Russia has failed to break through Ukrainian defenses in Kiyv and Kharkiv, despite successive airborne and armored assaults backed by artillery, since 24 February 2022. The Ukrainian military has significantly…
Russia has failed to break through Ukrainian defenses in Kiyv and Kharkiv, despite successive airborne and armored assaults backed by artillery, since 24 February 2022. The Ukrainian military has significantly decelerated Russia’s offensive and brought it to a near standstill on most fronts. What Vladimir Putin expected to be a blitz is turning into a slow grind for the Russian military. Ukraine’s defenses prove robust, and the military’s willingness to fight is unshattered.
Military aid from NATO will provide much-needed replenishment for anti-tank, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles ahead of a likely beefed-up Russian assault.
Russia will likely also escalate violence, relax the rules of engagement, and increase the use of heavy artillery like thermobaric munition, cluster submunition, and ultimately, ballistic missiles. The objective will be to break the Ukrainian military’s and population’s will to resist.
#UPDATE Map of Ukraine locating areas where explosions, strikes and fighting have been reported and under Russian control.
Updated as of 0900 GMT #AFPgraphics @AFP pic.twitter.com/ks3YdEclst
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) February 27, 2022
FOUR DAYS OF WAR, ONE FAILED BLITZ
1. The past 100 hours have shown that Russia’s campaign has been governed by overconfidence that Russian forces would move fast and seize key objectives, including Kiyv, and a severe underestimation of the Ukrainian military’s ability and will to fight. Moscow’s buoyancy racked up a hefty bill, which includes thousands of Russian soldiers killed in action and loss of military hardware such as aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles. Grave symptoms of Russia’s misguided optimism are:
INABILITY TO ACCEPT FIERCE UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE
2. Russia’s biggest miscalculation was to doubt Ukraine’s ability and willingness to fight. Russian commanders have likely forecasted an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian military or a chain-surrendering of the units posted on the frontline, similar to Crimea in 2014, facilitating a quick advance on Kiyv. Besieging Kiyv, forcing the Zelensky administration out of office (even through assassination), and installing a pro-Russian government is undoubtedly the main objective of the Russian invasion.
3. Most Russian war plans seem to have been based on the assumption of weak resistance, which led to poor logistical planning, a “restrained” offensive counter-air (OCA), incomplete suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), the inability to establish complete air superiority, and ultimately, failure to reach key objectives.
FAILURE TO SEIZE KIYV AND MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS
4. Four days into the invasion, Russia has not managed to seize and control any of Ukraine’s major population centers, including Kiyv.
KIYV: Ukrainian forces have heroically repelled multiple Russian charges on Kiyv. The Ukrainians fought off at least three major airborne assaults (two on Hostomel airfield, which was ultimately captured, and one on Vasylkiv airbase) and three to five mechanized and/or motorized operations. Russia’s assaults on Kiyv have exclusively come from the northwest as Russian troops have failed to surround the capital thus far. Ukraine’s victories resulted in tactical defeats and massive casualties for Russia’s tip-of-the-spear units, the special operations forces (SOFs), and airborne assault troopers.
NLAW seen during a firefight. Insane video filmed reportedly on the outskirts of Ivankov. pic.twitter.com/a0mtrFPzhT
— C O U P S U R E (@COUPSURE) February 26, 2022
Ukraine has also managed to hit deep beyond Russian lines, including with a Bayraktar TB2 and anti-tank ambushes.
Байрактари в роботі. Наші оператори ювелірно криють колони ворожих військ. Знищено російський БУК в районі Малина Житомирської області.
Бійтеся, вороги! Не буде вам спокою на нашій землі!https://t.co/P5fCPeWTB8 pic.twitter.com/dH2UEUbKST
— ВОЇНИ УКРАЇНИ🇺🇦 (@ArmedForcesUkr) February 27, 2022
CHERNIHIV: Despite several attempts, Russia did not manage to break through Ukrainian defenses at Chernihiv.
