban. Russia, Pakistan and China are actively attempting to legitimate the movement and bring it to the negotiations table. Beijing’s geo-economic “Silk Road” project and Russia’s resurgence attempting to erode US influence will continue to have an impact on the transnational stage of the Far East.

 

COMPETING CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION

In February 2017, Russia, Pakistan and China agreed to start an outreach for reconciliation with the Taliban. New Delhi and Kabul registered their protest with Moscow, which led to an invite to the conference for the two countries, along with Iran held in Moscow. India and Afghanistan wanted these countries to respect the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution on terrorist groups. Russia, Iran and Pakistan agreed to respect the international red lines but refused to end the ongoing channels of talks with the Taliban. The United States, which was no invited to the conference, has reasons to believe that Russia manifests interest in the Taliban in order to harm the US effort in Afghanistan, camouflaged under the standard of “combating ISIS”.  Chinese, Pakistani and Iranian interests align in context of Beijing’s ‘One Belt, One Road/ Silk Road’ initiative that would not only traverse their respective countries, but the Taliban-held territories as well – reason for stimulating communication channels with the jihadists. In 2016 a delegation led by Abbas Stanakzai, head of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, visited Beijing on July 18-22 at the invitation of the Chinese government, a senior member of the Taliban said. In addition to the prospective geo-economic interest, the Chinese government is faced with its own Islamic insurgency in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, where a strong jihadist movement blessed by both al-Qaeda and ISIS is continuously aided by transnational and regional militant groups some of who are also rooted in Afghanistan.

The Beijing-Islamabad bond is even stronger on the regional issue, where besides the historical military alliance in the context of Cold War and Pakistan-India rivalry; they share a common strategic project. In an effort to diversify the “Silk Road” project, China has crafted several visions that include the usage of maritime ways and accessing major ports located in proximity of relevant regions. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor or OPEC is the embodiment of this doctrine being estimated at 62$ billion. China is working to boost Pakistani road and railway infrastructure traversing the country’s territory from the northern common border to the southern port of Gwadar whilst expanding it to host and sharply export large volumes of goods and merchandise. It goes without saying that such a massive investment needs protecting and given Pakistan’s security environment, the Taliban’s are a key player to the development of this project. Beijing hopes to secure their non-aggression via Islamabad; we have reason to speculate that as rumored even during the US War from 2001 onwards, the Chinese will intensify ammunition and weapons transfer in exchange for security and non-aggression. Nonetheless, the project also traverses the southern region of Baluchistan were militant activity is not only high but densely fragmented and out-of-state control. In addition, the geopolitical balance of the Pakistani-Indian equation is as needy as ever for Beijing, as New Delhi can stir turmoil at the border area and in Kashmir, which would again threaten Chinese infrastructure. Whether this context and dynamic will prove to be deal-breaker or a challenge for Chinese strategic ambitions it remains to be seen, what’s clear is that Beijing is looking into risky options to contain the threats and facilitate a fragile geo-economic-oriented stability.        

In a similar mindset, the Kremlin is attempting to secure a seat at the Near East table by exaggerating their regional and international power and impact in order to erode US strategic interests and to possibly develop energy projects for to the gas-rich markets of South Asia. Once again, Afghanistan and Pakistan represent a quick route towards the large populations in the Indian Subcontinent: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. They believe that supporting the Taliban would serve best their interests: degrading the US-backed political establishment in Kabul, combat ISIS and secure at seat at the regional table. Yet, Russia of 2017 is not the same with the Russian Empire in the 19th Century where similar arrangements were being done against the British nor the USSR in the Cold War where a large military intervention could be accomplished to overthrow the establishment. As history showed, a soft power approach to the barely governable, tribal lands of Afghanistan is a zero-sum game, notably when it involves supporting radical factions as proxies or elements of stability. On the outlook, Russia will fail in its strategic objective; however the short-term effect generated by the Kremlin aid for the Taliban will have tactical consequences meaning more targets for the Pentagon and a higher risk for governance over Afghanistan.

 

THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY INTEREST

The Pentagon is expected to submit a new strategy for Afghanistan surgically planned by the incumbent Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Without a doubt Washington is faced with a crossroads of global engagement that has great ramifications for this region as well. Up to now, the Trump administration has proven to be more interventionist and inserting than the past one, being close to the Bush era course of action. Therefore we have reason to think that this new strategy will follow the newly established line of doing whatever it takes to counter-balance regional adversaries trying to conventionally or subversively assert themselves in Afghanistan, but also to defeat ISIS in the region an additionally erode the Taliban’s resurgence. In Afghanistan as in Iraq the ‘blitz’ retreat and the signs of global disengagement of the Obama administration crafted a vacuum that proved to be fertile enough for degraded foes to quickly arise and challenge the US constructions. Another dramatic consequence of the US pull-out was the loss of trust from local allies that risked so much to support Washington’s projects and lost so much when they left, leaving them exposed to Taliban revenge. Similar to how the post-2012 situation developed for the Sunni tribes that raised against al-Qaeda in Anbar, and that were later left alone and exposed to AQI retaliation and Baghdad’s Shi’a persecution.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis in recent visit in Afghanistan

T-Intelligence has identified several overall guidelines that it recommends as actionable security solutions for the region in regards to the Euro-Atlantic interest:

 (1) The United States needs to maintain Afghanistan as a strategic outpost in the War on Terror, even if that means launching a medium troop surge (3,000 – 6,000) to conduct surgical operations in needed regions and on tailored objectives, which could go beyond JSOC boundaries and expand to more regular infantry corps to project presence and re-assert the US military in the area. These troops could continue the mandate’s tradition and be largely provided by NATO countries.

