Tag: Japan

No Time To Dispute: Russia’s A2/AD in the South Kurils

Remote and derelict, riddled with active volcanoes and disputed between Russia and Japan, the South Kurils make the perfect secret lair for any self-respecting evil genius. It’s no wonder the…

Remote and derelict, riddled with active volcanoes and disputed between Russia and Japan, the South Kurils make the perfect secret lair for any self-respecting evil genius. It’s no wonder the writers behind No Time to Die, the latest Bond film, chose the South Kurils as the setting for the film’s final act. While not directly named, the South Kurils are clearly referenced by Q’s description of Safin’s island – “part of a chain disputed between Russia and Japan.”

A closer inspection of the Russian military presence in the archipelago suggests [spoilers] that Q’s “donut” flight over the island could have ended poorly. Likewise, the Royal Navy’s HMS Dragoon would have probably faced immediate retaliation for its missile strike on Safin’s bioweapons facility. As for Bond, he didn’t just break our hearts, he also broke into Russia’s A2/AD bubble.


KEY JUDGEMENTS

I. Together with the rest of the archipelago, the southern Kurils form a natural barrier, protecting the Russian Pacific Fleet’s naval bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk from threats in the Pacific

II. Russia has significantly enhanced its posture in the South Kurils by deploying advanced air defense systems including the S-300VM4, several Su-35 air superiority aircraft, and coastal missile systems in the past decade. By establishing an anti-access/area denial (A2AD) zone in the South Kurils, Moscow signals to Japan that it will never forfeit its easternmost territory. 

III. Russia’s militarization of the South Kurils will continue in the coming years and focus on the archipelago’s largest islands. Plans for further investment suggest that the South Kurils will no longer be a semi-dormant military outpost but could “go active” for Russian operations in the West Pacific. 

FLASHPOINT: NORTHERN TERRITORIES OR SOUTH KURILS?

1. Disputed between Russia and Japan, the southern Kurils are the southernmost islands in the chain that separates the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean. More specifically, the southern Kurils consist of Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese), Kunashir (Kunashiri), Shibotan (Shikotan), and the Habomai islets. 

copyright Australian National University

2. Russia exercises de facto control over the islands, but Japan has a historical claim to them. The ongoing Russo-Japanese dispute prevents the two countries from signing a formal peace accord to end World War 2 and foster closer economic ties. The rest of the Kuril island chain is internationally recognized as Russian territory. 

  • RUSSIA: Russia calls the archipelago the “South Kurils” and administers it as a district (Yuzhno-Kurilsky) in the Sakhalin oblast. Over 7,000 km from Moscow and only 20 km from Japan, the South Kurils district is Russia’s easternmost territory. Russian control of the southern Kurils can be traced back to 1945 when the Soviet Union seized the archipelago from Imperial Japan. The Soviets planned to use the islands as a springboard to invade mainland Japan in competition with the US. 
  • JAPAN: Japan refers to the southern Kurils as “Northern Territories” and considers them part of Hokkaido prefecture. The Japanese settled and administered the southern Kurils centuries ago and have a series of bilateral treaties with Russia that recognizes Japan’s sovereignty over the islands. 

3. It is virtually certain that Russia will never concede the southern Kurils to Japan, despite the recent detente in bilateral relations. Moscow fears that conceding even a part of the Kurils could create a dangerous precedent for its territorial disputes in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. While not at the top of the agenda, Tokyo is unlikely to shelve the southern Kurils dispute without significant concessions, such as free movement of Japanese fishers and/or demilitarization. However, there is a possibility, albeit low, that Russia might concede the Habomai islets and/or Shikotan islands to Japan as promised in an unratified 1956 Soviet-Japanese peace proposal.

SOUTHERN KURILS: BARRIER, GATEWAY, AND MINERAL DEPOSIT

4. BASTION BARRIER: While not strategic by themselves, the southern Kurils are critical components of the greater island chain, which serves as a natural barrier for Russia’s naval “bastion” in the Sea of Okhotsk. As a whole, the Kuril reef holds great military value from both defensive and offensive standpoints. 

  • DEFENSE: The Kurils can be flooded with air defense and coastal defense batteries combined with long-range artillery to keep adversaries at range. Invaders must adopt a costly leapfrogging strategy, contesting each island, if they wish to move surface vessels in the Russian Pacific Fleet’s Okhotsk bastion. 
  • OFFENSE: The USSR seized the South Kurils exclusively for offensive purposes in 1945. While military action against Japan is unlikely today (except retaliatory), the southern Kurils, particularly the Habomai islets, are valuable to monitor the US presence in Japan. 

5. GATEWAY TO PACIFIC: Russian naval movements indicate that the straits towards the southern Kurils are the Pacific Fleet’s most used passageways into the West Pacific. Even naval units based in Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan prefer to sail through the Kuril straits, via the Soya strait, over alternate routes (Tshushima and Tsugaru straits). The main reason is that the Kurils offer a more direct route to Alaska and the US mainland. Freedom of movement through the myriad of Kuril  straits is also important to diversify’s the fleet’s routes to and from the Pacific. Although some of the straits between South Kuril islands are difficult to navigate during winter due to ice formation.

6. RHENIUM: While underdeveloped, the south Kurils have always had some economic value. During the Cold War, it was fishing. Nowadays, rethium is the islands’ treasure – a rare earth element crucial for rocketry, aircraft production and the high-tech industry. Rhenium is widespread in the Kuril Islands, especially in the Kudryavyi volcano on Iturup. Given decades of underinvestment and poor infrastructure, Russia has barely tapped the islands’ mineral potential. 

GEOINT: RUSSIA’S A2/AD BUBBLE  IN THE SOUTH KURILS

South Kurils A2/AD (T-Intelligence)

7. Russia established an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in the southern Kurils throughout the past decade. The purpose of A2/AD is to deny adversaries freedom of action in a given theater and keep them at range. A combination of multi-layered air defenses and long-range strike platforms is the most common form of A2/AD composition, and the Kurils make no exception. 

  • AIR DEFENSE: By parrying a long-range S300VM4 with two short range systems (deployed in 2020), the Buk-M1 (d. 2012) and Tor M2 (d.?)Russia achieves a multi-layered air defense network that can monitor and threaten enemy aircraft. A variety of general surveillance and coastal radars are also likely based in the South Kurils. 
  • STRIKE PLATFORMS: Russia amassed the Bal and Bastion surface-to-surface missile systems (SSMs) to the Kurils in 2016. The Bal system (in Kunashir), and Bastion-P, (in Iturup), are capable of engaging both land and seaborn targets, and can be upgraded to accommodate newer missiles as they become available. 

ITURUP/ETORUFU

Overview: Locations of interest on Iturup/Etorufu Island (T-Intelligence)

Measuring 1,210 square miles (sq. m.), Iturup is by far the largest and most militarized island in the southern Kurils. Iturup absorbed the bulk of Russia’s military investment in the South Kurils with regard to hardware and infrastructure. Two airfields, a major infantry base, and several training grounds exist on Iturup. In the past decade, they have been modernized and expanded. Harbours and naval facilities have also improved over the years, but there is still no major naval base on Iturup. 

Russian forces have been sluggish in exploiting Iturup’s (dramatic) high ground for radar surveillance. There is also no visible progress on overhauling the islands’ WW2-era littoral defenses. Iturup’s fixed beach fortifications are overwhelmingly derelict. 

  • Burevestnik air base

Burevestnik Air Base on Iturup (T-Intelligence)

Built during WW2, then named “Tennet airfield,” Burevestnik is one of the largest airfields in the whole Kuril chain. The airfield hosted over 100 aircraft at the height of the Cold War. In 1965, the airstrip was extended to a length of 2,4 km, according to a declassified CIA assessment.  

In recent history, Burevestnik AB saw a significant all-around modernization. Nowadays, the airfield mainly hosts rotary-wing aircraft. The most notable improvement is the construction of an air defense site [44°55’7.77 “N 147°38’31.61 “E] dedicated to the S-300V4 systems (NATO reporting name: SA-23 Gladiator) that the Russia Eastern Military District deployed to Iturup in December 2020. Geolocation of the S-300’s first readiness exercise in Iturup to this location suggests that the air defense site was designed to host advanced hardware like the S-300. 