KHARKIV: Despite several attempts to encircle Ukraine’s second latest city, Russian forces have failed to besiege or establish a foothold in Kharkiv. Ukrainian defenses repelled all attacks and resisted multiple artillery strikes from across the border. The 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), Russia’s most capable armored formation, is spearheading the Kharkiv operation.
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) February 27, 2022
The failed “thunder run” towards downtown Kharkiv by Russian light infantry on 27 February showcased a lack of imagination and quick solutions for breaking Ukraine’s local defenses.
KHERSON: Russian forces were unable to fully control and hold Kherson despite a small incursion.
RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY
5. Russia has failed to establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. Multiple social media videos from the past days have shown Ukrainian Su-25 attack aircraft, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets, and Mi-24 utility helicopters engaged in operations against Russian forces. The Ukrainian Armed Forces recently released footage showing three separate strikes on Russian positions using Bayraktar TB-2 combat drones. News that NATO (likely Poland) has resupplied Ukraine with air-to-air missiles indicates that more Ukrainian fighter aircraft survived Russia’s pre-assault Offensive Counter Air (OCA) strike.
Insufficient OCA: While we are still reviewing satellite imagery, our preliminary assessment is that the vast majority of Ukrainian Air Force (UkAF) bases are still operational. As most runways are intact, flight operations can take place.
Craters and impact points are only visible on tarmacs, indicating that Russia’s missile strikes have damaged and disabled some aircraft. The strikes also destroyed fuel and ammunition storage facilities in annex sites.
Satellite imagery courtesy of @planet indicates at least three impacts at Mykolaiv air base #Ukraine 🇺🇦 https://t.co/CupJM0XU1C pic.twitter.com/vC0Dt6OQZN
— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) February 24, 2022
Satellite imagery reveals damage to Chuhuiv air base #Ukraine 🇺🇦 (49.836, 36.645)
📷: @Maxar pic.twitter.com/mWUVlKCw8W
— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) February 24, 2022
Russia likely planned this outcome. As many analysts have pointed out, Russia probably expected to seize the airfields and use them immediately. Instead of destroying the runways, Russia preferred to render the UkAF fighter jets ineffective by leaving them without fuel and ammunition.
Nevertheless, this “restrained” OCA has boomeranged on the advancing forces who continue to face aerial bombardments from Ukrainian attack aircraft, helicopters, and drones.
Unsuccessful Suppression of Air Defenses: Amid continued reports of Ukrainian air defense activity, including the S-300 and Buk-M1, it is highly likely that Russia did not manage to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s defenses completely. These systems are highly mobile. Ukraine probably moved some systems to hideouts to survive “the first day of war.” It is also likely that Ukraine baited Russian missiles with dummy targets, even radar-emission-rich, to improve the survivability of its air defenses.
POOR LOGISTICAL PLANNING
6. Another key symptom of Russia’s overconfidence is the derelict logistical situation of its troops in Ukraine. There are reports that Russian soldiers lack fuel and food and therefore have to source resources locally. This does not come as a surprise, as the Ukrainian military has scored big hits on Russian supply lines, destroying scores of fuel trucks and utility vehicles lagging behind assault troops. In “blitz” offensives, the infantry pushes forward towards the objective, leaving the logistical units behind in a highly vulnerable position. If the logistical support units are destroyed, the assault becomes unsustainable despite significant territorial gains of the advancing force.
One iconic video shows a conversation between the crew of a stranded Russian armored personnel carrier that ran out of fuel and a Ukrainian citizen.
A priceless exchange of a brave Ukrainian citizen with Russian army stuck out of fuel. ENGLISH SUBTITLES.
[Thanks to my Ukrainian friend for transcription and translation] pic.twitter.com/Rar3WRXEwD
— Ali 🇺🇦🕊 (@aliostad) February 26, 2022
Another video shows Russian soldiers looting a convenience store in Kharkiv.