(2)The NATO Resolute Support mission should consequently be extended and expanded in a framework where a great emphasize is put on developing the Afghan’s Army logistical capabilities, notably strengthening the Afghan Air Force. A powerful and robust Afghan Air Force will have a strategic impact for Kabul to expand their power projection and governance-reach in tribal lands and mountains. Such an asset will also provide them with the position to be first responders and to assert itself as a security provider and not just as a receiver.

(3) In face of growing geopolitical challenges from competitive states, the United States should go beyond a friendly partnership with Islamabad and alter the regional dynamic will attempting the long awaited ‘Indian pivot’. While not abandoning Pakistan as the major Afghan partner, the ambivalent and deceiving nature of their Deep State security apparatus needs to be addressed in a resolute manner. Consequences should be inflicted.  

Additionally, it is important to resurface the Bush era partnerships with Central Asian countries which are needed as buffer zones to contain Russian or Chinese ambitions

(4) The ‘winning the hearts and souls’ protocol should remain the main population-based COIN correlated in contrast to the military solution as an integrated asymmetric response. Because a guerilla group cannot survive without support from the population, counterinsurgencies are as much about winning over local populations as they are about the military defeat of insurgents.

(5) The financial aid should be maintained; notably referring to the NATO-run Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, the UN-run Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the US-run Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF).

(6) The overall Afghan infrastructure needs to be extended as another soft power element of COIN. The country only has about 7,500 miles of paved road. Given the vastness of the country, this is a tiny number. Since 2002, the U.S. military and other NATO donors have built around 2,000 of these miles. U.S. military leaders considered roads so significant to their fight against the Taliban that local commanders spent the vast majority of their emergency funds (nearly $900 million out of a total of $1.3 billion) on road construction. In many instances, these roads are either continuations or restorations of routes originally built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the 1960s (as Cold War infrastructure) or extended by the Soviets after the 1980 invasion. The new roads paid for by the U.S. connect the largest cities to supply routes within Afghanistan. As Dave Kilcullen wrote in the Small Wars Journal blog in 2008 (further reading):

Like the Romans, counter-insurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication, and bringing economic development, health, and education to the population. Clearly, roads that are patrolled by friendly forces or secured by local allies also have the tactical benefit of channeling and restricting insurgent movement and compartmenting terrain across which guerrillas could otherwise move freely. But the political impact of road-building is even more striking than its tactical effect.”

Another great further reading on counter-insurgency through infrastructure we recommend this paper from ETH Zurich.

(7) Continue a HVT-centered campaign against Taliban and ISIS-K leadership; while many see this as un-effective given a guerilla’s flexibility on the “top-to-bottom” chain of command, there have been proven instances where the KIA of HVTs resulted in a direct weakening of the entire structure: see Osama Bin Laden-Al-Qaeda or even the Taliban after Mullah Omar’s death in 2013. In effect, a permanent drone campaign operated by the CIA should not only be maintained but boosted.

 (8) Necessity of re-assessing the US counter-narcotics strategy towards Afghanistan in a bid to degrade the Taliban’s financial income from opium trade. 92% of the world’s opium demand comes from Afghanistan, and with the topple of the Taliban government, the market was consequently opened for a mosaic of militant or mob-like groups ready to capitalize on the Taiban’s loss of control over most of the fields and consequently the erosion on the Taliban’s harsh rules over the trade. Still, they managed to regain the opium-rich regions of southern and eastern Afghanistan, which in correlation with control of the border crossing also makes the Taliban an intricate network of drug-trafficking, both as production and as protection of trade routes – corroborated by Ann Patterson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement, an Kabul Police Anti-Criminal Branch report and by Muhammad Daud, former governor of Helmand Province. However, until the civilian population is not faced with an actionable alternative source of income they will continue with poppy trade that finances terrorist activities and the Taliban will remain the main “job creator” for the Afghans. And at this stage, the narcotic issue cannot be simply solved through law enforcement or border control. More about the US counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan and the opium trade in the region at this analysis from the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College.

(9) The border issue remains one of the largest source of insecurity, remaining largely ungovernable and tribalized, militants can cross between jurisdictions easily while Coalition forces are faced with a sovereignty blockade that stalls and slows the process of targeting them. Un-sanctioned intrusions in Pakistani air space and territory remains a bed-rock of the black operations launched by JSOC or CIA, yet the overall situation still orbits around the unrestricted cross-border flow of jihadists and the Pakistani national restriction.

While in the past it was needed to keep the border open for NATO supply lines coming for Pakistani port and airports, at the current troop numbers in Afghanistan logistics could probably be provided solely through local airfields? – Open question – if so, a “closing the border” strategy could become realistic in planning, even though the implementation remains largely difficult.  

 

END NOTES

It goes without saying that the list goes on, these guidelines barely being the top of the iceberg in regards to the regional situation. However given the public’s growing interest in the ISIS-K activity in Afghanistan rivaled by the Taliban’s resurgence but also of the geopolitical game, Transylvania Intelligence considered such an analysis as being suitable for presenting an Euro-Atlantic strategic paper on Afghanistan and the Far East.

We shall now wait for the Pentagon’s new Afghan strategy, largely expected and realistically needed to call for a troop surge and an advancement of US/NATO operations in the area. The loss of US presence and influence throughout the world is the strategic tendency that the Trump administration has inherited, and in order to preserve the American Century and to promote the Euro-Atlantic interests, a strong tendency-reversal is inevitable and needed.

 

Please follow and like us:
No Comments on Towards a New Strategy for Afghanistan: ISIS-K, Taliban Resurgence and Geopolitical Competition

Type on the field below and hit Enter/Return to search