Geolocation of S-300 exercise in December 2020 to Burevestnik Air Base (T-Intelligence)

The air defense site and subsequent warehouse were built sometime between September 2012 and November 2015. Due to lack of open-source satellite imagery coverage before 2012, we could not pinpoint the exact timeframe. 

  • 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division [45° 2’3.68 “N 147°45’19.18 “E]

Temporal analysis of the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division camp in Iturup shows significant infrastructure enhancement between 2005 and 2019 (T-Intelligence)

In the past, the base was a typical case of Soviet-era ghost military base. Still, imagery from August 2019 shows an explosive expansion and modernization of the military camp, especially compared to the previously available imagery from Google Earth from September 2005. The old and decayed buildings in the base’s midsection have been demolished and replaced with new, modern facilities. The base expanded eastwards, where a warehouse of interest, among other structures, emerged. A review of Planet’s RapidEye satellite imagery suggests that the warehouse was built in the second half of 2016. 

A GEOINT assessment conducted by Israeli company ImageSatIntl in July 2019 named the warehouse as a deployment site for coastal missile defense systems and identified two Rubezh systems (SSC-3) parked on the cement pad nearby. The newly deployed Bal (SSC-6) or Bastion (SSC-5) systems have likely replaced and retired the ageing Rubezh systems.  

  • Iturup Airport [45°15’28.50″N 147°57’16.53″E]:

Su-35 presence at Iturup airfield (T-Intelligence)

Built in 2014, Iturup airport (also known as Yasny) is a rare case of an entirely new facility constructed in the South Kurils. Iturup airport is also the first airfield to be built from scratch in post-Soviet Russia. With a 2,4 km airstrip and modern facilities, Iturup Airport is a dual-use airfield serving both civilian and military flights. In August 2018, Russia deployed three Su-35 air superiority (Flanker-E) aircraft to Iturup airfield. 

Image shows the three Su-35s on the Iturup airport’s apron in May 2020. Photo credits: Vera Bykova

  • Naval areas 

While the island does not host a military naval base, there are several noteworthy ports or small wharves that small vessels of the Russian Border Security Force (BSF) – Coast Guard or Russian Navy can use. Iturup’s coastline contrasts from flat beaches to sharp cliffs. Therefore artificial docking facilities, like wharves, are needed to accommodate vessels. 

  • Kurilsk Harbor [45°15’24.7 “N 147°52’55.9 “E]- Iturup’s largest port has seen significant modernization in the past years, which undoubtedly expanded Kurilisk’s military potential. 
  • LLC Fish processing plant and wharf [45°06’12.2 “N 147°41’53.0 “E]
  • “Autumn” fishing village [45°00’34.4″N 147°31’11.2″E]

KUNASHIR/KUNASHIRI

Overview of Kunashir island (T-Intelligence)

Kunashir is the second-largest island in the South Kurils (580 square miles). The island hosts a major airport (civilian) and a massive infantry base. Kunashir used to host a large naval Soviet presence in the Cold War, and was the assembly point for the Japanese Imperial surface group that attacked Pearl Harbor, according to a declassified CIA assessment. 

  • Yuzhno-Kurilsk Mendeleyevo Airport [43°57’42.17 “N 145°41’13.23 “E]

Mendeleyevo Airport in July 2021 via Google Earth (imagery: Maxar Technologies and CNES/Airbus)

With a 2,2 km airstrip and modest facilities, Mendelyevo has remained relatively unchanged in the past decade. The airport has seen limited modernization of auxiliary facilities but not expansion. Mendelyvo does not have a declared military role; however, if needed, it could support a limited number of fighter aircraft and helicopters for a short amount of time. Aeroflot subsidiary Aurora Airlines is the only commercial airline that flies to Mendelyevo. Aurora’s only route to Yuzhno-Kurilsk Mendeleyevo Airport is from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and is mainly serviced by the company’s De Havilland Canada Dash 8-400 aircraft.

  • Seaport Yuzhno-Kurilsk 44°01’19.6 “N 145°51’15.7” E

Yuzhno-Kurilsk Seaport in April 2020 via Google Earth (image: Maxar Technologies and TerraMetrics)

Although mainly for civilian-commercial use, the Yuzhno-Kurilsk seaport has military significance. The wharf and docking facilities have likely once formed a “major Soviet naval base” as referenced in a declassified CIA report from 1955. While the coordinates provided in the CIA report are “broken,” pointing to an offshore location (happens to the best of us), Yuzhno-Kurilsk seaport is the island’s only naval facility and it is “near” the local airfield. A direct road links the two sites.

The seaport also hosts a fish processing plant and an offsite fuel storage facility, which are vital to the island’s economy and inhabitants. 

  • 46th Machine Gun-Artillery Regiment 44°03’19.3″N 145°47’06.2″E 

46th Machine Gun Artillery Regiment camp (T-Intelligence)

This Soviet-era installation bloomed starting in 2010 and nearly doubled after May 2017. New housing facilities, warehouses, and a host of small and medium-sized structures appeared during this timeframe. The constructors have also prepared approximately 120 square meters of parking areas, indicating an increase in troop and supply transportation vehicles.

A large, white hangar also emerged southeast of the parking lot for hosting advanced weapons capabilities (AWC), as the geolocation of the Bal systems in storage photo suggests. The image in question was obtained by a Japanese newspaper, Sankei, from a source on the ground. 

Leveraging the local high ground, two air defense sites exist north of the base. The first site, within the base’s limits, was built between 2015 and mid-2018. The layout is identical with the air defense site prepared at Burevestnik air base on Iturup, where the S-300VM4 resides. Google Earth’s latest imagery, dated April 2020, shows a probable surface to surface missile (SSM) system – either Bal or Bastion – positioned in the revetments, suggesting that the site is not exclusively for air defense. The second presumed air defense site (“high ground SAM site”) predates the recent modernization and has not hosted SAM activity in the past years, based on our review of available satellite imagery. 

A warehouse is also visible to the southeast, with vehicle marks suggesting pre-established routes to the nearby woodland – a possible shoot-and-scoot path. The warehouse and auxiliary areas were built between May 2017 and June 2018. As ImageSat International was the first to assess, the warehouse facility is identical with the one constructed at the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division. This suggests a similar use, namely hosting advanced weapons capabilities (AWC). 


SHIBOTAN/SHIKOTAN

Overview Shikotan island (T-Intelligence)

Two noteworthy naval facilities exist on the archipelago’s third-largest island. While under civilian authority, Shibotan’s ports regularly – or permanently host – Russian Coast Guard vessels. No airfield exists on Shibotan. However, at least one helipad is visible at Malokurilskaya Bay [43°51’59 “N 146°49’39” E], and the island offers a host of adequate landing zones for helicopters. Infantry troops and likely an artillery unit are also based on the island. Declassified CIA reports from the 1950s claim that Shibotan hosted a Soviet frontier naval division, suggesting that this island played a crucial role in Moscow’s posture vis-a-vis Japan. 

  • Malokurilskaya Bay [43°52’29.5″N 146°49’23.5″E]

Geolocation of Russian Coast Guard vessels docked in Kunashir (T-Intelligence)

Geolocation of images posted on Russian forums underscores the Russian Coast Guard’s presence at Malokurilskaya Bay. The images suggest that the local Coast Guard unit (likely unit 2264 based on unverified crowdsourced information) is using the bay’s northern wharf as “home port” [43°52’25 “N 146°49’19” E].  

  • Trench line (derelict) [43°51’23″N 146°49’25″E]

Covering the hilly southern approach to Malokurilskaya Bay is a WW2-era trench fortification system accompanied by a slate of abandoned T-34, IS-2, and IS-3 tanks. If needed, the trench line could be revived as a stop-gap defensive measure, if overhauled, and reinforced with modern armored units. 

  • Krabovaya Bay [43°49’35″N 146°44’55″E]

This smaller port exclusively serves fishing activities, but its new, large wharfs make it adequate for small patrol craft to a certain extent. Large tonnage vessels are unable to reach due to shallow waters. Krabovaya Bay boomed after a private company built a new fish processing and storage plant and expanded the port docking facilities in 2019. 