Video: Russian marauders robbing shops in Kharkiv pic.twitter.com/sqan6jgyni
— Liveuamap (@Liveuamap) February 27, 2022
Expecting a “blitz” offensive with a quick victory, Russian commanders possibly ignored the need to ensure a steady stream of supplies.
FRUSTRATION & ESCALATION: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR
NORTH-EAST AXIS OF ATTACK COULD SPELL DOOM FOR KIYV
7. A Russian breakthrough on the Chernihiv-Hulkhiv-Sumy frontline could mark the beginning of the end for Kiyv. If these forces are freed up and reach the capital, the Russian military could surround Kiyv. Thus far, the Ukrainian army has managed to keep the Russian advance from southeastern Belarus, Yelnya and Kursk, in check. However, this is an area of operations that require close attention
AVOID CITIES, RACE FOR KIYV
8. There are reports that Russian forces have been ordered to bypass regional cities and race towards Kiyv. A rush for Kiyv would leave the flanks and rear of the Russian columns extremely exposed to Ukrainian attacks, but the pay-off would be huge. A multi-axis convergence on the capital would very likely break the capital’s defenses. The presence of Russian troops beyond cities that they have not captured, such as Chernihiv and Kharkiv, are clear indicators of a rush for Kiyv.
#Ukraine: A Russian convoy consisting of a T-72B3 tank, an Osa-AKM SAM system and logistics trucks were ambushed today in Sribne, #Chernihiv. pic.twitter.com/HZzb8xrohb
— 🇺🇦 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) February 27, 2022
COUNTER-LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN WESTERN UKRAINE
9. Stopping the flow of ATGMs and MANPADs from NATO to Ukraine will become a priority for the Russian military in the coming days. Small teams of Russian Special Operations Forces (SOFs) will likely infiltrate to interdict Ukraine’s supply lines from Poland. They will recon Ukraine’s supply routes and storage and distribution hubs and pass on intelligence for air or artillery strikes. Russian SOFs could also provide terminal guidance for RuAF strikes, especially in the case of precision-guided munitions. It is also possible that Russian SOFs could take matters into their own hands and seek to destroy munition transports.
Renewed Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s western airfields, or even attempts to shoot down cargo jets are likely also on the table, as a way to disrupt Ukraine’s logistical connection with NATO.
TROOP & VIOLENCE ESCALATION
10. As Russia becomes frustrated with the Ukrainian resistance, it will likely ease rules of engagements (ROE) and phase in more heavy artillery strikes on populated centers. In such a calculus, we would see widespread use of ballistic missiles (BMs), including the Iskander systems, which have been forward-positioned along Ukraine’s borders for weeks. Mounting evidence suggests that Russia has already launched BMs from Belarus, some of them impacting Zhytomyr airfield and Chernihiv.
More Iskander launches recorded from Mozyr https://t.co/QqZMqjZ0Pz pic.twitter.com/oDCCLyq9h3 via @zloy_odessit
— Liveuamap (@Liveuamap) February 27, 2022
Earlier today, a missile strike destroyed the historic cinema building – classified as an architectural monument – in Chernihiv, northeastern #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/g0cmTw6ZxF
— Michael A. Horowitz (@michaelh992) February 27, 2022
11. Russia will likely allocate more forces to the offensive. Currently, only 50 to 70 percent of the troops amassed around Ukraine are engaged in the offensive. As more Russian troops from staging grounds in southern Belarus, Yelnya, Kursk, Voronezh-Belgorod, and Crimea cross the border, Russia will need to rebuild its reserve force. An indicator of this will come in the form of eyewitness videos from Russia showing new troop movements or mobilizations, as we have recently seen with the Chechens. A higher troop count (over 200,000 soldiers) combined with overwhelming artillery and missile strikes is likely Putin’s ultimate bet to break Ukraine’s will to fight.
editing by Gecko