HABOMAI ISLETS

Overview of the Habomai islets (T-Intelligence)

The closest to Japan’s Hokkaido province and the smallest landforms in the southern Kuril chain (39 square miles – combined), the Habomai are of little significance to Russia’s military posture. The islets’ rich waters are sought after by Japanese fishers, and Tokyo still hopes that it can recover the Habomai or establish a joint fishing zone in Habomai’s waters. The return of the Habomai (and Shikotan) to Japan was promised in the 1956 Soviet-Japan Joint Declaration, but the two parties failed to ratify the peace agreement. 

Except for two border outposts* and several defunct barracks and derelict fortifications, there are no noteworthy Russian installations or forces on the Habomai islets. Small boats and fast patrol craft of the Coast Guard regularly patrol the Habomai’s waters and arrest Japanese fishers. 

*Border post – Zelenoe Yuzhnokurilskiy [43 ° 30’9 “N 146 ° 5’23” E] 

*Border post – Muravyovka [43 ° 25’5 “N 145 ° 54’2” E]


OUTLOOK

8. Russia will further its force build-up by expanding the military infrastructure on Iturup and Kunashir, Russian Prime Minister Mishushtin announced in August 2021. Moscow said that it will build “51 more pieces of military infrastructure” in the Kurils, without detailing what kind of infrastructure this will be. We assess that most investments will likely upscale the logistics facilities and amenities of local units. Modern radars, point air defenses, and new naval facilities would greatly improve Russia’s local posture and are therefore strong candidates for the Kremlin’s upcoming investment plan. 

9. The growing A2/AD bubble in the South Kurils solidifies Russia’s grip on the disputed territories. It also dramatically reduces the likelihood of the islands, or parts of them, returning to Japan. Plans for further investment suggest that the South Kurils will no longer be a dormant military outpost but could “go active” and increase the pace of Russian operations in the West Pacific.


by HARM

Afterword: this strategic analysis (SA) does not encompass all *possibly* military-related sites and objects on the South Kurils as it prioritzed high value locations and advanced hardware. The SA’s purpose is to provide a succinct overview of the archipelago’s most noteworthy locations and highlight objects of interest. 

This assessment was made using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques and resources. Visit Knowmad OSINT to learn more about our online OSINT training. 

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Kim Jong-Un: Chilling in Wonsan or Secretly Dead?

More and more reports about North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s deteriorating health are surfacing. U.S intelligence and recently South Korean and Japanese press have suggested that Kim Jong-Un (KJU) is…

More and more reports about North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s deteriorating health are surfacing. U.S intelligence and recently South Korean and Japanese press have suggested that Kim Jong-Un (KJU) is in critical condition after a failed emergency heart surgery in mid-April. China, North Korea’s main ally, has reportedly sent a medical team led by a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department to check on KJU’s health. 

Standing at 5-foot-7 and weighing roughly 300 pounds, KJU is considered “severely obese.” He was last seen on April 11, when he presided over a party meeting and has reportedly visited a military airbase north of Pyongyang the next day. 

Bearing in mind that KJU disappeared from public life before, the rumors of his death should be taken with a grain of salt. In 2014 he was not seen for nearly six weeks, reportedly due to cyst removal surgery, before reappearing with a cane. 

What makes things different this time is that KJU missed the country’s most important holiday on April 15, the birthday of North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-Sen. 



ALIVE AND WELL IN WONSAN?

The South Korean Presidential Palace has been quick to dismiss the reports, claiming that KJU is “alive and well” and that he has been residing at his seacoast villa in Wonsan since April 13. 

Satellite imagery pulled by 38thNorth confirms that KJU’s train is indeed at the Leadership Railway Station in Wonsan, but it only arrived between April 15 and 21. 

The South Korean statements and the geospatial intelligence are consistent with other reports that the North Korean dictator has been out of the country’s capital Pyongyang for the past weeks. However, they do not clarify KJU’s health status or his whereabouts.   

 

NO CLEAR SUCCESSION PLAN

In the event of KJU’s death, the North Koreans would likely delay the official announcement until an heir to the throne is chosen. 

The lack of a clear successor is the main critical uncertainty that would result from KJU’s death.  This question is particularly worrisome, as the succession will determine who is in control of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the arsenal of ballistic missiles, and other WMD programs. That person would also inherit one of the most repressive totalitarian regimes and a starving population caught in the middle of a pandemic. 

Photo of Kim Yo-Jong’s via Reuters

It is unknown whether KJU named a successor in the event of his demise, but the options considered in intelligence circles are the following:

  • His sister, Kim Yo-Jong. 
  • A general or a military junta with or without the support of the Korean Workers Party. 
  • A regency between Kim Yo-Jong and senior military heads backed by the Korean Workers Party. 

Any succession would be temporary until one of KJU’s two children will be old enough to take power. The continuation of the Kim dynasty (or Paektu bloodline) is critical for the survival of the regime in Pyongyang. 

MILITARY READINESS AT HISTORICAL HIGH

The United States, South Korean, and Japan fear that the death of KJU could cause the collapse of the regime and result in a vacuum of power with multiple factions fighting for power. North of the 38th parallel, the North Korean military, and the Korean Workers Party fear that any vacuum, even if temporary, would embolden their enemies to pray on the leaderless and mourning nation. 



The signs of anxiety on Pyongyang’s part are clear. The North Korean military readiness remains at a historical high, with the air force and artillery units showing an unusual increase in operations.

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A Week in Missile Tests: Russia, North Korea and the US

The Russian Federation, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or “North Korea”) and the United States have each conducted major ballistic missile (BM) tests in the span of only…

The Russian Federation, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or “North Korea”) and the United States have each conducted major ballistic missile (BM) tests in the span of only a few days between September 30 and October 2, 2019. 


RUSSIA: TOPOL-M/ SS-27 “SICKLE B”

The Russian Strategic Missile Forces test-launched a RT-2MP2 Topol-M (NATO reporting name: SS-27 “Sickle B”) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from a spaceport silo in Plesetsk on November 30, 2019. The ICBM landed 6000 km away in an undisclosed location on the Kamchatka peninsula. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the test fire confirmed the technical readiness of the Topol-M ICBM. 




Commissioned in 1997, the Topol-M is a three stage, solid fuel ICBM with a maximum operational range of 10,000 kilometers. Bearing similarity with the American Minuteman III ICBM, the Topol-M has a single, 500 kiloton-yield warhead. As a ground-launch system, the Topol can be fired from both reinforced missile silos and a mobile transporter erector launcher (i.e. MZKT-79221 “Universal” 8×8). 

Flight path of Topol-M/ SS-27 “Sickle-B” ICBM during the November, 30 2019 test (T-Intelligence)

Experts believe that the Topol-M has formidable evasive features that significantly increase the missile’s survivability against modern anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. 

  • Short boost phase: Minimizes launch footprint and complicates early-warning threat acquisition. 
  • Flat ballistic trajectory: Complicates ABM interception. 
  • Maneuverable and enforced reentry vehicle (RV): Complicates ABM interception in terminal phase due to unpredictable attack path and renders the RV immune to radio, electromagnetic or physical disturbance. 
  • Countermeasures and decoys: Significant decrease in successful interception, as the vast majority of ABM system are unable to discriminate between targets. 

The Kremlin aims to augment its current nuclear ICBM capability through the phased deployment of the RS-24 “Yars” (referred to as the SS-27 Mod. B or SS-29), which contains multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) as opposed to the single-warhead Topol-M. The RS-24 is believed to be capable of a larger kilotone capacity and extended engagement range. 

In addition, Russia is developing a replacement for its obsolete R-36 ICBM, called the RS-28 Sarmat (NATO Reporting name: SS-X-30 Satan II). One “Satan II” ICBM is believed to be able to launch a combination of 10 to 15 MIRVs consisting of conventional nuclear warheads and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), including the Avangard. 


DPRK: PUKUGUKSONG-3 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) test-fired a previously unidentified submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) off Woffsan, on October 1, 2019. The SLBM was identified as the Pukuguksong-3 by the state-controlled media. 

Pukuguksong-3 launched from a submerged platform or submarine courtesy of North Korea state media

According to the Republic of Korea’s (ROK or South Korea) Joint Chiefs of Staff, who constantly monitor DPRK missile tests, the Pukuguksong-3 flew about 450 km on an eastward trajectory and reached an apogee of 910 kilometers. The SLBM landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone in the East Sea. 

Flight path of DPRK’s Pukuguksong-3 SLBM during the October 1, 2019 test (T-Intelligence)

Earlier in July, the DPRK revealed that the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) is developing an another indigenous diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSB) in addition to the existing Sinpo-class SSB (also known as “Gorae”-class) that was deployed in 2014. The new SSB appears to be a modified version of the Russian-made Project 663 submarine (NATO reporting name Romeo-class), with a significantly larger and wider sail to accommodate one solid-fuel Pukuguksong-3 SLBM. The new submarine is expected to enter service in the Sea of Japan soon, according to DPRK-owned media. 

Kim Jong-Un inspect DPRK’s newest ballistic missile submarine. In order to conceal technical details, North Korea censored blurred the upper side of the submarine.



Washington has been aware of this new North Korean submarine for more than a year, a senior US official told CNN. Despite the KPN’s recent development of new subsurface capabilities, Seoul assessed that the Pukuguksong-3 was test-fired from a submerged launching platform instead of a submarine. However, the successful testing of the Pukuguksong-3 and the constant advancements in SSB technology show that the DPRK is pursuing a credible (nuclear) second strike capability that is more elusive and difficult to track than land-based systems. While neither of KPN’s nuclear-capable submarines can threaten the US western seaboard, they would represent a force multiplier when it comes to overwhelming ROK, Japanese, and even American (in Guam) ABM defense systems. 


US: MINUTEMAN III

The U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command successfully test-fired a Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, at 1:13 AM, October 2, 2019. The Minuteman’s RV traveled 6,760 km to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. 

Despite the “chain” of missile tests by Russia and the DPRK, the US Air Force (USAF) clarified that the test launch was not in connection to “world events” or “regional tensions.” In fact, the USAF tests its Minuteman III arsenal once or twice every year to ensure that the ICBMs are functional to fulfill their role for nuclear deterrence. The recent test was planned and organized six months to a year in advance. 

Flight path of Minuteman III ICBM during the October 2, 2019 test

Ever since the early 1960s, the Minuteman family of missiles has served as the backbone component of US nuclear capability. Starting with 2014, the Minuteman III became the sole American land-based nuclear system. With a maximum range of 13,000 km, the Minuteman III can carry three RV with a combined payload of 350 kiloton. However, under the New START treaty, the US and Russia modified their ICBM arsenal to carry only one warhead per missile. 

The 50-years-old Minuteman III will continue to serve as America’s premier land-based nuclear capability until the mid-2030s, when the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (next-generation ICBM) will be deployed. 

 

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NATO in Asia-Pacific: Temporary Deterrence or Forward Thinking?

Urgent Briefing – The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has conducted a diplomatic tour to visit the two regional allies in Asia-Pacific, namely Japan and the Republic…

Urgent Briefing – The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has conducted a diplomatic tour to visit the two regional allies in Asia-Pacific, namely Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, ‘South Korea’). This raised a legitimate debate regarding NATO’s prospects in a region so far away from the Euro-Atlantic realm.

 

Visits to South Korea and Japan

Jens Stoltenberg arrived on October 30, 2017 in Tokyo for a three-day visit. Appointed in 2015 as Secretary General, this was his first tour in Asia-Pacific, throughout which he reinforced the Alliance’s partnership with Japan and South Korea. Having talked with the Japanese Defense Minister, the two agreed on the potential to expand cooperation in the areas of maritime security and cyber defense, additionally to the substantial efforts already undergone. On November 1st, he traveled to South Korea for a two-day trip to meet with the Foreign Minister, and to address the North Korean threat. He made bold comments about this issue, condemning Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic programs; Stoltenberg referred to them as a threat to ‘international and regional security’, calling on Kim Jong-Un to abandon this pursuit.

 

NATO’s Asia-Pacific policy

Sine the conclusion of the Cold War, the Alliance created a wide range of partnership options through which it pursued fostering good relations with states across the globe. The largest such framework is Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a 50-nation multilateral forum that encompass diverse actors, from Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Ukraine, to Austria or Armenia. The Mediterranean Dialogue is eligible for states situated in Northern Africa or the Levant, as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) welcomes several Gulf states as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Additional to these frameworks, there are individual options that are loosely referred to as ‘Partners across the Globe’, and provides interested peers with tailored diplomatic protocols that facilitates a closer engagement to NATO. Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are one of those states. And following Washington’s model, they are NATO’s key partners in shaping an Asia-Pacific policy. Evidently, the United States has a leading role in applying and conceptualizing such a policy, but the other 28 states also have a decisive input. It is widely known that NATO has a history of conducting operations and crafting strategies in rapport with issues and regions outside the Euro-Atlantic space in the post-Cold War era. Operation Ocean Shield (Indian Ocean, Bab-el-Mandeb strait), ISAF (Afghanistan) or Iraq Training Mission have cemented the Alliance’s outlook towards the external space amid the 21st century security environment and emerging threats. The 2010 Lisbon Summit formally marked this transition by adding Crisis Management and Cooperative Security to NATO’s core values, in addition to the original task of Collective Defense. The 2010 New Strategic Concept is relevant in application to all issues and challenges, while keeping the focus on cooperative efforts with regional peers.

There has been no official military presence in the waters of Asia-Pacific before, nor substantial diplomatic effort in the region under a NATO framework. This marks Stoltenberg’s tour as a milestone in the Alliance’s ‘coming-of-age’ towards the region. The visits to Japan and South Korea can be regarded as a natural sign of solidarity towards NATO’s biggest financial contributor and strongest member, the United States. And that extensively, the effort was an additional deterrence tool in applying pressure towards the North Koreans.

 

North Korea: a global problem

In a speech held at the National Press Club in Tokyo, October 31st, Jens Stoltenberg outlined the ‘new geography of danger’ emphasizing the global dimension of the North Korea threat and the necessity for a united, potentially stronger front, against Kim Jong-Un regime. Mr. Stoltenberg called on Pyongyang to “abandon its nuclear program once and for all”; to “suspend the development of ballistic missiles”; and to “refrain from further testing”. He also reiterated that “NATO strongly supports a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.” He also added that “achieve this, pressure is key”, before acknowledging that Japan is NATO’s “natural partner”. (read the entire speech here, as delivered)

Asked whether an North Korean attack on the island of Guam, a US territory, would trigger Article 5, he refused to respond. However, he did mention that NATO’s European Defense system is ready to counter any possible ballistic missile launched from the Korean peninsula.

 

Key Judgements

NATO is right to have concerns regarding the North Korean problem. The passive and impotent efforts throughout the past three decades have allowed the totalitarian regime from Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons, and now, even sophisticated means of transporting them towards enemy targets. The strike range of those ballistic missile do not only extend towards California, Alaska or some Pacific islands, but also over Europe. NATO’s concerns are legitimate and worthy of being shared at the strategic level by all 29 members. While the diplomatic tour in Japan and South Korea can well be accounted as a pressure force towards North Korea, and as a solidarity gesture towards the United States, there is the potential for more than just an episodic touch. Given the rise of China in the international stage and the risks it poses for global trade and regional stability, notably given the standoff in the South China Sea, it’s fair to assume that NATO is considering widening its projection. Benefiting from predictable and strategic partnerships with capable actors in the region, namely Australia, New Zeeland, Japan and South Korea, and its utmost important member in the driving seat, the United States, NATO holds the incentives for a long-term game in respect with the Asia-Pacific theater.


Briefing is a short-to-medium assessment that presents a sharp overview of a recently occurring event with the objective of providing timely information with additional comments, rather than a comprehensive in-depth analysis. Such a paper does not regularly exceed 1,100 words. 

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Enhanced Pressure on North Korea: Clock is Ticking

Situation Report – Tensions between North Korea and the United States have reached a new boiling point in the past days. Uncertainty and hostilities have been spiked by the newest…

Situation Report – Tensions between North Korea and the United States have reached a new boiling point in the past days. Uncertainty and hostilities have been spiked by the newest statements and by an analysis composed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon’s intelligence service that indicate that Pyongyang is now capable to fully miniaturize the nuclear weapon in order to be mounted as a missile’s warhead. A similar conclusion has been reached by the Japanese as well. Furthermore, U.S. officials believe that North Korea now holds a stockpile of 60 nukes, more than previously estimated, while other independent experts believe the number is lower, but between 30-60.  Additional reports state that the CIA and the other intelligence agencies of the U.S. agree with the DIA’s assessment.

Over these infinitely tense environment, Pyongyang also issued a plan to fire an ICBM containing a war head into Guam, a U.S. island in the Pacific ocean and near the Sea of Philippines, of which trajectory will violate Japanese airspace. It is now clear that the ‘clock’ has reached an unprecedented moment, when North Korea not only has nuclear weapons but also holds that capacity necessary to deliver them against military targets, hence the rising deterrent factor that it applies.

It’s unclear what kind of missiles is the DIA report referring too, but if it can fit on the following missiles: Hwasong-14 (KN-20) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-12 (KN-17) intermediate-range ballistic missile, or Pukkuksong series (KN-11 or KN-15), then North Korea has indeed the operational readiness and technological know-how to strike South Korea, Japan and parts of the United States. The Hwasong-14 (KN-20)  ICBM for example, has been tested twice this year in July, following a new wave of high tensions that are better described for that context in this past analysis, including the Chinese pivot, hypothetical regime change and the military option.

In March 2017, Secretary of States Rex Tillerson announced the ‘end of strategic patience’, a North Korea policy followed by past Presidents attempting to cope with the North Korean issue, and instead adopted an ‘Enhance Pressure’ approach. The past strategy was founded on the belief that if enough pressure and isolation is applied, North Korea will eventually come to the negotiations table, in a way that worked, in theory for now, with Iran. The decades-long strategic patience instead resulted in a gradual increase of military capabilities, nuclear developments and missile tests that have paramounted in a functional cache of ICBMs and a significant stockpile of nukes. The perpetual bellicose attitude of Kim Jong-Un and his efforts driven to secure his throne also stirred anxiety at Beijing who were prospecting the idea of a regime change while not interrupting the dynasty, hence the assassination of Kim-Jong Nam by North Korean intelligence in Malaysia.

 

Enhanced Pressure

The new enhanced pressure approach is currently unclear and blurred, being still in application and sheltered under the fog of public vs. backchannel diplomacy. For now, it seems that the unprecedented increase in hostile declarations against Pyongyang has not deterred it from trying to pursue nuclear weapons and ballistics missile technology. It did however, secure China’s public disapproval of the Kim Jong-Un regime, even though that could be circumstantial given their separate bilateral dynamic and how that evolved since Jong-Un took power. Strategic Patience has become obsolete and even an anachronism.

The strategic environment has changed, shifting from a nuclear-aspiring North Korea to a nuclear armed and ICBM-ready one, capable of deterring its enemies. The U.S. is needed and willing to strike first in order to avoid letting itself vulnerable to the whims of a rogue nuclear state. And while diplomacy is still the first option, ‘Enhanced Pressure’ might be the last chapter in negotiations before bringing the military options upfront. 

This new dimension of American power projection towards the Korean Peninsula was needed, which as many other geopolitical disputes, are inter-winded with several other factors and inputs. Notably China, Russia or the Asia-Pacific order. ‘Enhanced pressure’ also implies, publicly made by Rex Tillerson, that all options are on the table, followed by President Trump’s ‘fire and furry’ comments and complemented by Secretary of Defense James Mattis declarations about the military options being prepared. The situations seems tense and critical, however, when speaking of the North Korea issue, hostile declarations or increased media coverage could easily fuel false and periodical alarmism which amounts to nothing. This is an occurring tendency for years, that could very well prove to be case now as well. However, given the new, earlier-argued context, there are reasons to believe this situation is different.

Even from the earlier boiling point in March 2017:

  • China has moved thousands of troops on the border city of Dandong,
  • Russia has also closed its airspace in March, in southern Prymorskyie Oblast and around Vladivostok by moving S-300s in the area. Now, the Kremlin put their air defense infrastructure on high alert,
  • while the U.S. increased its naval presence in the water around South Korea and Japan, while also equipping its regional allies with THAAD and Patriot (PAC-3) missile defense systems. THAAD guards Seoul from the border while reports suggest that the Japanese owned PAC-3’s have been detached in Hiroshima, Shimane and Kochi, shielding Tokyo from a feared course change.

The two traditional U.S. allies are firmly against a preemptive campaign that has been rumored for the past months, since it would be impossible to stop all the small arms fire, rogue missile or rockets fired in Japan or South Korea. As James Mattis presented, such an options would imply a massive shelling of Seoul and the border area, that would cost thousands of allied lives. A war with North Korea is unwanted given the consequences and after effects it will produce, but it may become a reality, if theoretical, that is the next step after ‘Enhanced Pressure’ fails – if it does. Accordingly, a military campaign against North Korea’s nuclear program, which would be the best and more limited scenario, is more difficult than most think. Pyongyong’s key facilities are spread to all over the country and are protected by significant coastal early-warning systems (be they outdated and rudimentary) that could buy enough time for North Korea to do enough harm to its neighbors.

Therefore, an escalating path to to war has several potential weaknesses for American strategy: allied disapproval. Notably, South Korea could be so desperate in avoiding a war that it could accept to rollback U.S. presence in the peninsula, appeasing their northern neighbors and their interests. While appeasement is a proven strategy for failure and would actually fuel expansionist prospects, it may be an mirage-option for Seoul. Therefor Washington needs to play this card very close to the chest, striking a balance between deterring North Korea and not alarming the South.

L.E: Just one day after writing this assessment, President Moon Jae-In of South Korea issued a statement saying: ‘There will be no war repeated on the Korean Peninsula […] Military action against North Korea should be decided by ourselves and not by anyone else‘, further confirming our hypothesis that Seoul could block or temper US pressure on North Korea, if it considers that the situation reaches a critical boiling point.

Open in ‘view image’ for a larger picture.

Camouflaged Negotiations: Threats, Statements and Remarks

Transylvania Intelligence recommends that the recent bellicose rhetoric between the U.S. and North Korea is actually a prelude to negotiations and not to war. If in March, Rex Tillerson stated that there will be no negotiations for the nuclear weapons, now he expressed openness for dialogue with Pyongyang if its halts missile tests. North Korea responded by saying that nukes are off the negotiations table, the United States needs to leave the Korean peninsula. Both actors publicly presented their interests: U.S. wants to de-nuclearize the peninsula, North Korea wants the American presence there gone or reduced to a sterile level. Convergence is very little if none at all, the situation is too black and white to find a middle ground. And that is exactly why they are now leveraging each other. General Kim Rak Gyom, chief of the Strategic Forces of North Korea presented on live television the fly path of Hwasong-2 rockets that sees the bogeys crossing through Japanese airspace and landing in the waters of Guam, a Pacific territory that hosts a strategic U.S. base. It is obvious that no country would publish its ‘going-to-war’ moment before it does, especially when only 50% of ICBM tests have been successful. This is actually Pyongyang’s way of deterring the United States, showing that it now has leverage through striking capability, informing their counterparts that the stakes have changed and that they are not the only ones holding a joker card. While the overall sentiment is that Pyongyong is bluffing with its Guam threat.

L.E: The next day after writing this assessment, state news agency KNSA reported that Kim Jong-Un reviewed plans to fire a ICBM towards Guam but has now decided to post-pone the decision, awaiting Washington’s move. This also confirms our judgement that the Guam threat was a useful bluff for providing additional leverage in the negotiations.

As of now, the United States does not have enough assets in the Korean Peninsula to fight an all out war with North Korea, it does have, however, strategic bombers in place capable of conducting preemptive sorties, recon and sabotage ops. While there are still enough ways to build-up forces in South Korea and Japan capable of going unnoticed by the press or observers, there would still be several weeks needed for a march towards a conventional conflict that would involve the overthrow of a government, securing nukes, dog fights, naval warfare (including aircraft escorts, counter-submarine ops), neutralizing enemy forces and occupying the country through massive numbers of U.S. Army assets and personnel.

Anxious and nervous of the verbal war drums of the dispute, China and Russia have presented Tuesday a plan for de-escalating the tensions. They suggest that Pyongyang declare a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests while the United States and South Korea refrain from large-scale military exercises. This way, North Korea does not continue to enhance its nuclear and ICBM features while the United States would not conduct a build-up of forces in the South Korea under the disguise of military drills. There are enough reasons to doubt the reason and prospects of this proposal. For one, there is no guaranteeing body or force that could oversee a halt in North Korea’s nuclear program, nor is it feasible anymore, the nukes are produced, some ICBMs work, this is not an Iraqi or Iran situation where this late-stage can be prevented – what’s done it’s done. Chinese and Russian interests, although weakened and compromised by Kim Jung Un’s way of leading the country, still uplift the containment of Washington in Asia-Pacific as their utmost strategic aim.

Even though many argue that a fragile management of nuclear North Korea should be the option of choice, being the lesser evil of the other scarier methods, Transylvania Intelligence considers that the volatile, unprecedented nature of an ICBM-ready and nuke-rich North Korea is too unpredictable and hostile to sleep safely at night for decision makers at Washington. While I do not consider that the Kim regime is irrational or ‘crazy’, there is a precedent and history of rogue states going out of their way in face of enhanced pressure and anxiety in order to secure their survival.

However, America’s first options continues to be the diplomatic one, motioned by Rex Tillerson and Nikkey Halley that work around the clock behind the international stage’s curtain to negotiate a deal. A key would be bypassing Chinese mediation between the two and actually be able to establish a direct line of communication, something that Beijing might be opposed to, dully because that would cut China’s importance in the diplomatic dialogue and ignore it’s power-broker role in the region. And while diplomacy is in motion, Joint Chief of Staff General Joseph Dunford recently met with South Korean President in order to discuss military coordination and strategic issues in regards to this threat. It’s safe to assume, that contingency plans are planned and negotiated as never before, hence the after statement of ‘military action is our last resort’.

 

Contingency plans

If everything fails, then it’s better to attack now than later. Time is not on Washington’s side. Every missile test, every ICBM production or uranium enrichment means more nukes, better capabilities and an overall tougher North Korean defense posture.  And while China continues to re-assert itself as being the bridge between Pyongyang and the intentional community, the bilateral interaction with the U.S. is complex and ambivalent, crafted by other inputs as their competitive nature in international affairs, Asia-Pacific geopolitics, and some rare episodic convergences. Regardless of perception, the North Korea regime acts from a rational motivation: ready-to-launch nukes secure the continuity of the regime and therefor, deter outside attacks. Washington may now be opened for clear negotiations but this position is fragile. An over aggressive misstep from Pyongyang, as enforcing their Guam threat,  would put the Trump administration in a very though spot, prompting it to reinforce its red line. However, we should also bear in mind that preemptive action could actually be synonym to preventive war, there is not guarantee that targeted strikes on nuke sites would reduce a hypothetical conflict to just a limited campaign.

This is not a time for missteps and anxious moves. Another War in Korea would be the battle of a generation of Americans and a first when two nuclear powers engage in direct combat; the lack of historical precedent is enough to make anyone feel nervous, even if, pragmatically thinking, the option would be preferable now then later. The level of urgency has obviously spiked, and time should be judged as a resource for all strategic thinkers observing these events unfold.

 

 

 

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Showdown in Korea: The end of US strategic patience while envisioning a Chinese-approved regime change

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS – In order to comprehensively approach the North Korea problem, a glimpse into the past is needed. The Cold War that stretched from the immediate post-World War II…

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS – In order to comprehensively approach the North Korea problem, a glimpse into the past is needed. The Cold War that stretched from the immediate post-World War II period to the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall holds the origin and the inception of the North Korean problem. In contemporary times, the regime from Pyongyang through its pursuit of nuclear armament has become an international threat and a troubling issue for the Asia-Pacific security complex.  Moreover that the conventional capabilities of the North Korean Armed Forces are able to target and inflict devastating damage to South Korea and Japan – the major US allies in Asia and one of the leading nations in terms of economy and technology.  Yet the web dynamic goes further to China and Russia, the main backers of the Kim dynasty in the Korean peninsula, who have traditionally opposed though sanctions on the Communist state and are openly sustaining the country’s economy by a trade relation exclusively bounded into a geopolitical idea. And that’s precisely why the North Korean issue has remained unresolved, due to its geopolitical weight, deeply rooted in the second half of the 20th Century.

 

The Korean issue: origins and historical context

Following the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945, Korea was divided into two zones along the 38th parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union, with the north occupied by the Soviets and the south by the Americans. Moscow’s interest in extending its influence in the Asia-Pacific is well know, and as Nazi Germany fell in Europe, Stalin quickly shifted his attention on Imperial Japan, as promised even from the 1943 Tehran conference. There has been even a wide debate through academics of whether the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blast were also keen as leverage against Soviet interests towards Japan and the Pacific region, urging the American need to quickly crumble the government in Tokyo and initiate an US-oriented political regime. In August 1945 the Soviet Union engaged in a short but steadfast offensive against the Japanese, occupying Manchuria and carving a way towards the Korean peninsula. The northern half received after the surrender of Japan was an unexpected geopolitical win that has shifted the post-WW2 order in Asia-Pacific until this day.

However, it wasn’t the USSR who continued to back the state establish north of the 38th parallel, Democratic People’s Republic of Korean (DPRK) or North Korea, but China; another major Communist state that was aspiring towards regional hegemony, which would later bring the two “red states” competing against each other (Sino-Soviet Split). The geopolitical emergence of China began with the victory of the Communist guerillas led by Mao Zedong in 1949 taking over Beijing, and then continued to be amplified by the strategic mistake of Joseph Stalin. The Soviet dictator had a saying: “one’s power is as long as its army can go”, yet when the Korean War was about to being, and Kim Il-Sung requested permission to invade the South, Stalin initially refused. Swiftly was China grated the opportunity to act. Mao Zedong approved Kim Il-Sung’s aspiration and additionally promised to send troops to support his campaign. Later on, Stalin changed his position as well, realizing China’s gamble. Yet Stalin’s engagement in Korea was limited, by having only non-combatant military advisors on the ground, especially because he wanted to avoid confrontation with the United States, and therefore lost influence and power over the regime in Pyongyang. China on the other hand continued to capitalize on this weakness, or rather, strategic boundary that limited the USSR, sending thousands of ground troops in a combatant role to support the DPRK army in any way needed.

archive photo of US servicemen in Korea

The invasion initiated by North Korea led to the Korean War (1950–1953). After three years of fighting to repeal and defeat the DPRK invasion, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. In effect, there was only a ceasefire that followed, and no peace treaty; the hostilities continued at a lower intensity. Theoretically speaking the two countries are still in a state of war. Yet, China saw the potential in building a stead-rock regime in Pyongyang which would issue threats that Beijing couldn’t, which could directly threaten US interests as China wanted to publicly avoid. The Chinese have also developed a strong leverage over the North Korea government, involving trade, energy and technology. The isolated DPKR relies on Chinese imports to maintain its economy, on Chinese technology to keep its military capacity up –and-running and on Beijing to maintain a diplomatic shield over the Kim dynasty, outside as well as inside – against tempted generals to take power. Over the years and following China’s global engagement and strong trade relationship with the US, Beijing’s doctrine over North Korea remained the same, yet a rather unexpected situation occurred. Following Kim Il-Sun’s death in late 2011, his son, until then kept hidden from international eyes, has emerged to power.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un

 

Kim Jong-Un has boosted the government’s pursuit for nuclear weapons and has intensified its aggressiveness towards US strategic interests. The Nuclear bomb is perceived by the regime in Pyongyang as being an existential element of retaining the country’s sovereignty, capitalizing on the MAD theory (mutual assured destruction) that deterred the aggression of one nuclear nation over another throughout the Cold War. DPKR (North Korea) has managed to develop fully functional nuclear weapons, but it has starved its whole population in the process. However, the defensive capacity is strongly disputed given the frequent provocations against South Korea, Japan and the United States. Subsequently, the development and testing of long-range ballistic missiles makes the nuclear program as offensive as possible. The Taepeodong-2 and KN-08 (Rodong C) are capable of delivering a 1,000 kg neutron bomb as far as America’s western coast, posing a direct vital threat towards the homeland, in Hawaii or Pearl Harbor. Hwasong 5 and 6, tested and fully-functional are already capable of hitting targets in Japan and South Korea, where taking aside the civilian factor, are also US strategic bases.

As we can conclude, the North Korean problem has been growing harder to address, both because of the US strategic patience and due to China’s loss of grip over Kim Jung-Un. Both US President Donald J. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have agreed on this issue, and Kim Jung-Un has credible concerns in regards to it.

 

The Communist anomaly

The North Korean dictatorship is not only a Communist hellhole and a totalitarian state, but also the only country that did not completely de-Stalinize. They did not catch the cvasi-reform period that occurred in the Iron Curtain during the 50’s and 60’s, being quickly taken under China’s grip who had no interest in reforming, thereby weakening, a servile and obedient dynasty.

According to the CIA Factbook, DPRK’ has one of the world’s most centrally directed and least open economies, facing chronic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair, the agricultural sector is weak, due to collective farming practices, poor soil quality and lack of needed technology or fuel. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption.

The mid 1990s were marked by severe famine and widespread starvation. Significant food aid was provided by the international community through 2009. Since that time, food assistance has declined significantly. In the last few years, domestic corn and rice production has been somewhat better, although domestic production does not fully satisfy demand. A large portion of the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. In addition, few sustainable solutions have been undertaken, the country remaining fully underdeveloped, with a total political control over its affairs and isolated from transnational projects that would include the DPKR in an economical zone. In addition, the almost inexistent trade relation is overwhelmingly depended on China; up to 75% of exports goes to China, while the country imports come 76% from China and 5,5% from Congo.

 

The 25 million population, weakened and in deep poverty are subjected to an ideological and political repression that goes beyond the traditional personality cults found elsewhere on the globe, transcending to an almost messianic embodiment of defunct Kim Il-Sung, whom remains the Eternal Leader of the country. Given the monopolization of state power, even in a Communist state, Beijing has swiftly realized that Kim Jung-Un no longer fits its interest and also no longer abides by them. The government in Pyongyang has also developed awareness on the potential effects of its rogue behavior in regards to nuclear and ballistic developments. Consequently, Jung-Un began preparing for the worst from his enemies and “ex-friends”. He has initiated a purge within his family, party and armed forces, that began with 2012 and escalated in 2016 after he even restructured the party’s leadership positions. His uncle, brothers, sisters and officers were executed in a disclosed manner to send a message to both external threats but also internal silent opponents. In this way, he gradually but firmly declared war those who intend to depose him from this “rightfully” and hereditary throne. Both Washington and Beijing realized the scope of Kim’s paranoia and aggressive contingency actions, therefore plans were put in motion.  

 

The silent regime change plan

A hypothetical American-Chinese agreement foreseeing a regime change would need to satisfy the following needs:

  1. renounce the nuclear program and abandon pursuit for long-range intercontinental ballistic weapons;
  2. Liberalize the country, but
  3. Maintain Chinese influence in northern Korea in balance with the security concerns of US and its allies.

However, China was always skeptical, fearing to not make a bad deal, giving up a disobedient, yet anti-American regime in Pyongyang, for a liberalized, but possibly leaning-American one. Therefore, Beijing inclined for a half-measure: continue the dynasty but bring a different Kim in charge. That’s precisely why Kim has launched a purge over his relatives, to prevent such an action, being well aware that his relatives, as long as they’re alive will pose a perpetual threatening competition. Beijing was quick to punish the regime, and has already began imposing “masked” economic sanctions that are highly representative by yesterday’s episode, when the coal transports traditionally imported by China, where refused and turned back to North Korean.

Kim Jong-Nam, the dictator’s defunct step-brother

China’s favorite candidate for the throne in Pyongyang was Kim Jong Nam, the incumbent’s half-brother that lived overseas. As a consequence, he was publicly assassinated on February 13th 2017 by two DPRK Intelligence operatives at Kim’s order in Kuala Lumpur Airport, Malaysia. Lawmakers and intelligence officials from South Korea also acknowledge this fact. The kill-op has left Beijing without its top candidate for a regime change, an action that Kim hoped to continuously secure his place, which almost did. But the death of Kim Jong Nam also benefited the United States. Washington would prefer to completely terminate the dynasty, launch a de-Kimification process and install a general, supported by the DPKR Armed Forces to lead the liberalization of North Korea. From there on, Chinese ambitions could be curved and US interests inserted.

External-made regime changes have occurred in the past, but never in regards to a nuclear state, therefore, be advised, we are now on hypothetical territory. Such an undertaking would involve military pressure, sterile or active, political opportunity within the state and a strong international will go to all the way in forcing a nuclear nation into submission.

 

Military options: everything on the table

After 8 years of Obama’s strategic patience, which is a sedative for “doing nothing” we came to realize that the Kim dynasty will not give up their nukes on their own, and that throughout this time, DPRK’s offensive capacity has become much greater. The United States has tried diplomacy and then coercion; the very limited non-military options have gradually proven their sterility. It has now hit a critical level. North Korea has a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons and the means to transport them to their target; imminently , now in testing, the ICBM’s will also be able to hit the US coast. Furthermore, an additional fear is that of a “nuclear domino”. That the day DPRK has the capability to hit the US with their own ICBM, Iran will also have it for the right price. It will sharply and dramatically curb and degrade the United States, exposing it further to threats and facilitating a nuclear multi-polar world – a type of international order proven throughout history as being the most unstable and war-leaning. In that moment, the end of the American century will commence. The threat of North Korea cannot be postponed again.

The regular US military drills in cooperation with South Korea and Japan, as well as the permanent military installations on the territory of the mentioned states, do provide the Pentagon with actionable resources to commence any political decision to be translated into military effort. Furthermore that the pivot in Asia-Pacific began late by the Obama administration does provide for an increased US presence in the region. The strong-act put up by Donald J. Trump during Xi Jinping’s visit at Mar-a-Lago, bombing the Syrian regime while casually enjoying a desert, spoke volumes to Chinese, Russians and North Koreans. It suggested that the current US President will not act publicly in regards to America’s strategic intentions, and will hold a high degree of unpredictability in regards to foreign and defense policy. This alarmed President Xi, forecasting that the US might even act alone, if he’s not on board, which could have devastating consequences for Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula. In the end, this has facilitated a common position from the two countries on the North Korean issue, and the above-mentioned regime change deal in principal.

The USS Carl Vinson escorted by a destroyer

The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier is already in Korean waters, hosting dozens of airplanes including F-22’s and F-18’s. Strategic bombers, including stealth planes, are stationed in the Guam airbase, staged just 3,400 km from North Korea – a distance that can be easily traversed by the B-2. Capable to travel up to 19,000 km with just one air refuel, and costumed to bomb from a tall-altitude such as 15 km, the B-2 Stealth bomber is America’s favorite nuke-to-go plane. It can virtually enter denied airspace and successfully neutralize an enemy’s strategic assets, such as ballistic missile silos that would conceal the enemy’s offensive strength, nuke and ballistic missiles. The MOAB (“Mother of All Bombs”, firstly used in combat just yesterday against the “islamic state” insurgents in Narnarghal province, Afghanistan, is the biggest non-nuclear ordnance that the Pentagon has at its disposal. This strike destroyed an underground tunnel infrastructure was also fired in retaliation for the killing of a Green Berate. In addition, the MOAB is also the preferred weapon to destroy bunkers and underground silos; the same that an enemy would also use to store ballistic assets. Surely that the strike speaks volumes in Pyongyang; it echoes as a war-cry surely perceived overseas.  The WC-135, also called the “Nuclear Sniffer” has been detached in Okinawa airbase since April 13th. This is a special-purpose aircraft capable of collecting samples from the atmosphere with the purpose of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. Dozens of fixed wing F-18’s also stand on guard in America’s largest military installation throughout Asia-Pacific, the Kadena Airbase in Okinawa, Japan. They are ready to swiftly react and generate air combat in case one of its assets monitoring North Korea will be attacked.

[We have the footage from the MOAB strike in Afghanistan]

In the case of a hypothetical yet possible military option from the US against the Kim regime, preemptive action is vital for the safety of America’s allies. If not, nukes can fly all over the region, targeting Tokyo, Seoul or US ships. However, the Pentagon has placed a THAAD in South Korea, a United States Army anti-ballistic missile system which is designed to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase using a hit-to-kill approach. It is a state-of-the art piece of military hardware, which should protect allied airspace without many concerns as the DPRK does not hold the capacity to launch a saturation strike, firmly because their nuke stockpile as their ballistic transporters are in a limited number, most of them with questionable functionality.

F-18 Hornet taking off

The US should have the first strike initiative, bombing the nuclear silos using strategic stealth bombers, crippling their capacity to threaten allied nations. This would destroy Kim’s nuclear leverage and supposedly alter his decision-making. In effect, negotiations should be expected from China’s behalf, trying to convince Kim to either abide or leave. Yet, the decades long indoctrination and properness for war makes the conflict hypothesis moderately-likely. US operations should continue.

Cruise missiles, the fan-favorite Tomahawk, should be the first and foremost assets used before any conventional air campaign would be launched, purposely to avoid putting US pilots and assets in harm’s way by operating in an armed hostile airspace. Tomahawks should level the anti-air defense system, notably the coastal infrastructure which would provide a great operational flexibility for starters. Successively, the cruise strikes should dig deeper and deeper in DPRK territory to eradicate the rest of anti-air weapons, so that US jets can swiftly take flight and impose a no-fly zone, which would again degrade any offensive capacity from the DPRK. Any North Korean aircraft taking off or in-flight will be grounded, with the possibility to conduct strike missions on major airfields for preemptive reasons.   

However, such an undertaking could take days, if not weeks, a time in which China’s supposed leverage, which would involve ground troops, should pressure Kim by moving towards the border bringing him at the negotiations table – yet, that is NOT the only way of going around.

The B-2 stealth bomber

Ideally for the US would be that following the B-2 preemptive strike, or the cruise & air campaign, elements within the military leadership would realize the consequences of this action and the imminent annihilation of the North Korean state if Kim is no stopped would step-in and topple the government. Realistically, this could have several following scenarios, stretching form a successfully coupe d’état, to a civil war fought between loyalists and revolutionaries, that could manifest as a conventional confrontation or an insurgency turned into a proxy war. In this case, the Chinese alignment could alter, forcing it to support the loyalists and not the revolutionaries which would clearly be mainly US backed. Keeping the unity of the state and political structure is pivotally important for achieving a stable post-conflict resolution both for US interests and regional security.

Given the racially homogeneously and confessional uniformed nature of the population, the socio-cultural factor would not play a major part in the post-conflict resolution, as it would be the case of a Middle Eastern country. However it is imperative to have as little as power vacuum in country as possible – this is a dangerous uncertainty in any regime change case. Traditionally in communist dictatorships and not only, the armed forces play a major role in the post-liberation phase. Subsequently, it is imperative to have a ready replacement to assume office while retaining as much of the political establishment and military loyalty with it.

 

The boiling point: The “Day of the Sun” or “Diua de la Muertes”?

Saturday April 15th is the biggest celebration in DPRK, the “Day of the Sun” or Kim Il-Sung’s birthday. A grand military parade traditionally takes place in Pyongyang, which this time can be camouflaged march to war; consequently, a show of strength is also being featured by launching ballistic tests. In contrast to previous celebration, this year an unwelcomed guest resides in the Korean water, which is the US strike group composed by the USS Carl Vinson and several Tomahwak “open carrying” destroyers. The US administration has threatened to bring down any ballistic missile fired, suggesting a firm “red line”. The problem with the “red line”, as envisioned by retired-General Stanley McChrystal is that if you’re not prepared to enforce it, you lose credibility both from your enemies and your friends. The Trump administration is surrounded by strategic geniuses as NS Advisor MacMaster and Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, we should not expect empty threats. Will the DPKR call the bluff an issue a ballistic test?

In addition, the “38 North” intelligence analysis center has published a report widely presented by news outlets, as showing heavy military activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear testing center. This facility was built with an underground storage capable of withstanding nuclear blast. This suggests that the DPKR is locked and loaded to launch a nuclear test; enough to defy the international pressure and afferent military threats, but also sufficient to show strength on a symbolic date and tense context. If US and China fail to respond to a nuclear test, then the carefully build-up power in this episode will slowly deconstruct and fade. However, there is no precedent for nuke testing on the “Day of the Sun”, which should serve as an secondary input, yet it is recommended to watch out for the mushroom cloud; even if conducted underground, a nuclear test will still cross the “red line”.

However, Vice-President Mike Pence is expected to conduct a visit on Sunday in Seoul. There are several factors why this potentially is an altering input. First of all, a top level visit will not be conducted if the administration expects that a possible military even will occur, regardless of being a limited campaign or a war. Secondly, there are rumors of a significant South Korean opposition towards a military option against North Korea, given their close proximity, Seoul has major concerns. Mike Pence’s visit could be costumed to address those issues. Also, the VP visit could be canceled if a military action is eventually needed or commenced, which leads us also to another possible outcome: peace and de-tension.

There is also unconfirmed intelligence that Russia has moved anti-air defense systems in Vladivostok [source] and that an “endless” convoy of Chinese infantry armored vehicles are heading towards the DPRK border. [Source] The footage is from March and the movements have been geolocated as having place around the Chinese border with North Korea, more exactly, near the town of Dandong.

 

 

Addressing the “Black Swan” in the room

The hypothesis of “hot air” is as strongly as the other ones, but it can be highly unlikely due to the current context. Evidently, the military build-up and the tense political climate could blow off and retain the status quo, yet the current political climate and the tense military build-up is nothing comparable to past situations: not even to 2013, when DPKR attacked a South Korean island. Regional allies are under a constant vital threat, as time passes Kim’s ballistic capabilities will only improve whereas his nuclear cache will also enlarge. The situation is not funny anymore, DPRK is closer than never to become a real offensive threat to the US homeland. Not to say that these continuously fueled tensions are endangering one of the most emerging strategic vectors: Asia-Pacific. The strategic patience has outgrown, it’s not an option anymore, widely given the imminent threat posed by DPKR’s ballistic program that potentially, in two or three years could reach California. Letting an open-hostile regime develop nukes and then acquiring the means to transport them to your turf is a slow but steady suicide on watch. Recent history is not kind to US plans to pacifying North Korea, neither George Bush nor Barrack Obama were capable of solving the issue, it’s also possible that Trump won’t manage as well, yet his approach is uniquely different which can pull out a surprise.

The historic Chinese shift towards an anti-Kim position is also a strong input for a showdown notably given Trump’s openness to unilateral action, in accordance to the widely-misunderstood strategic doctrine, labeled by the press as being isolationist, but actually potentially quite neoconservative: “America First”. However, there is always a persistent uncertainty coming off these uneasy alliances, as is this case with China. It is not impossible for the Chinese to completely change their policy and return as the protectors of North Korea, outmaneuvering the US; it dependents on how things evolve behind close doors. We can only assume that there are multiple ways of negotiating between Pyongyang and Beijing, an advantage that the US does not posses. The situation is dynamic and fast-shifting, new circumstances and signals appear on a daily basses, the tone changes in regards to what’s discussed behind close doors. Still, a Chinese betrayal is moderately-unlikely at this moment and would in the best case only stall, but not stop, firm actions against Pyongyang.

 

America First, a conclusive factor

America First has the remarkable preeminence of reflecting a contemporary and publicly assumed realistic doctrine that holds similarities to the neoclassic interpretation of raison d’etat; likewise blended with the preemptive post 9/11 engagement and with Barry Goldwater’s “Peace through Strength”, also applied by President Ronald Reagan.

The settlement of the North Korean issue is critically needed, whether this real and actionable opportunity does come to practice is still bounded in the hypothetical realm; negotiations and discussions are still ongoing behind closed doors while plans are outlined, weapons are armed and diplomats are on the watch, the Asia-Pacific concert headlined by Trump and Xi Jinping is still yet to debut. The ball is in Kim’s court.

 

 

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